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Federal Financial Institutions Legislative and Regulatory Reporter – June 2026

Fri, 14 Aug 2026 00:00:00 Z

The Reporter provides a monthly summary of Canadian federal legislative and regulatory developments of relevance to federally regulated financial institutions. It does not address Canadian provincial financial services legislative and regulatory developments. In addition, purely technical and administrative changes (such as changes to reporting forms) are not covered.

June 2026

Published	Title and Brief Summary	Status (if applicable)
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)
June 25, 2026	Streamlined Approvals Framework for Targeted New Entrants OSFI has launched a streamlined approvals framework for targeted new entrants. It is intended to give eligible new entrants, including entities with innovative or emerging banking models and credit unions, a quicker, clearer, and more predictable path to becoming federally regulated financial institutions. The new framework would move applicants through three phases, from an early readiness assessment to ministerial approval and commencement of operations. Each phase has a defined timeline. A public dashboard will show application status throughout the approval process. OSFI has provided eligibility criteria for targeted new entrants, overviews of the application process and application assessment process, and an application toolkit of required documents, guides and forms.
June 19, 2026	OSFI Lowers Domestic Stability Buffer to 3.0 per cent so Canada's Largest Banks Can Deploy More Capital OSFI has announced that it is lowering the Domestic Stability Buffer (DSB) to 3.0% from 3.5% of total risk-weighted assets. This is the first change in the DSB level since June 2023. In addition, OSFI is lowering the range of the DSB to 0 to 3% from 0 to 4%. OSFI expects all domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) to target a Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of at least 11.0% of total risk-weighted assets. In addition, OSFI is lowering the range of the DSB to 0% to 3% from 0% to 4%. OSFI provides additional background information on the decision in a Decision Summary Note.	DSB took effect June 19, 2026.
June 4, 2026	Modernizing How We Collect Data From Institutions OSFI’s Data Collection Modernization initiative, which runs from May 2023 to April 2028, is intended to modernize its regulatory data collection technology platform, and to advance prioritized data initiatives and enhance data quality. Its new platform, called Regulatory Data Hub (RDH), will go live late in the fall of 2026, and will be implemented in phases until spring 2028. As part of its industry engagement initiative, OSFI is launching a Basel Capital Adequacy Reporting (BCAR) Working Group in September 2026; it is soliciting participation from stakeholders in banks and loan and trust companies.	Stakeholders interested in participating in BCAR Working Group should register by August 14, 2026.
Bank of Canada
June 29, 2026	Reminder: PSP Reporting Obligations Under the RPAA The Bank of Canada has issued a communication to remind all payment service providers (PSPs) registered under the Retail Payment Activities Act (RPAA) of their ongoing reporting obligations. Responsibilities are listed under the following headings, with links to relevant policies and guidance: Incident reporting: PSPs must report any incident they become aware of that has a material impact on an end user, a payment service provider or a clearing house of a clearing and settlement system. Significant change or new activity reports: PSPs are required to notify the Bank of any significant change to their operations if the change could reasonably be expected to have a material impact on operational risks or the manner in which end-user funds are safeguarded, or before performing a new retail payment activity. Notification is required at least 5 business days before the change is made. Reporting changes to registration information: PSPs must inform the Bank whenever there is a change, or anticipated change, to certain information the PSP provided during the registration process. Acquisitions of control and prescribed changes: PSPs are required to submit a new application for registration, and become re-registered under that new application, before making certain changes to their organizational structure. Annual reports: PSPs must submit an annual report to the Bank by March 31 of the year following the calendar year being reported on (reporting year).
June 29, 2026	Reporting Changes to Registration Information Under the Retail Payment Activities Act (RPAA) and the Retail Payment Activities Regulations (RPAR), registered payment service providers (PSPs) must inform the Bank when there are changes or anticipated changes to certain information that the PSP provided during the registration process. The timing requirements for informing the Bank of these changes vary depending on the nature of the information. The Bank of Canada has issued an updated supervisory policy explaining how they expect registered PSPs to comply with requirements to provide updated registration information.
June 12, 2026	Bank of Canada to begin publishing Notices of Violation by Payment Service Providers The Bank of Canada has announced that it will soon start publishing Notices of Violation related to Payment Service Providers (PSPs) that are subject to the Retail Payment Activities Act (RPAA) and the associated Retail Payment Activities Regulations. After a PSP has received a Notice of Violation, and once the period for making representations has expired, the notice will be published on the Enforcement decisions section of the Bank’s website. The enforcement decision will provide some details on the nature of the violation, as well as the amount of any administrative monetary penalty. The violation will also be noted on the PSP’s entry on the Bank of Canada’s Registry of PSPs.
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)
June 23, 2026	FINTRAC Guidance Related to the Ministerial Directive on Financial Transactions Associated With the Islamic Republic of Iran This guidance explains the requirements of the Ministerial Directive on Financial Transactions Associated with the Islamic Republic of Iran. This Ministerial Directive includes requirements that: Enhance existing obligations of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations; and Extend the obligations of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations. In section 3.3, “Additional measures required,” the following requirement has been added: Assess the client information to determine whether you have property in your possession or control that is owned or controlled by or on behalf of a listed person or entity, for which you are required to make a disclosure to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and report a Listed Person or Entity Property Report to FINTRAC. Information about Casino Disbursement Reports, which must be used after December 26, 2026, has been updated, and specific deadlines for reporting virtual currency transactions and casino disbursements have been added to the guidance.	Casino Disbursement Reports must be used after December 26, 2026.
June 22, 2026	Private-to-Private Information Sharing (Updated) This guidance explains the requirements for reporting entities that voluntarily choose to engage in private-to-private information sharing the exchange of personal information without an individual’s knowledge or consent between reporting entities that participate in an approved code of practice) under section 11.01 of the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act. The guidance has been updated with the addition of a new section 7, entitled “What FINTRAC Expects from Participants in an Approved Code of Practice.”
Payments Canada
June 22, 2026	PRD-002 -Procedures for foreign currency transfers within Canada This procedure, part of the rules for Lynx, provides that members within Canada shall provide Swift transfer of U.S. funds and foreign currencies to other members within Canada in accordance with the procedures detailed in the following sections if the account of the beneficiary is domiciled in Canada. “Members” refers to both Canadian banks and non-bank financial institutions acting on their own behalf or on behalf of their foreign branches, affiliates and/or subsidiaries. A current list of members can be found in Appendix I. Members may request that all USD or foreign currency items be settled via Swift.
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
June 2, 2026	Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Risk Management: Range of Practices Information and Communications Technology (ICT) is a key component of operational risk management, playing a vital role in supporting the broader goal of achieving operational resilience. Banks’ operational resilience to ICT incidents has become increasingly important in an evolving and digitalised technology landscape. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has analyzed ICT risk management practices across jurisdictions to address non-malicious ICT incidents. This report is part of an effort to strengthen banks' operational resilience to information and communication technology (ICT) incidents in an increasingly digitalised world; it complements the Committee’s 2018 report on cyber resilience. The Committee will continue to monitor developments related to the digitalisation of finance and financial technology from a prudential perspective.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
June 23, 2026	International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations The FATF Recommendations set out a comprehensive and consistent framework of measures which countries should implement in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Countries have diverse legal, administrative and operational frameworks, and different financial systems, and so cannot all take identical measures to counter these threats. New amendments include changes to Recommendation 6, which requires countries to implement targeted financial sanctions to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist financing. The updated Standards will require countries to comply with the humanitarian exemption contained in UNSCRs 2664 and 2761, as well as 2615. The updated Standards are intended to ensure that sanctions measures do not block the flow of funds, assets, resources, goods, and services necessary for humanitarian assistance and basic human needs in line with the UN framework.	This version is as amended June 2026.
June 23, 2026	FATF Launches Public Consultation on Guidance to Increase Payment Transparency FATF is inviting the views of stakeholders on new guidance to support the implementation of strengthened FATF Standards on payment transparency when they come into effect. The revisions to FATF’s Recommendation 16, agreed upon in June 2025, are intended to keep pace with changes in the payment landscape, and strengthen the safety and security of the international payment system by increasing the transparency of information that accompanies cross-border payments and requiring the introduction of tools to protect against fraud and error. All countries around the world are expected to be ready to implement the changes by the end of 2030. The FATF is soliciting feedback from stakeholders, including financial institutions worldwide with different business models and capacity, payment system operators, civil society and the research community. It has provided as support a Public Consultation Explanatory Memorandum and a copy of Draft R16. Guidance for consultation.	Comments are due August 21, 2026.
June 2026	2022 Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT/CPF Systems The FATF assesses each member’s implementation of the FATF Recommendations and its actions to tackle money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on an ongoing basis. The Methodology for Assessing Technical Compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT/CPF Systems (The FATF Methodology in short) sets out the process by which the FATF assesses each member’s implementation of the FATF Recommendations and its actions to tackle money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on an ongoing basis. The FATF Methodology focuses on two distinct areas: Effectiveness: each assessment will have a significant focus on effectiveness, to ensure that countries are implementing and making use of the laws, regulations and policies that are being passed. Technical compliance: each assessment also looks at whether a country has all the necessary laws, regulations and legal instruments in place, in line with the technical requirements of the 40 FATF Recommendations. The FATF commenced its 5th round of evaluations under this methodology in 2024, and FATF-Style Regional Bodies will also progressively use this methodology once they complete their previous round of evaluations.	This version is as amended June 2026.
Financial Stability Board (FSB)
June 10, 2026	Sound Practices for Responsible Adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI): Consultation Report This consultation report highlights the benefits and risks associated with AI use in the financial system. To facilitate responsible AI adoption by financial institutions, it proposes 12 sound practices that financial institutions could apply in their organisation-wide AI governance and management of the relevant stages of AI development and deployment (AI lifecycle). It draws upon case studies drawn from real-world AI implementation practices by financial institutions. FSB is soliciting comments on the consultation report and a set of questions.	Comments were due July 22, 2026.
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)
June 23, 2026	Technical note – Credit Rating Agencies and ICS Rating Category Mapping This technical note clarifies the Insurance Capital Standard (ICS) Rating Categories (RC) Mapping for the Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) listed in Table 1, which originated during the monitoring period and was retained at ICS adoption for practical reasons. It also outlines the pathways under the ICS to recognize ratings from other CRAs.
June 17, 2026	FSI and IAIS Publish Joint Insights Note on the Cyber Insurance Market Financial Stability Institute (FSI) and IAIS have jointly published a note on the cyber insurance market, entitled FSI Insights on policy implementation No 75: Cyber insurance unpacked: the corporate digital safety net. Based on desktop reviews and interviews with supervisors, insurers, reinsurers, brokers and other market participants, this note takes stock of the evolving cyber insurance landscape. In particular, it examines cyber insurance product coverage, pricing and underwriting practices, and explores the insurance protection gap. The note also highlights key considerations for supporting the sound and sustainable development of cyber insurance.
Legislation
June 27, 2026	[Proposed] Regulations Amending the Financial Consumer Protection Framework Regulations The Budget Implementation Act, 2025, No. 1, introduced amendments to the Bank Act to combat consumer-targeted fraud. Once the relevant legislative amendments are in force, these amendments will require banks to have policies and procedures to address consumer-targeted fraud, allow consumers to adjust maximum transaction amounts, obtain express consent to enable certain prescribed account capabilities, allow consumers to disable certain account features, and require banks to collect and report prescribed fraud data to the Commissioner of the FCAC. These proposed regulations would provide more specificity to support these legislative amendments, such as prescribing additional policies and procedures banks would need to have, the account capabilities that banks must allow consumers to enable and disable, how banks must obtain express consent before enabling these capabilities, when banks must enable transaction limit increases requested by consumers, and the specific data points banks will need to collect and report to the FCAC with respect to consumer-targeted fraud. The intention is for the consumer-targeted fraud legislative amendments to come into force on the same day as the proposed Regulations.	Closes for comments July 27, 2026.
June 27, 2026	[Proposed] Consumer-Driven Banking Regulations The Consumer-Driven Banking Act (the Act), which received royal assent in March 2026, and the proposed Consumer-Driven Banking Regulations (the proposed Regulations), introduces a secure framework overseen by the Bank of Canada that enables Canadian individuals and businesses to share their financial data with accredited service providers of their choice. The proposed Regulations include requirements related to accreditation, security, national security, authentication and consent, reporting, record keeping, framework transparency, technical standards, assessments, and violations. The proposed Regulations also include the timelines and information requirements to support the national security review process related to the Minister of Finance’s national security authorities under the Act.	Closes for comments August 26, 2026.
June 18, 2026	Spring Economic Update 2026 Implementation Act, S.C. 2026, c. 22 (Bill C-30) Among its provisions to implement the 2026 Spring Economic Update, the following measures of Bill C-30 affect federally regulated financial institutions: Division 1 of Part 3 amends the Bank Act to provide that the Investment Canada Act does not apply in respect of certain transactions made by foreign banks or entities associated with a foreign bank if the transactions are subject to an approval under the Bank Act, the Trust and Loan Companies Act or the Insurance Companies Act. Division 2 of Part 3 amends the Bank of Canada Act to combine into a single act the Bank of Canada’s powers, duties and functions related to the recovery of costs incurred by it for or in connection with the administration of certain acts. It also makes related amendments to other acts. Division 3 of Part 3 amends the Canadian Payments Act to provide immunity for the Canadian Payment Association and certain individuals from any civil liability, other than in contract, for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the administration or discharge of any powers or duties conferred under that act.	House Third Reading June 18, 2026. Senate First Reading June 18, 2026. Senate Second Reading June 18, 2026. Senate Third Reading June 18, 2026. Royal Assent June 18, 2026. Division 1 of Part 3 comes into force on October 16, 2026 (the 120th day after the day on which Bill C-30 receives Royal Assent). Division 2 of Part 3 comes into force on proclamation but see coming into force provisions for section 20. Division 3 of Part 3 is in force on Royal Assent.
June 18, 2026	Canadian Payments Association By-law No. 10 — RTR, SOR/2026-133 This new Canadian Payments Association by-law is being implemented in connection with the planned introduction of the Real-Time Rail, a real-time payment exchange, clearing and settlement system (the RTR system or RTR). The RTR by-law reflects the RTR’s financial risk framework, key operational requirements, and policy requirements governing how the system operates. These policy requirements include, for example, the provision of payment amounts to payees and participant obligations in processing payments. The by-law also refers to the RTR rules, which will provide detailed technical and business process requirements for participants. The RTR by-law focuses on Payments Canada’s operation of the RTR system and the rights and responsibilities of system participants. It establishes the general eligibility criteria for RTR participation. Participation is voluntary and any Payments Canada member is eligible to become an RTR participant if it meets the requirements set out in the RTR by-law and rules. The RTR by-law establishes the classes of payment items acceptable for exchange, clearing, and settlement in the RTR. It also sets out the circumstances in which a payment will be cleared and settled in the RTR, key steps, and certain rights and obligations of participants related to the clearing and settlement process. The RTR by-law requires a receiving participant to make the amount of an RTR payment available to the payee (such as an individual customer) according to the time frames and procedures established in the rules, except under certain circumstances. It contemplates the possibility that the RTR, or a participant’s use of the RTR, may be disrupted. The by-law allows the President of Payments Canada to take a variety of actions to respond to disruptions or other emergencies. In conjunction with the RTR rules, the emergency provisions in the by-law will enable Payments Canada, working with the Bank of Canada and system participants, to safely and effectively respond to potential disruptions.	In force August 24, 2026.
June 18, 2026	Bill C-29, Financial Crimes Agency Act Bill C-29 establishes the Financial Crimes Agency (FCA) as a specialized federal law enforcement agency whose mandate is to investigate financial crimes and to contribute to the recovery of proceeds of crime. It also makes consequential amendments to certain acts and regulations. The FCA will be headed by a commissioner, employ its own staff and have powers to investigate serious and complex financial crimes. It will also participate in international efforts to combat these crimes and report on its operations. In addition, the bill provides a role and specific powers to the Attorney General of Canada regarding certain financial crime prosecutions that would normally fall under the authority of the provincial attorneys general. The bill also makes consequential amendments to a number of acts and regulations, in part to authorize the sharing and disclosure of information between the FCA and certain federal ministers and entities.	House Second Reading June 18, 2026. In force on Royal Assent, except for section 27, which comes into force on the first anniversary of the day on which Bill C-30 received Royal Assent. Section 29 comes into force on the day on which section 33 of the Public Complaints and Review Commission Act comes into force or, if it is later, on the day on which this Act receives Royal Assent.
June 17, 2026	Bill S-6, Federal Law–Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 4 Bill S-6 is the fourth in a series of enactments drafted in the course of the harmonization of federal statutes by the Department of Justice of Canada resulting from the coming into force of the Civil Code of Québec in 1994. Among the acts amended by Bill S-6 are acts governing financial institutions: the Bank Act, the Cooperative Credit Associations Act, the Insurance Companies Act and the Trust and Loan Companies Act. The amendments are made in order to ensure that each language version takes into account the common law and the civil law.	Senate Third Reading June 17, 2026.
June 15, 2026	Bill C-36, An Act to enact the Protecting Privacy and Consumer Data Act, to amend the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and to make amendments to other Acts Bill C-36 enacts the Protecting Privacy and Consumer Data Act to govern the protection of personal information of individuals while taking into account the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose personal information in the course of commercial activities. Consequently, it repeals Part 1 of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act and changes the short title of that Act to the Electronic Documents Act. As a consequential amendment, it replaces references in the Bank Act, Insurance Companies Act, Cooperative Credit Associations Act and Trust and Loan Companies Act to Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act with Electronic Documents Act.	House First Reading June 15, 2026. Act, except sections 1 and 51 and Part 3, to come into force on proclamation (but that day must not be before the day on which that Part 3 comes into force). See also s. 52(1) with respect to the coming into force of Bill C-34, Safe Social Media Act.
June 15, 2026	An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts, S.C. 2026, c. 9 (Bill C-8) Bill C-8 establishes a regulatory framework to protect systems and services essential to public safety or national security. Part 1 amends the Telecommunications Act to add the promotion of the security of the Canadian telecommunications system as an objective of the Canadian telecommunications policy and to authorize the governor in council and the minister of Industry to direct telecommunications service providers to do anything, or refrain from doing anything, that is necessary to secure the Canadian telecommunications system. Part 2 enacts the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA) to provide a framework for the protection of the critical cyber systems of services and systems that are vital to national security or public safety and that are delivered or operated as part of a work, undertaking or business that is within the legislative authority of Parliament. The CCSPA imposes onerous cyber security obligations on “designated operators” of federally regulated critical cyber systems. These operators carry out vital services or systems (that is, infrastructure essential to preserving national security and public safety). These obligations include, among others: Developing, maintaining, and regularly reviewing cyber security programs (CSPs); Reporting material changes in ownership, control, or use of third-party products and services to the appropriate regulator, as to mitigate supply-chain and third-party risks; and preserving detailed records of cyber security programs and incidents. The CCSPA delegates broad, sector-specific powers to the appropriate regulators, including banking systems overseen by OSFI and the clearing and settlement systems overseen by the Bank of Canada. The CCPSA will allow the regulators to, inter alia, enter any place (subject to limitations) to examine records and data, order internal audits, and issue compliance orders. The CCPSA also introduces significant administrative monetary penalties for violations. While the proposed regime is designed to promote compliance, fines could amount to $15 million per violation, per day, for organizations, and $1 million per violation, per day, for individuals. Moreover, directors and officers of designated operators could be held personally liable if they were complicit in committing a violation.	Senate Third Reading June 4, 2026. Royal Assent June 15, 2026. Part 2 (Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act) in force on proclamation. Remainder of Act in force on Royal Assent.
June 3, 2026	Bill C-31, Budget 2025 Implementation Act, No. 2 Bill C-31 implements certain measures put forward in the November 4, 2025, Budget. Division 1 of Part 4 amends the Trust and Loan Companies Act, the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act to prohibit financial institutions from issuing documents in bearer form and provide for the replacement of documents that are currently in bearer form. Division 2 of Part 4 amends the Trust and Loan Companies Act, the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act to provide that no action lies against His Majesty in right of Canada and federal government officials for any acts or omissions made in good faith under those acts. Division 3 of Part 4 amends the Bank Act to require an institution to offer or sell deposit products in a non-discriminatory manner in certain circumstances. Division 6 of Part 4 amends Schedule II to the Access to Information Act to prohibit the disclosure of confidential information obtained under the Retail Payment Activities Act or prepared from information obtained under that act.	House Second Reading June 3, 2026. Division 1 of Part 4 in force on Royal Assent. Division 2 of Part 4 in force on Royal Assent. Division 3 of Part 4 in force on proclamation. Division 6 of Part 4 in force on Royal Assent.

Disclaimer
This Reporter is prepared as a service for our clients. It is not intended to be a complete statement of the law or an opinion on any subject. Although we endeavour to ensure its accuracy, no one should act upon it without a thorough examination of the law after the facts of a specific situation are considered.

Federal Financial Institutions Legislative and Regulatory Reporter – May 2026

Fri, 14 Aug 2026 00:00:00 Z

May 2026

Published	Title and Brief Summary	Status (if applicable)
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)
May 21, 2026	Draft Guideline B-12 Interest Rate Risk Management Consultation OSFI has informed banks and trust and loan companies by letter of a consultation with respect to targeted adjustments to Guideline B‑12 – Interest Rate Risk Management. The adjustments would update the interest rate shock scenarios in the guideline to align with recent revisions from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). BCBS published its revised Recalibration of shocks for interest rate risk in the banking book in July 2024. The guidance would also be updated with respect to how institutions should consider different types of balance sheet scenarios against earnings measures. In addition, details related to public disclosures would be replaced by a reference to OSFI’s Pillar 3 disclosure guidelines. The current version of Guideline B-12 was published in May 2019. The letter and draft Guideline are accompanied by a Backgrounder.	Comments are due July 20, 2026. OSFI plans to publish the final guideline on September 10, 2026. The guideline will come into effect on November 1, 2026 (for October 31 year ends) or January 1, 2027 (for December 31 year ends)
May 21, 2026	Draft Capital and Liquidity Treatment of Crypto-asset Exposures (Banking) Guideline (2027) OSFI has informed banks and trust and loan companies by letter of a consultation with respect to draft revisions to the Capital and Liquidity Treatment of Crypto-asset Exposures (Banking) Guideline. OSFI states that the revisions, building on the latest version of the guidance (in effect in Q1 2026), are meant to respond to developments in the crypto market, but also ensure that the capital and liquidity treatment of crypto‑asset exposures continues to reflect the underlying risks faced by institutions, and remains prudent in light of the dynamic nature of the crypto market. Targeted revisions would recognize cross‑exchange hedging for Group 2a crypto‑assets traded on regulated exchanges. OSFI states that the current draft revision does not address several key issues noted in its October 29, 2025, letter to industry, such as the risk weight applied to Group 2a crypto‑assets and Group 2a crypto-assets’ eligibility as collateral. The draft guideline is accompanied by a backgrounder.	Comments are due July 20, 2026. Final version of revised guideline will come into effect on November 1, 2026, or January 1, 2027 for institutions with a fiscal year ending October 31 or December 31, respectively.
May 21, 2026	Draft Liquidity Adequacy Requirements Guideline (2027) OSFI has informed banks and trust and loan companies by letter of a consultation with respect to draft revisions to the Liquidity Adequacy Requirements (LAR) Guideline. OSFI states that the revisions are aimed at ensuring that liquidity requirements continue to align with the underlying risk faced by institutions; at enhancing the clarity of its liquidity rules; and at improving the consistency of the application of those rules. It proposes: A new Level 1B high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) category to acknowledge the market liquidity of certain instruments that do not currently qualify as Level 1 HQLA; Adjustments to the transactions approved for interdependent asset and liability treatment under the Net Stable Funding Ratio; Updates to the guideline intended to improve structure and reliability, ensure alignment with other OSFI guidelines, and improve coherence.	Comments are due July 20, 2026. Final version of revised guideline will come into effect May 1, 2027.
May 21, 2026	Consultation on Pillar 3 Disclosure Guidelines for Interest Rate Risk in the Banking Book OSFI has informed Banks and Trust and Loan Companies by letter of a consultation with respect to draft amendments to Pillar 3 disclosure guidelines for domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) and small- and medium-sized banks (SMSBs) on interest rate risk in the banking book (IRRBB) disclosure expectations. The amendments incorporate the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision disclosure standard on interest rate risk in the banking book and align with draft amendments to Guideline B-12 – Interest Rate Risk Management. The amendments have no impact on capital or liquidity expectations for institutions in scope. For small- and medium-sized banks, disclosure expectations are applied in proportion to the nature, size, and complexity of the deposit-taking institution.	Comments are due July 20, 2026. Final version of revised guideline is expected to be published in September 2026, with disclosure expectations expected to come into effect for fiscal Q4 2027 reporting periods.
May 21, 2026	Draft Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process Guideline (2027) – Letter OSFI has informed banks and trust and loan companies by letter of a consultation with respect to a draft Internal Liquidity Adequacy Assessment Process (ILAAP) Guideline, with feedback intended to inform a final guideline that would take effect on May 1, 2027. The draft Guideline is intended to enhance alignment of liquidity requirements with underlying risks faced by institutions, improve clarity, and promote a more consistent application of liquidity rules. Feedback from a May 2025 discussion paper exploring Pillar 2 liquidity concepts about improving liquidity supervision and what should be taken into account when drafting an ILAAP guideline emphasized the need for a more proportionate approach for smaller, less complex deposit-taking institutions, with sufficient transition time built into the implementation to all for governance, data, and stress-testing enhancements. With respect to a more proportionate approach, OSFI states that while it expects the final guideline to apply to all deposit-taking institutions, it acknowledges that some of the Pillar 2 liquidity risks will not be applicable to all deposit-taking institutions; it has reflected this in the draft ILAAP Guideline. OSFI is proposing a proposing a three-year phased implementation schedule in the draft ILAAP Guideline, applicable to all deposit-taking institutions.	Comments are due August 19, 2026. OSFI proposes a phased implementation schedule, beginning in May 2027 and building to maturity by 2029 fiscal year-end.
May 21, 2026	Draft Guideline B-2 Large Exposure Limits (2028) OSFI has informed banks and trust and loan companies by letter of a consultation with respect to draft revisions to Guideline B-2 – Large Exposure Limits. The current version of Guideline B-2 applies to domestic systemically important banks (D‑SIBs); these draft amendments extend the scope of Guideline B-2 to Category 1 and Category 2 small‑ and medium‑sized banks (SMSBs). They would replace the 1994 large exposure guideline currently applicable to these institutions. In addition, under these revisions, Category 3 SMSBs and foreign bank branches will no longer be subject to the large-exposure guideline. Changes to Guideline B-2 will include the following: Expanding the scope of application of the guideline to Category 1 and Category 2 SMSBs at the consolidated entity level; Applying a general large exposure limit of 25% of Tier 1 capital for SMSBs, consistent with the approach for D‑SIBs; Aligning exposure measurement for SMSBs with the Capital Adequacy Requirements Guideline, including the recognition of eligible credit risk mitigation techniques; Updating the criteria for SMSBs to identify groups of connected counterparties to promote more consistent aggregation of exposures; Introducing quarterly large exposure reporting for SMSBs, using the same reporting template that currently apply to D‑SIBs; making minor SMSB‑specific adjustments to certain measurement approaches to support proportionality and limit regulatory burden.	Comments are due August 19, 2026. Final version of revised guideline will come into effect on November 1, 2027 or January 1, 2028 for institutions with a fiscal year ending October 31 or December 31, respectively.
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)
May 6, 2026	Administrative Monetary Penalties: Changes Following Legislative Amendments FINTRAC has issued a document explaining how FINTRAC will implement a new approach to administrative monetary penalties (AMPs), pursuant to amendments put in place by the Strengthening Canada’s Immigration System and Borders Act, S.C. 2026, c. 4 (Bill C-12). It describes how FINTRAC is updating its AMP policy and developing new guidance to reflect the changes resulting from the legislative amendments. The new guidance will explain how penalties are administered under the new legislative framework and will include guidance on compliance agreements and compliance orders as well as an updated approach to calculating penalties. According to FINTRAC, the new administrative monetary penalties framework will give it the authority to: Define prescribed violations and compliance order violations subject to penalties; Apply increased maximum penalty amounts (up to 40 times current limits); Consider ability to pay as part of the criteria for determining a penalty amount; Require mandatory compliance agreements for prescribed violations; Introduce compliance orders as an additional enforcement tool.	New legislative requirements will apply to violations that occur after March 26, 2026.
Payments Canada
May 27, 2026	CACPA Code STP Formatting Best Practices Payments Canada has released best practices and formatting guidelines for Canadian routing numbers, or CACPA codes, to facilitate straight-through processing (STP). This industry guideline is designed specifically for domestic and international payment originators who are sending wire transfers within or destined for Canada.
May 21, 2026	National Fraud Strategy: Payments Canada Feedback Department of Finance Canada issued a National Anti-Fraud Strategy Discussion Paper in April 2026, requesting feedback on three initial measures that might be taken to advance the strategy. Payments Canada has submitted its feedback, emphasizing the following: Multi-sector collaboration, uniting financial sector, telecommunications providers and digital platforms; Payment modernization; Consistent regulation, and proportionate and consistent application of anti-fraud requirements; Enhanced information sharing across sectors and with regulators; Coordinated oversight that includes a central coordinating function and sector-specific regulators; Consumer education; Law enforcement support.
Financial Stability Board (FSB)
May 6, 2026	Report on Vulnerabilities in Private Credit FSB has issued a report that highlights that private credit brings benefits but also vulnerabilities, including complex interlinkages with banks, borrower credit quality concerns, and valuation opacity. It reports that although the growth of private credit may bring benefits, it also brings potential vulnerabilities. Private credit at its current size and scope has not been tested during a severe economic downturn, which could expose leverage and borrower credit quality vulnerabilities. The report argues that authorities should work to close data gaps, harmonise definitions to enhance monitoring, and deepen analysis of financial interconnections and liquidity issues, while sharing supervisory insights.
Legislation
May 26, 2026, 2026	Bill C-30, An Act to implement certain provisions of the spring economic update tabled in Parliament on April 28, 2026 Among its provisions to implement the 2026 Spring Economic Update, the following measures of Bill C-30 affect federally regulated financial institutions: Division 1 of Part 3 amends the Bank Act to provide that the Investment Canada Act does not apply in respect of certain transactions made by foreign banks or entities associated with a foreign bank if the transactions are subject to an approval under the Bank Act, the Trust and Loan Companies Act or the Insurance Companies Act. Division 2 of Part 3 amends the Bank of Canada Act to combine into a single act the Bank of Canada’s powers, duties and functions related to the recovery of costs incurred by it for or in connection with the administration of certain acts. It also makes related amendments to other acts. Division 3 of Part 3 amends the Canadian Payments Act to provide immunity for the Canadian Payment Association and certain individuals from any civil liability, other than in contract, for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith in the administration or discharge of any powers or duties conferred under that act.	House of Commons Second Reading on May 26, 2026. Referred to Standing Committee on Finance. Division 1 of Part 3 comes into force on the 120th day after the day on which Bill C-30 receives Royal Assent. Division 2 of Part 3 comes into force on proclamation but see coming into force provisions for section 20. Division 3 of Part 3 is in force on Royal Assent.
May 20, 2026	By-law Amending the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Deposit Insurance Policy By-law, SOR/2026-81 Act to implement the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, S.C. 2026, c. 7, amended Schedule IV of the Bank Act to clarify how a country or territory acceding to an existing trade agreement is treated under Schedule IV of the Bank Act. Accordingly, the reference to Schedule IV of the Bank Act in the Policy By-law is amended by this By-law to ensure alignment with the amendments to Schedule IV to the Bank Act.	In force on the day Act to implement the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, S.C. 2026, c. 7, s. 11, comes into force.
May 6, 2026	Act to implement the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, S.C. 2026, c. 7 (Bill C-13) Bill C-13 implements the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, done July 16, 2023. It includes consequential amendments to the definition of “regulated foreign entity” in sections 2 of the Bank Act, Insurance Companies Act and Trust and Loan Companies Act, respectively.	Royal Assent May 6, 2026 Act comes into force on proclamation.
May 6, 2026	Bill C-31, Budget 2025 Implementation Act, No. 2 Bill C-31 implements certain measures put forward in the November 4, 2025, Budget. Division 1 of Part 4 amends the Trust and Loan Companies Act, the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act to prohibit financial institutions from issuing documents in bearer form and provide for the replacement of documents that are currently in bearer form. Division 2 of Part 4 amends the Trust and Loan Companies Act, the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act to provide that no action lies against His Majesty in right of Canada and federal government officials for any acts or omissions made in good faith under those acts. Division 3 of Part 4 amends the Bank Act to require an institution to offer or sell deposit products in a non-discriminatory manner in certain circumstances. Division 6 of Part 4 amends Schedule II to the Access to Information Act to prohibit the disclosure of confidential information obtained under the Retail Payment Activities Act or prepared from information obtained under that act.	House of Commons First Reading on May 6, 2026. Division 1 of Part 4 in force on Royal Assent. Division 2 of Part 4 in force on Royal Assent. Division 3 of Part 4 in force on proclamation. Division 6 of Part 4 in force on Royal Assent.

Disclaimer

This Reporter is prepared as a service for our clients. It is not intended to be a complete statement of the law or an opinion on any subject. Although we endeavour to ensure its accuracy, no one should act upon it without a thorough examination of the law after the facts of a specific situation are considered.

Updating membership criteria? What Ontario not-for-profits should know

Wed, 12 Aug 2026 00:00:00 Z

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s decision in Barrie & District Association of Realtors v Information Technology Systems Ontario, 2025 ONSC 3388, confirms that Ontario not-for-profit corporations may update their membership criteria, even where the changes could affect an existing member’s ability to remain a member.

The decision is useful for boards because it explains when courts will defer to internal governance decisions under the Ontario Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010 (ONCA), and when they may intervene.

Key takeaways

Ontario not-for-profits may amend membership criteria to respond to legitimate governance or operational concerns.
Boards should ensure that amendments are adopted properly, clearly drafted, and aligned with the corporation’s best interests.
Courts will generally defer to board decisions unless there is a legal breach, procedural unfairness, or bad faith.

How the ONCA challenge arose

Barrie & District Association of Realtors was a member of Information Technology Systems Ontario, a not-for-profit corporation that pools MLS listing data for its member real estate associations.

After Barrie announced an integration with the Toronto Regional Real Estate Board, which Information Technology Systems Ontario viewed as a competitor, Information Technology Systems Ontario amended its by-laws. The amendment required members to maintain the same corporate structure and control as when they first joined.

Barrie challenged the amendment under ONCA section 191. It argued that the amendment was retroactive, unclear, inconsistent with the Act, and adopted in bad faith to target Barrie.

How the Ontario Superior Court ruled

The Court dismissed the application and upheld the by-law amendment. It confirmed that courts will usually avoid interfering in the internal affairs of not-for-profit corporations unless there is a breach of the corporation’s governing documents or the Act, a denial of natural justice, or bad faith.

The Court found that the amendment did not amount to a retroactive breach of contract. There was no agreement that the membership rules would remain unchanged forever.

The Court also rejected the argument that the amendment was too vague. The requirement to maintain the same “corporate structure and control” was sufficiently clear when read in context, and the Act did not require the by-laws to list every factor the board could consider when exercising discretion.

Finally, the Court held that the amendment was not made in bad faith. Information Technology Systems Ontario had a legitimate concern about a competitor gaining control over one of its member associations and followed the proper process to amend its by-laws.

Contact us

For any questions about this case or Ontario’s Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, please contact a member of our Charities & Not-for-Profit Group.

ONCA update: Court clarifies when a special resolution is required for certain by-law amendments

Tue, 11 Aug 2026 00:00:00 Z

A recent Ontario court decision, Chifor, et al v Windsor/Essex County Humane Society, 2026 ONSC 667, has clarified the interaction between sections 17 and 103 of the Ontario Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010 (ONCA), confirming that certain by-law amendments require member confirmation by special resolution.

This decision provides welcome guidance on an area of the ONCA that has generated uncertainty since the legislation came into force. Organizations planning by-law amendments should review their approval process carefully to ensure compliance and avoid challenges to the validity of amended by-laws.

What happened?

The court considered amendments relating to matters listed in section 103(1)(g), (k) and (l) of the ONCA, and concluded that amendments dealing with those provisions must be confirmed by special resolution of the members.

Why does it matter?

This interpretation provides important guidance for organizations amending their by-laws. While ONCA generally permits directors to make, amend and repeal by-laws, that authority is subject to member confirmation. Organizations should carefully assess whether proposed by-law changes require member confirmation by ordinary resolution or special resolution before proceeding.

Practical takeaway

If your organization is amending its by-laws, then it should consider whether any proposed amendments engage the provisions identified in section 103(1)(g), (k), and (l) of the ONCA, as member confirmation by special resolution will be required.

The matters listed in section 103(1)(g), (k), and (l) relate to important members’ rights provisions, including the transfer of a membership, the manner of giving notice to voting members, and the method of voting by members not in attendance at a meeting of the members.

BLG can assist

For more information about ONCA compliance or governance reviews, please contact a member of BLG's Charities and Not-For-Profit Group.

Draft technical amendments expand the scope of taxable Canadian property

Mon, 10 Aug 2026 00:00:00 Z

On July 23, 2026, the Department of Finance released draft legislative proposals containing numerous technical amendments to the Income Tax Act (Canada) (the Act) accompanied by explanatory notes released on July 27, 2026. Among the proposals are amendments to the definition of "taxable Canadian property" (TCP) in subsection 248(1) of the Act.

Coming into force on Royal Assent, the proposed amendments will:

modify the rules governing when units of publicly traded partnerships constitute TCP;
broaden the look-through rule found in paragraph (d) of the definition of TCP;
reinstate the deeming rule for options and interests in property that previously applied in determining whether property is TCP.

1. Publicly traded partnership units

Under the proposed amendments, paragraph (d) of the definition of TCP no longer applies to partnership units listed on a designated stock exchange.

Instead, listed partnership units are brought within paragraph (e), alongside listed corporate shares and mutual fund interests, and are now subject to the 25 per cent ownership test and the more-than-50 per cent FMV test. Unlisted partnership interests continue to be tested only under the more-than-50 per cent FMV test in paragraph (d). This generally aligns the treatment of listed partnerships with that of listed corporate shares.

The revised language appears designed to better accommodate partnership structures when applying the ownership threshold. The proposal may therefore be particularly relevant for investment funds and other collective investment vehicles.

2. Broadening of look-through rule in paragraph (d)

The proposed amendments broaden the look-through rule found in paragraph (d) of the definition of TCP by permitting value to be traced through a wider range of intermediate entities, including through any corporation, trust or partnership (other than entities described in paragraph (e)).

Non-listed shares and interests that indirectly derive more than 50 per cent of their value from underlying TCP assets may now constitute TCP even where intermediate entities are not themselves TCP. As a result, shares that are not TCP under the current rules may become TCP because more underlying Canadian property is considered in applying the more-than-50 per cent FMV test.

3. Options, rights and interests: A significant broadening

The amendments also replace the existing deeming rules found in subparagraph (d)(iv) and paragraph (f) of the TCP definition with proposed subsection 248(1.2). New subsection 248(1.2) provides that, for the purposes of the definition TCP in subsection 248(1), a property described in any of paragraphs (a) to (e) of that definition is deemed to include an option in respect of, or an interest in, or for civil law a right in, the property, whether or not the property exists.

The explanatory notes indicate that the amendment is broader in its application than subparagraph (d)(iv) and paragraph (f) of the definition (which are consequently being repealed), as it ensures that options and interests themselves can qualify as TCP while also applying for the purposes of the TCP definition as a whole. The explanatory notes provide the following example:

a taxpayer who owns 24 per cent of the shares of a corporation and holds an option to acquire an additional 1 per cent of its shares meets the 25 per cent or more ownership test under subparagraph (e)(i) of the definition due to the application of this new deeming provision; consequently, both the taxpayer's shares and the option to acquire additional shares would be TCP, provided the condition in subparagraph (e)(ii) of the definition is also met.

As a result of the proposed amendments, options to acquire shares are once again factored into the 25 per cent test and can affect whether the shares are considered TCP.

Historical context

This new subsection reinstates the deeming rule that was repealed effective Oct. 1, 1996, when the definition of TCP was located in subsection 115(1) of the Act, with options or interests being dealt with in former subsection 115(3).

Subsection 115(3) provided that references to property described in subsection 115(1) included "any interest therein or option in respect thereof, whether or not such property is in existence.” As such, in Finance’s example above, the taxpayer would have also been deemed to have met the 25 per cent ownership test under the definition of TCP found in previous subsection 115(1).

When the TCP definition was relocated from subsection 115(1) to subsection 248(1) as part of the 2001 amendments, the former subsection 115(3) rule was not carried forward in its entirety. Although portions of the concept were subsequently reflected in subparagraph (d)(iv) and paragraph (f) of the TCP definition, the statutory language no longer expressly provided that options or interests are considered in determining whether the 25 per cent ownership threshold was met.

The Canada Revenue Agency acknowledged this issue shortly after the 2001 amendments. In technical interpretation 2002-0151795, the CRA noted that former subsection 115(3) was not reproduced when the TCP definition was moved to subsection 248(1), creating uncertainty regarding the treatment of options and interests in property for purposes of the TCP definition.

Viewed in this context, the addition of subsection 248(1.2) appears less like an expansion of the TCP regime and more like a restoration of a concept that existed under former subsection 115(3) before the 2001 reorganization of the Act.

Maisons Canada s’élance : 4 000 unités de construction directe et un projet de conversion controversé en C.-B.

Thu, 06 Aug 2026 00:00:00 Z

Le 14 septembre 2025, le gouvernement a lancé Maisons Canada, un nouvel organisme fédéral ayant pour mandat de construire des logements abordables à grande échelle au pays. L’organisme travaillera de concert avec les provinces, les territoires, les municipalités et les communautés autochtones pour créer des logements communautaires abordables destinés aux ménages à faible revenu, tout en s’associant au secteur privé afin d’offrir des logements abordables à la classe moyenne.

Le 5 février 2026, le gouvernement fédéral a déposé le projet de loi C-20, Loi concernant la constitution de Maisons Canada (la Loi), afin d’officialiser et d’élargir le mandat de Maisons Canada. La Loi fournit le cadre législatif nécessaire pour constituer Maisons Canada en société d’État, et confère à l’organisme davantage de pouvoirs et de souplesse opérationnelle pour remplir sa mission, qui consiste à construire des logements abordables à grande échelle partout au pays.

La Loi a obtenu la sanction royale le 18 juin 2026, et le gouvernement du Canada en a fait l’annonce le lendemain. Cette sanction marque la mise en place du cadre permettant à Maisons Canada de devenir une société d’État. Quelques mesures restent à prendre, comme l’adoption de décrets, la mise en place de la structure de gouvernance et la nomination de la direction, avant qu’elle soit entièrement fonctionnelle plus tard en 2026.

Ce que vous devez savoir

Maisons Canada est maintenant passée aux choses concrètes. Son mandat consiste à accroître l’offre de logements au pays en réalisant des projets de logements abordables à grande échelle.
Le projet de loi C-20, Loi concernant la constitution de Maisons Canada, lui fournit l’assise législative, les pouvoirs et la souplesse opérationnelle nécessaires à sa transformation en société d’État.
Ses premiers projets de construction directe porteront notamment sur environ 4 000 logements sur des terrains fédéraux et serviront de premier banc d’essai à la stratégie fédérale visant à aménager des logements sur des terrains publics.
En Colombie-Britannique, un projet de conversion de copropriétés pourrait transformer plus de 2 200 unités vacantes de copropriété en logements abordables, bien que les modalités, les prix et les critères d’accessibilité financière ne soient toujours pas établis.
Le projet pourrait aussi inclure un modèle novateur de location avec option d’achat, donnant ainsi à des Canadiennes et Canadiens incapables d’accumuler une mise de fonds suffisante une nouvelle façon d’accéder à la propriété.

Les terrains fédéraux sont l’essence même de la stratégie

Le gouvernement du Canada a investi un montant initial de 13 milliards de dollars dans Maisons Canada afin de financer et de mettre en chantier des projets de logements abordables dans l’ensemble du pays. Ces projets miseront notamment sur l’utilisation de terrains publics fédéraux pour diminuer les coûts fonciers, simplifier la construction et améliorer l’accessibilité financière des résidences.

Grâce à l’intégration de la Société immobilière du Canada à son portefeuille, Maisons Canada a maintenant accès aux terrains fédéraux, dont 88 propriétés propices à des projets résidentiels. L’organisme peut ainsi louer ou offrir au rabais des terrains publics excédentaires ou peu utilisés à ses partenaires afin de réduire les coûts d’aménagement et de construction et de soutenir ses objectifs d’abordabilité.

Selon le ministre canadien du Logement, Gregor Robertson, le recours à des terrains fédéraux par Maisons Canada constitue une décision marquante pour une génération et garantira l’accès à un logement à toute la population canadienne.

Même si la plupart des terrains fédéraux sous-utilisés répertoriés dans la Banque de terrains publics du Canada sont situés en Ontario, on examine des terrains publics partout au pays en vue d’autres projets. Au moment de la publication, trois terrains de cette banque situés à Port Moody, Vernon et Vancouver en Colombie-Britannique sont « ouverts à la rétroaction ».En comparaison, l’Ontario compte 46 terrains actuellement à l’étude. Tous sont soit en phase de rétroaction, d’acception des soumissions ou d’examen des soumissions.

Même si la majorité des possibilités de projets se trouvent en Ontario, les ministres fédéraux ont reçu pour tâche de repérer des terrains propices à des projets résidentiels parmi ceux qui appartiennent à leurs ministères (mis à part les 88 terrains qui figurent déjà dans la Banque de terrains publics du Canada). À mesure que de nouveaux terrains publics sous-utilisés sont recensés, d’autres occasions de construire des logements abordables pourraient émerger en Colombie-Britannique.

Maisons Canada passe des politiques aux projets de construction

Pour déployer sa stratégie d’optimisation des terrains fédéraux, Maisons Canada a entrepris six projets pilotes de construction directe sur ces terrains, et ceux-ci devraient générer environ 4 000 logements.

Tandis que la planification de ces six premiers projets va de l’avant, l’organisme choisit des partenaires en privilégiant des collaborations qui mettent en valeur les ressources du pays, appuient les entreprises canadiennes et favorisent la création d’emplois de qualité bien rémunérés d’un océan à l’autre.

Voici les six premiers projets :

Arbo (Toronto) : 540 nouvelles demeures sur une partie du site Arbo Downsview, à Toronto.
Naawi-Oodena (Winnipeg) : Un nouveau partenariat entre les Premières Nations signataires du Traité nº 1 et la Société immobilière du Canada prévoit la construction de 320 nouvelles unités résidentielles.
Village à Griesbach (Edmonton) : 355 nouveaux foyers au Coin nord-est du Village à Griesbach.
Pointe-de-Longueuil (Québec) : 1 055 nouvelles unités situées en bordure du fleuve Saint-Laurent, dans la ville de Longueuil.
Chemin Heron (Ottawa) : Environ 1 100 nouvelles demeures sur un terrain fédéral de 18 acres, à 20 minutes du centre-ville d’Ottawa.
Parc Shannon (Dartmouth) : Environ 630 nouveaux logis sur une parcelle dédiée.

Bien que si les six premiers emplacements retenus constituent une avancée importante pour augmenter l’offre de logements abordables au Canada, la ministre du Logement de la Colombie-Britannique, Christine Boyle, a invité le gouvernement fédéral à réaliser des projets de construction directe comparables dans la province. En misant sur les terrains fédéraux disponibles dans la Banque de terrains publics du Canada et en trouvant davantage de terrains fédéraux non optimisés, on espère favoriser la construction directe de nouveaux logements abordables en Colombie-Britannique.

En plus de ses projets de construction directe, Maisons Canada a conclu des partenariats de grande envergure partout au Canada, notamment avec la Ville d’Ottawa, les gouvernements de la Colombie-Britannique, du Québec et de la Nouvelle-Écosse, ainsi qu’avec le Nunavut et la société Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. dans le cadre d’une entente tripartite. Ces partenariats visent à stimuler les investissements, à moderniser les méthodes de construction, à accélérer les processus d’approbation et de délivrance des permis, et à réduire les coûts de réalisation des projets.

Par exemple, Maisons Canada et la Ville d’Ottawa unissent leurs efforts pour favoriser la réalisation de 3 000 nouveaux logements à revenu mixte et abordables. Le projet bénéficie d’un soutien pouvant atteindre 400 millions de dollars en subventions fédérales et municipales. La Ville d’Ottawa s’est aussi engagée à éliminer certains frais, à accélérer l’approbation des projets et la délivrance des permis, ainsi qu’à offrir des exemptions de taxes foncières pour aider à réduire les coûts et maintenir les logements abordables pour les résidents.

En Colombie-Britannique, Maisons Canada explore des possibilités dans le cadre du Partenariat entre le Canada et la Colombie-Britannique sur la conversion de copropriétés. Même si ce projet apporte une possibilité d’augmenter l’offre de logements abordables au Canada, il a fait l’objet d’un examen public plus poussé que certains autres partenariats annoncés.

Projet de conversion de copropriétés en C.-B. : aide au logement ou aux promoteurs?

Dans le cadre du projet de conversion de copropriétés en Colombie-Britannique, lancé le 18 juin 2026, les gouvernements fédéral et de la Colombie-Britannique entendent utiliser des outils de financement pour convertir plus de 2 200 unités de copropriété vacantes en logements abordables par l’intermédiaire de Maisons Canada et de BC Housing.

Cette proposition a essuyé des critiques par certains analystes, qui la considèrent comme une possible forme d’aide aux promoteurs immobiliers susceptible de maintenir artificiellement les prix des habitations plutôt que de laisser les forces du marché les ramener à un niveau abordable pour les Canadiens. D’autres analystes se montrent toutefois optimistes par rapport au projet, jugeant qu’il pourrait constituer un moyen concret de convertir des unités invendues existantes en logements abordables, à condition que les modalités d’acquisition soient adéquatement structurées.

Même si la formule d’acquisition n’est pas encore arrêtée, le gouvernement fédéral affirme vouloir acheter des copropriétés à des prix sous le marché, idéalement à un coût inférieur à celui de leur construction. Ottawa a aussi précisé que ces achats ne se feront pas dans la ville de Vancouver, mais plutôt dans des secteurs où le modèle est économiquement viable, notamment dans la vallée du Fraser, l’Okanagan et l’île de Vancouver.

Dans le cadre du projet de conversion des copropriétés, le premier ministre Mark Carney a récemment annoncé la mise en place d’un programme de location avec option d’achat destiné aux Canadiennes et Canadiens qui peinent à accumuler la mise de fonds nécessaire. Certains logements convertis devraient donc servir à la fois de logements locatifs et de tremplin vers la propriété.

Les programmes de location avec option d’achat prévoient habituellement des versements mensuels au propriétaire. Une partie de ces versements, souvent appelée crédit de loyer, est mise de côté en vue d’une future mise de fonds. L’occupant bénéficie alors de l’option d’acheter la résidence à une date prédéterminée, sans avoir à verser immédiatement la totalité de la mise de fonds.

Jusqu’à maintenant, les gouvernements du Canada et de la Colombie-Britannique ont communiqué peu de détails sur la structure du projet de conversion de copropriétés. Lorsqu’on en saura davantage, les promoteurs immobiliers, les institutions prêteuses et les résidentes et résidents de la Colombie-Britannique pourront mieux évaluer les effets du projet sur l’abordabilité du logement au pays.

À surveiller

Dans l’ensemble, les six premiers projets de construction directe et les partenariats annoncés ne représentent que le commencement. Maisons Canada continue d’accepter et d’évaluer des propositions de projets de logements abordables par l’intermédiaire de son portail, ouvrant ainsi la porte à de nouvelles occasions pour les prêteurs, les municipalités et les promoteurs.

Le groupe Droit immobilier de BLG demeura constamment à l’affût des nouvelles du gouvernement fédéral pour bien conseiller les clients sur la meilleure façon de participer aux programmes de Maisons Canada et d’en tirer avantage. Si vous avez des questions, veuillez écrire aux avocats du groupe Droit immobilier.

Affaires Baker et Li : la Cour d’appel de l’Ontario statue sur les clauses de cessation qui s’en tiennent à la LNE

Thu, 06 Aug 2026 00:00:00 Z

Deux décisions ontariennes récentes en droit du travail, Baker v. Van Dolder’s Home Team Inc., 2025 ONSC 952 et Li v. Wayfair Canada ULC, 2025 ONSC 2959, ont remis les projecteurs sur les clauses de cessation d’emploi qui n’offrent rien de plus aux employés que les minimums exigés par la Loi de 2000 sur les normes d’emploi (la LNE). Dans les deux cas, les juges de première instance devaient se pencher sur de telles clauses, mais ils en sont arrivés à des conclusions opposées. Les deux appels ont été entendus le 25 mars 2026, et la Cour d’appel a rendu des décisions éclairantes pour les employeurs.

L’importance de ces appels

De plus en plus d’employeurs tentent d’utiliser des clauses de cessation « limitées à la LNE » pour éviter le préavis accordé par la common law. Toutefois, vu le manque de constance dans les décisions de première instance, il était devenu difficile de prédire dans quelles circonstances de telles clauses allaient être considérées comme valides. Ensemble, les arrêts Baker et Li viennent éclaircir le tout.

Baker v. Van Dolder’s Home Team Inc.

Contexte et décision de première instance

Dans l’affaire Baker, la Cour supérieure de justice de l’Ontario a examiné une allégation de congédiement injustifié découlant d’un congédiement sans motif valable. L’employeur s’était appuyé sur des clauses contractuelles de cessation limitant les droits de l’employé aux minimums prévus par la LNE.

Clauses de cessation en litige (extraits traduits)

« Cessation sans motif valable : Nous pouvons mettre fin à votre emploi à tout moment, sans motif valable, en vous accordant seulement les droits minimaux prévus par la Loi de 2000 sur les normes d’emploi pour ce qui est notamment du préavis, de l’indemnité tenant lieu de préavis et, s’il y a lieu, de l’indemnité de cessation. Si d’autres paiements ou droits, comme le versement de cotisations pour le maintien du régime d’avantages sociaux, sont exigés par ces normes minimales, nous vous les accorderons également. Le présent paragraphe s’applique dans les circonstances qui constitueraient un congédiement déguisé. »

« Cessation pour un motif valable : Nous pouvons mettre fin à votre emploi à tout moment pour un motif valable, sans préavis ni indemnité de quelque nature que ce soit, sauf les droits minimaux prévus par la Loi de 2000 sur les normes d’emploi. Les situations suivantes constituent des motifs valables : a) un mauvais rendement, après avoir été informé par écrit des normes à atteindre; b) la malhonnêteté liée à l’emploi (affirmations trompeuses, falsification de documents, déclarations fausses sur les compétences exigées pour le poste, etc.); c) le vol, le détournement ou l’usage abusif des biens de la société; d) un comportement violent ou harcelant envers d’autres employés ou des clients; e) la communication de renseignements protégés ou confidentiels de la société de façon intentionnelle ou par négligence grave; f) toute conduite qui constituerait un motif valable selon la common law ou la loi. »

En première instance, on a conclu que ces deux clauses étaient inexécutoires, vu l’emploi répété de l’expression « à tout moment » et la définition de « motif valable » donnée dans le contrat, qui ensemble sous-entendaient un droit absolu de cessation contraire aux limites de la LNE (par exemple, à l’interdiction de procéder à une cessation dans certaines circonstances, comme pendant un congé légal ou comme forme de représailles). En s’appuyant sur les décisions Dufault v. Township of Ignace et Waksdale v. Swegon North America Inc., la Cour en est arrivée aux conclusions suivantes :

Une clause de cessation qui déforme la LNE ne peut être sauvée par un énoncé de conformité générale à la LNE.
L’expression « à tout moment » sous-entend à tort que le droit de l’employeur de mettre fin à l’emploi est absolu.
Comme une partie du libellé est inexécutoire, la clause entière est écartée, et l’employé a droit au préavis raisonnable prévu par la common law.

Les questions soulevées en appel

Les questions soulevées en appel dans l’affaire Baker sont pertinentes pour l’ensemble des employeurs et des employés de l’Ontario. Comme la Cour d’appel l’a reconnu lorsqu’elle a autorisé les appels dans Baker v. Van Dolder’s Home Team Inc., 2025 ONCA 578 et 2025 ONCA 829, le dossier fait intervenir les questions suivantes :

Dans un contrat, un libellé qui permet une cessation d’emploi « à tout moment » est-il nécessairement contraire à la LNE?
À quel point les tribunaux devraient-ils être stricts dans leur évaluation des clauses de cessation qui semblent limiter les employés aux minimums prévus par la loi?
Dans quelle mesure la décision Waksdale s’applique-t-elle encore à l’analyse des clauses de cessation fondées sur la LNE?
Quel est l’équilibre adéquat entre l’objectif réparateur de la LNE et la certitude commerciale dans la conclusion de contrats d’emploi?

Décision en appel

La Cour d’appel a accueilli l’appel de l’employeur et infirmé la décision de première instance. Elle a statué que les deux clauses de cessation étaient conformes à la LNE. Celle sur la cessation sans motif valable indique clairement que l’employé aura droit à tous les minimums prévus par la LNE. Elle est donc exécutoire. De la même façon, la clause sur la cessation pour un motif valable est exécutoire, car elle garantit « les droits minimaux prévus par la [LNE] », même si la définition de « motif valable » au contrat est plus large que la norme de l’inconduite délibérée de la LNE.

Li v. Wayfair Canada ULC

Contexte et décision de première instance

Dans l’affaire Li, le tribunal de première instance était parvenu à une conclusion différente sur des questions similaires. M. Li, un employé haut placé comptant moins d’une année de service, a vu son emploi prendre fin et a reçu l’indemnité de préavis minimal d’une semaine prévue par la LNE. Il a contesté la validité des clauses de cessation de son contrat au motif qu’elles restreignaient indûment ses droits à ceux prévus par la loi.

Clauses de cessation en litige (extraits traduits)

« Cessation pour un Motif valable : La Société peut mettre fin à votre emploi à tout moment pour un Motif valable, et ce, sans préavis, indemnité tenant lieu de préavis, indemnité de cessation d’emploi, maintien des avantages sociaux ou autres indemnités ou dommages-intérêts de quelque nature que ce soit, sauf ce qui est expressément exigé par la LNE, auquel cas seuls les droits minimaux prévus dans la loi seront accordés. »

« Définition de “Motif valable” : Aux fins des présentes, « Motif valable » désigne tout acte d’inconduite délibérée, d’indiscipline ou de négligence volontaire dans l’exercice des fonctions qui n’est pas frivole et que la Société n’a pas toléré, et qui constitue un motif valable au sens de la LNE. »

« Cessation sans Motif valable : Après votre période d’essai, en l’absence de Motif valable, la Société peut mettre fin à votre emploi à tout moment et pour quelque raison que ce soit en vous remettant uniquement le préavis écrit minimal exigé par la LNE ou l’indemnité de préavis minimale exigée par la LNE, ou une combinaison des deux, de même qu’en vous remettant l’indemnité de cessation d’emploi exigée par la LNE, en maintenant vos avantages sociaux pendant la période minimale exigée par la LNE et en vous remettant tous les autres éléments qui vous sont dus, le cas échéant, aux termes de la LNE. »

Contrairement au tribunal de première instance dans l’affaire Baker, celui qui a tranché l’affaire Li a confirmé la validité des clauses de cessation, en insistant sur le fait que le contrat reconnaissait constamment les minimums de la LNE et définissait « Motif valable » en faisant référence à la norme d’inconduite délibérée de la LNE. En interprétant le contrat dans son ensemble, le tribunal en est arrivé aux conclusions suivantes :

Le contrat lie constamment et expressément la cessation « pour un motif valable » et « sans motif valable » aux normes de la LNE.
La définition de « Motif valable » cadre expressément avec la norme d’« inconduite délibérée » de la LNE.
Contrairement à ceux des affaires Dufault et Baker, le contrat en cause en l’espèce ne déformait pas les exigences de la LNE et n’omettait pas de catégories de droits obligatoires.
Les tribunaux ne devraient pas invalider des contrats autrement conformes simplement parce qu’ils limitent les droits des employés aux minimums prévus par la loi, tant que le libellé est clair et exact.

Par conséquent, le demandeur s’est vu accorder uniquement les minimums prévus par la LNE, et s’est vu refuser le préavis raisonnable de common law.

Les questions soulevées en appel

L’affaire Li soulevait des questions similaires à celles de l’affaire Baker en appel, dont les suivantes :

Est-ce que les tribunaux peuvent maintenir des clauses de cessation d’emploi qui, lorsqu’elles sont lues dans leur ensemble, s’en remettent clairement et constamment aux minimums de la LNE?
Dans quelle mesure les expressions « à tout moment » et « pour quelque raison que ce soit » font-elles échec à une clause lorsque le libellé du contrat est par ailleurs conforme à LNE?
Comment les cours d’appel devraient-elles jongler avec des décisions de première instance en apparence divergentes sur l’applicabilité de clauses de cessation d’emploi?

Décision en appel

La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a rejeté l’appel de l’employé. Elle a confirmé la validité de la clause de cessation sans motif valable, car elle prévoit à maintes reprises que l’employé recevra à tout le moins les minimums exigés par la LNE. La Cour d’appel a conclu qu’une simple lecture montrait que l’employeur et l’employé avaient manifestement convenu que l’employé recevrait les droits que lui accorde la LNE à la cessation de son emploi, et qu’il n’y avait donc aucune raison de déclarer la clause inexécutoire. Les expressions « à tout moment » et « pour quelque raison que ce soit » n’étaient pas contraires à la loi, car elles ne faisaient que réitérer le droit de l’employeur de mettre fin à la relation d’emploi : elles ne suggéraient pas qu’il pouvait le faire de façon illégitime.

La Cour s’est abstenue de revenir sur l’affaire Waksdale, estimant que les clauses de cessation des deux contrats étaient exécutoires.

Points à retenir pour les employeurs (après les appels)

Ces décisions clarifient que les tribunaux ne devraient pas invalider des clauses de cessation d’emploi en s’efforçant de trouver des incompatibilités hypothétiques avec la LNE. Ce qu’il faut savoir, c’est si la clause, lue dans son contexte, préserve objectivement les normes minimales de la LNE.

La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a clarifié, dans les décisions Baker et Li, les circonstances dans lesquelles les clauses de cessation « limitées à la LNE » sont exécutoires. Les employeurs qui révisent ou rédigent des clauses de cessation devraient :

s’assurer que le contrat respecte les exigences minimales de la LNE dans tous les scénarios de cessation (avec et sans motif valable);
utiliser un libellé clair qui démontre une intention objective de respecter la LNE;
s’abstenir de penser que les expressions « à tout moment » et « pour quelque raison que ce soit » les autorisent à procéder à une cessation illégale;
s’assurer que les clauses de cessation pour motif valable préservent les minimums prévus par la LNE, sauf si la norme d’inconduite délibérée de la LNE est satisfaite.

En résumé : Les employeurs peuvent utiliser les clauses de cessation d’emploi pour limiter les droits des employés aux minimums prévus dans la LNE, mais seulement si le contrat, lu dans son ensemble, préserve clairement ces minimums en toutes circonstances et ne semble pas autoriser des cessations ou des renonciations interdites par la législation sur les normes d’emploi, la santé et la sécurité et les droits de la personne, ou d’autres lois de protection.

Le moment est bien choisi pour revoir les clauses de cessation dans vos contrats d’emploi à la lumière des nouvelles orientations de la Cour d’appel.

CCAA vesting orders and Crown royalty arrears: Alberta Court of Appeal confirms finality

Tue, 04 Aug 2026 00:00:00 Z

In Alberta (Energy and Minerals) v Spartan Delta Corp,¹ the Court of Appeal held that Alberta Energy’s claims for both pre-filing and post-filing royalty arrears under leases sold subject to a CCAA vesting order were barred by operation of the joint, but not several, liability created under the Mines and Minerals Act, RSA 2000, c M-17 (MMA) and the wording of the vesting order.

Spartan has important implications and provides much-needed clarity respecting the liability exposure of co-lessees to oil and gas leases.

How the Bellatrix CCAA sale led to Crown royalty arrears claims

This appeal is rooted in the CCAA proceedings surrounding Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. (Bellatrix). Bellatrix was an oil and gas company that held interests as a co-lessee in various Crown petroleum and natural gas leases (the Leases). Canadian Natural Resources Limited (CNRL) was the other co-lessee in the Leases.

During the CCAA proceedings, Bellatrix sold its interests in the Leases to Spartan Delta Corp. (Spartan). The sale to Spartan was approved under an Approval and Vesting Order (the Vesting Order) granted by the Court and the Leases were transferred free and clear of all claims save for limited permitted encumbrances. Bellatrix remained liable for any royalty arrears that arose in the period between the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and the closing date of the sale of the Leases to Spartan in June 2020. An $8.5 million holdback was retained by the CCAA monitor to cover any post-filing claims. The CCAA proceedings were terminated in summer 2022.

Under the MMA, there is a 5½-year period in which royalty amounts are subject to recalculation by Alberta Energy. In November 2024, more than four years after the closing of the sale of the Leases, Alberta Energy issued notices to Spartan and several co-lessees, including CNRL, demanding payment of both pre-filing and post-filing royalty arrears. Spartan, CNRL and the monitor sought relief under the Vesting Order precluding the claims.

What the Alberta Court of Appeal decided on CCAA vesting orders

A. Why pre-filing royalty arrears were barred

The Court of Appeal held that Alberta Energy was not entitled to the pre-filing arrears.

The Court of Appeal held that liability under an MMA lease is joint, not joint and several. Unlike joint and several liability, where each party individually assumes an identical obligation, if joint liability is extinguished for one party it is extinguished for all.

Having determined that the extinguishment of Bellatrix’s liability for pre-filing arrears would extinguish the liability of any co-lessee, the court turned to the wording of the Vesting Order. On the plain language of the Vesting Order, the court found that royalty arrears were intended to be among the claims expunged when Bellatrix’s interests in the Leases were transferred free and clear to Spartan.

In the result, the court held that the Vesting Order barred the claims for pre-filing royalty arrears.

B. Why post-filing royalty arrears were barred

For the post-filing arrears, the Court of Appeal emphasized that Alberta Energy had notice of the holdback but did not claim from it during the CCAA process. Rather, as the CCAA proceedings had concluded, Alberta Energy had informed the monitor that Bellatrix’s royalty deposit was sufficient and that the estate could be closed.

The Court of Appeal found that the CCAA process provided a mechanism for the recovery of post-filing royalty arrears, and Alberta Energy did not use that mechanism or attempt to create a mechanism for possible future royalty adjustments.

In this context, the court held that Alberta Energy’s post-CCAA collection efforts undermined the integrity and finality of the CCAA process and offended fundamental principles of fairness. The court emphasized the “single proceeding” model for insolvency proceedings in its reasons.

Key takeaways for oil and gas co-lessees in CCAA proceedings

The Court of Appeal’s decision demonstrates the intended finality and certainty of CCAA approval and vesting orders and reinforces the importance for any affected stakeholder to participate in settling the terms of the order. The decision also provides a practical demonstration of the effect of the court’s related holding that the MMA creates only joint liability for co-lessees to Crown mineral leases. Provided that the vesting order is appropriately drafted, solvent co-lessees are provided with certainty that historical arrears are extinguished.

Cliquez à vos risques et périls : avis du personnel des ACVM sur les pratiques de cybersécurité

Fri, 31 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

Le 15 juillet 2026, les Autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières (ACVM) ont publié l’avis 33-322 du personnel, Examen des pratiques de cybersécurité des sociétés inscrites et indications supplémentaires (l’avis du personnel), à la suite d’inspections ciblées des pratiques de cybersécurité de 73 sociétés inscrites. Son contenu n’a rien de surprenant : la cybersécurité constitue un risque opérationnel majeur et les sociétés inscrites doivent mettre en place des mesures de contrôles concrètes, documentées et régulièrement mises à jour, adaptées à leur taille, à leur complexité et à leurs activités.

Points à retenir

Adaptez votre programme de cybersécurité à votre taille. Les petites et moyennes sociétés n’ont pas besoin d’une aussi grande infrastructure que celle d’une banque, par exemple, mais elles doivent tout de même se prémunir contre d’importants risques et rendre compte de leurs efforts.
Intégrez les procédures de cybersécurité à votre calendrier de conformité : révision des politiques, formation, évaluation des risques, examen des fournisseurs, essais du plan d’intervention en cas d’incident et tests de sauvegarde.
Conservez des preuves. Les ACVM mentionnent à maintes reprises la documentation, notamment les examens, les registres de formation, les évaluations des risques, le contrôle diligent des fournisseurs, les essais et les suivis.
Considérez les incidents impliquant des tiers comme vous touchant aussi. Si un fournisseur détient des données de votre société ou de vos clients, une fuite pourrait rapidement devenir un problème pour vous sur les plans réglementaire, contractuel ou de la communication avec les clients.
N’attendez pas qu’un incident se produise pour déterminer qui fait quoi. Testez votre plan d’intervention pendant une période calme.

Comme l’indique l’avis du personnel, les incidents de cybersécurité présentent un risque commercial pour les sociétés inscrites et un risque pour les données confidentielles de leurs clients en leur possession. Autrement dit, « nous pensions que les TI s’en étaient chargées » n’est pas vraiment une réponse acceptable.

Cinq pratiques de cybersécurité attendues

1. Des politiques adaptées à la réalité. Les sociétés devraient se doter de politiques et de procédures de cybersécurité écrites qui traitent des enjeux évidents : communications électroniques, appareils de la société et du personnel, accès à distance, protection et chiffrement des données, mises à jour logicielles, supervision des fournisseurs, formation, responsabilisation et signalement des incidents. Comme pour de nombreuses autres politiques, les ACVM s’attendent à ce que celles sur la cybersécurité soient révisées annuellement et qu’elles correspondent aux procédures ayant réellement cours. D’après notre expérience, il est judicieux d’évaluer les politiques, les contrôles, la gouvernance et l’établissement de rapports en fonction d’attentes véritables et de se baser sur les procédures de communication de crise, de continuité des activités, de reprise après sinistre et d’escalade déjà en vigueur. De plus, les guides d’intervention en cas d’incident devraient comporter des arbres décisionnels, un processus de signalement, ainsi que des protocoles de documentation et de conservation des preuves. Pour ce qui est des mots de passe…

2. Un programme d’apprentissage qui porte ses fruits. Une formation axée spécifiquement sur la cybersécurité devrait être donnée pendant le processus d’intégration des recrues, puis au moins une fois par année ensuite. Des rappels plus fréquents peuvent s’avérer nécessaires, selon le profil de risque de la société. Le contenu devrait porter sur l’hameçonnage et le piratage psychologique, les renseignements confidentiels, les mots de passe, la sécurité des appareils, ainsi que les situations dans lesquelles il faut signaler un incident et la manière de le faire. Il convient par ailleurs de tenir des registres des personnes ayant participé, de la date et des sujets abordés. Les simulations d’hameçonnage documentées sont pratiquement obligatoires et les membres du personnel qui ne les réussissent pas doivent faire l’objet d’un suivi ciblé.

3. Des évaluations de risques accompagnées de contrôles concrets. Les sociétés auraient avantage à mener et documenter leurs évaluations des risques de cybersécurité au moins une fois par année. Celles-ci doivent permettre de repérer les actifs critiques et les données confidentielles, les vulnérabilités internes et externes, les menaces, les conséquences potentielles et l’efficacité des contrôles mis en place. Le personnel des ACVM s’attend à ce que ces évaluations soient non seulement documentées, mais qu’elles prouvent aussi que tous les aspects essentiels ont été pris en compte. Parmi les priorités des ACVM, mentionnons les risques et les contrôles liés aux droits d’accès, notamment les accès en fonction du poste, le principe du droit d’accès minimal, la révocation rapide des droits d’accès et les examens périodiques. Les sociétés qui font appel à des tiers pour ces évaluations doivent remédier à toute lacune relevée et expliquer comment elles comptent répondre aux préoccupations soulevées. Les solutions de base possibles comprennent l’authentification multifacteur, les VPN, le chiffrement des données, les sauvegardes programmées du système, le filtrage des courriels, l’application de correctifs et la mise à jour des logiciels, la tenue de registres des activités numériques suspectes et la suppression sécuritaire des données. Le personnel souligne que les audits de cybersécurité et les tests d’intrusion, bien qu’ils ne soient pas obligatoires, constituent des pratiques efficaces.

4. Une surveillance des fournisseurs qui ne se limite pas à penser : « C’est une grande entreprise, donc tout va bien aller. » Toutes les sociétés examinées par les ACVM faisaient affaire avec des tiers fournisseurs de services ayant accès à leur système et à leurs données. Les ACVM s’attendent à ce qu’un contrôle diligent documenté soit effectué avant l’intégration d’un tiers, puis périodiquement par la suite. Il est important de comprendre comment les fournisseurs protègent les données, où elles sont stockées, comment l’accès est contrôlé et comment les responsabilités sont réparties dans les environnements infonuagiques. Nous conseillons souvent aux sociétés de renforcer leurs exigences contractuelles et de mettre à jour certains éléments, comme les contrôles liés à la cybersécurité, les avis d’incident, les droits d’audit, la sous-traitance et la gestion des données. Les rapports sur les contrôles des systèmes et de l’organisation SOC 2 ou autres documents semblables sont utiles, lorsque disponibles, mais ils doivent tout de même être revus.

5. Un plan d’intervention qui a été mis à l’essai avant qu’il ne soit trop tard. Les sociétés devraient rédiger un plan d’intervention qui comprend une définition claire de ce qu’est un cyberincident, une description des différents types de cyberattaques possibles et des mesures à prendre en cas de piratage des systèmes d’un tiers fournisseur de services qui détient des données de la société, les rôles et les responsabilités pour les notifications, les procédures d’escalade, etc. Ce plan doit être testé régulièrement au moyen de simulations. Un exercice bien conçu consiste en un scénario de rançongiciel ou de cyberincident réaliste qui fait intervenir différentes étapes décisionnelles au sein des TI, de la haute direction et du conseil d’administration. Des essais de sauvegarde et de récupération des données devraient aussi être consignés. Bien que l’assurance cybersécurité ne soit pas obligatoire, les ACVM notent qu’elle peut être utile sur les plans financier et opérationnel.

BLG peut vous aider

L’IA dans les soins de santé canadien : du projet pilote à l’adoption

Thu, 30 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

L’utilisation de l’intelligence artificielle au service des soins de santé a franchi une nouvelle étape au pays. Nous avons récemment accueilli des leaders du secteur de la santé, des représentants d’hôpitaux, des entrepreneurs en technologie et d’autres parties prenantes lors d’un symposium sur l’IA dans le milieu de la santé canadien à Toronto.

Les discussions ont mis en évidence un changement clair dans la façon dont les organismes de soins de santé abordent l’IA. Il y a un an, les conversations tournaient autour de l’expérimentation et des cas d’utilisation. Cette année, l’attention se portait bien plus sur la mise en œuvre, la gouvernance, l’approvisionnement, la responsabilisation et l’expansion. Nous avons notamment beaucoup entendu que l’IA amorçait une nouvelle phase dans le secteur.

De l’expérimentation à l’adoption

La question n’est plus de savoir si l’IA peut être utilisée. On procède déjà à des essais, des évaluations et des déploiements un peu partout dans les milieux cliniques, opérationnels et administratifs. Ce qu’il reste à déterminer est comment les organismes de soins de santé peuvent mettre en place, gérer et optimiser ces outils de manière sécuritaire, fiable, viable et juridiquement défendable.

Pendant les 12 à 24 prochains mois, les hôpitaux, les autorités sanitaires, les entreprises du secteur, les assureurs et les fournisseurs de technologies de la santé se concentreront probablement moins sur les capacités technologiques que sur la gouvernance, la responsabilisation, l’approvisionnement, la protection de la vie privée et la rigueur dans la mise en œuvre.

L’adoption de l’IA s’accélère, mais son déploiement à grande échelle tarde à suivre

Un nombre croissant d’organismes de soins de santé canadiens envisagent de recourir à l’IA pour les aider avec tout ce qui touche la documentation, les flux de travail et de la patientèle, le triage, les diagnostics, les examens d’imagerie et la prise de décisions opérationnelles. L’IA ne se limite plus à la recherche ou à des projets pilotes isolés.

Cependant, le déploiement généralisé de cette technologie dans le système de santé tarde à se faire.

Plusieurs organismes ont cerné des cas d’utilisation prometteurs et mené des essais concluants. Par contre, ils sont bien moins nombreux à avoir intégré complètement l’IA dans leurs activités quotidiennes d’une manière évolutive, reproductible et qui inspire confiance au personnel médical, à la patientèle et à la direction.

Cet écart est en train de devenir l’un des principaux défis auxquels sont confrontés les organismes de soins de santé. Les obstacles sont rarement d’ordre purement technique. Le plus souvent, les organisations sont confrontées à des défis liés aux structures de gouvernance, aux modèles d’approvisionnement, aux obligations de protection de la vie privée, aux cadres de responsabilisation, à la planification de la mise en œuvre et à la préparation organisationnelle.

Les organismes de soins de santé ne se demandent donc plus forcément si l’IA fonctionne, mais plutôt s’ils peuvent la mettre en œuvre en toute confiance dans le contexte actuel.

Pourquoi est-ce important maintenant?

L’état du réseau de la santé en ce moment rend la conversation sur l’IA plus pertinente que jamais.

Partout au Canada, les organismes de soins de santé continuent de faire face à d’importantes pressions sur leurs effectifs, à un lourd fardeau administratif, à l’épuisement professionnel de leur personnel et à des défis d’accès aux soins. Ainsi, plusieurs organismes considèrent l’IA non pas comme une initiative technologique, mais comme une occasion susceptible de leur permettre de surmonter une foule d’obstacles. Ce sentiment d’urgence est l’une des raisons qui expliquent l’importance des discussions sur la mise en œuvre, la gouvernance et la responsabilisation.

Dans ces circonstances, l’IA est vue comme un moyen de réduire la charge en matière de documentation, de faciliter les processus cliniques, d’améliorer l’efficacité opérationnelle et d’aider la prise de décision.

Cela dit, l’adoption de nouvelles technologies dans le réseau de la santé ne se fait pas aussi simplement que dans certains autres secteurs.

Le déploiement de l’IA pourrait avoir des répercussions sur les soins prodigués à la patientèle, le jugement clinique, les droits de la protection des renseignements personnels, la responsabilité des établissements et la confiance du public. Les décisions quant à la mise en œuvre ont donc des conséquences différentes de celles qu’elles pourraient avoir dans d’autres secteurs.

C’est entre autres pourquoi la gouvernance est maintenant au cœur des discussions.

La gouvernance devient une condition préalable à la croissance

Un thème récurrent tout au long du symposium était que la gouvernance ne doit plus être une arrière-pensée.

La gouvernance s’impose de plus en plus comme le lien entre des projets pilotes réussis et une mise en œuvre durable.

Les organismes de soins de santé doivent répondre à une série de questions fondamentales :

Qui approuve la mise en place d’un système d’IA?
Quelles données probantes faut-il fournir avant la mise en œuvre?
Qui est responsable lorsque des problèmes surviennent?
Comment les systèmes seront-ils surveillés au fil du temps?
Dans quels cas faut-il suspendre, réentraîner, modifier ou abandonner un système?
Comment faut-il consigner et gérer les incidents, les presque exemples et les résultats imprévus?

La gouvernance porte donc de moins en moins sur l’élaboration de politiques et de plus en plus sur la mise en place de structures opérationnelles qui favorisent une utilisation responsable de l’IA tout au long du cycle de vie d’une organisation.

Les organismes qui ne parviennent pas à répondre à ces questions pourraient avoir de la difficulté à aller au-delà des cas d’utilisation isolés, quelles que soient les capacités de la technologie sous-jacente.

La protection de la vie privée et la gouvernance des données demeurent fondamentales

On ne peut aborder la question de l’IA dans les soins de santé sans parler de respect de la vie privée et de gouvernance des données. Le sujet est d’autant plus d’actualité, puisque le Canada a récemment déposé le projet de loi C-36, Loi visant à protéger la vie privée et les données des consommateurs, qui remplacerait la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels et les documents électroniques à titre de régime fédéral de la protection de la confidentialité dans le secteur privé; BLG a publié un guide détaillé sur les modifications proposées.

La mise en œuvre de l’IA soulève souvent des enjeux relatifs aux renseignements sur la santé, à la dépersonnalisation, au consentement, à l’accès des fournisseurs, à la cybersécurité, à l’utilisation secondaire des données et au risque de réidentification.

Les organismes de soins de santé qui explorent des solutions d’IA particulièrement complexes doivent trouver un équilibre entre leurs objectifs d’innovation, leurs obligations légales et les attentes du public.

Il est important de noter que les enjeux de gouvernance vont au-delà de la conformité. La confiance du public demeure un facteur essentiel à l’adoption réussie de l’IA. Les organismes de soins de santé doivent être capables d’expliquer comment les données sont utilisées, quelles mesures de protection sont en place et comment la responsabilité est répartie tout au long du déploiement.

La confiance n’est pas simplement une question de communication; il s’agit d’une exigence opérationnelle.

La discussion sur les normes de diligence commence

L’une des discussions les plus intéressantes de tout le symposium a porté sur l’évolution de la relation entre l’IA et les normes de diligence.

Par le passé, les préoccupations ont principalement porté sur les risques associés à une dépendance excessive aux résultats générés par l’IA. Évidemment, le personnel médical demeure responsable de l’exercice de son jugement professionnel et de ses décisions cliniques.

Une autre question pourrait se poser maintenant que l’adoption de l’IA se généralise.

Si plusieurs outils gagnent en précision et en fiabilité et qu’ils deviennent plus généralement acceptés dans la pratique clinique, le fait de ne pas tenir compte de certains outils d’IA déjà largement reconnus ne crée-t-il pas une catégorie de risque distincte?

Même si la législation canadienne n’a pas encore offert de réponses définitives, les organisations devraient s’attendre à ce qu’une attention accrue soit accordée aux interactions entre l’IA et les obligations professionnelles, la prise de décision clinique et la gestion des risques institutionnels.

Cette question revêtira assurément une importance croissante à mesure que l’IA passe du stade expérimental à celui d’une adoption à plus grande échelle.

Les achats et les contrats se rapportant à l’IA deviennent des enjeux stratégiques

Un autre point à retenir du symposium est que bon nombre de risques liés à l’IA sont, en fin de compte, gérés ou créés par le biais d’ententes contractuelles.

Les organismes de soins de santé accordent souvent la priorité à la fonctionnalité d’un outil proposé. Les modalités régissant la mise en œuvre, la maintenance, la mise à jour, la surveillance et le soutien de ce dernier au fil du temps sont toutefois tout aussi importantes.

Les organisations devraient examiner attentivement les éléments suivants :

répartition des responsabilités;
obligations de respect de la vie privée et de sécurité;
propriété des données et utilisations autorisées;
responsabilité de mise en œuvre;
attentes de rendement;
droits d’audit et de signalement;
obligations relatives à la mise à jour des modèles, aux fonctionnalités et au réentraînement;
interruptions de service et interventions en cas d’incident;
exigences de gouvernance et de surveillance.

L’évolution des systèmes d’IA fait en sorte que les ententes d’approvisionnement, plutôt que de se limiter à l’acquisition de logiciels, doivent également prendre en considération la gestion du cycle de vie.

La conclusion de contrat est donc un aspect stratégique de la gouvernance de l’IA, pas simplement une tâche administrative.

Cinq questions pratiques pour les organismes de soins de santé

Alors que les organismes de soins de santé évaluent leurs projets d’IA, les équipes de direction devraient se poser les questions suivantes :

Quel problème voulons-nous régler?
Quelle structure de gouvernance supervisera la mise en œuvre et l’utilisation à long terme?
Comment les risques ayant trait à la protection de la vie privée, la gouvernance des données et la cybersécurité seront-ils pris en compte?
Quelles mesures de protection contractuelles sont nécessaires pour gérer les risques de manière appropriée?
Comment l’organisation évaluera-t-elle le rendement, assurera-t-elle le suivi des résultats et réagira-t-elle aux problèmes après le déploiement?

Les organismes capables d’apporter des réponses pertinentes à ces questions seront bien positionnés pour passer de la phase d’expérimentation à une mise en œuvre durable.

Une approche multidisciplinaire est essentielle

Les enjeux entourant l’IA dans le réseau de la santé relèvent rarement d’une seule discipline juridique ou opérationnelle.

Ils touchent souvent simultanément au droit de la santé, à la protection de la vie privée, à la cybersécurité, à l’approvisionnement en technologies, à la conformité réglementaire, à la gouvernance, à l’assurance, aux risques de litiges et à la gestion des risques d’entreprise.

Au lieu d’aborder un seul enjeu de façon isolée, les organisations ont besoin de conseils englobant différents points de vue.

Chez BLG, nos équipes Droit de la santé, Cybersécurité et respect de la vie privée, Technologies, Droit des sociétés et droit commercial, Réglementation en matière de santé et Litiges travaillent ensemble pour aider les organismes de soins de santé à analyser leurs projets d’IA sous différents angles, qu’il s’agisse d’évaluer les cadres de gouvernance, de négocier des ententes d’approvisionnement, d’examiner les obligations de protection des renseignements personnels, d’élaborer des politiques de mise en œuvre ou de gérer les risques opérationnels et cliniques.

Regard vers l’avenir

S’il y a bien une chose à retenir du symposium de BLG sur l’IA dans le milieu de la santé canadien, c’est que cette technologie est passée de l’abstrait au concret.

Les organisations qui réussiront au cours des 12 à 24 prochains mois ne seront pas nécessairement celles qui adopteront l’IA en premier, mais plutôt celles qui parviendront à la gérer, à l’expliquer, à en assurer la surveillance et à en assumer la responsabilité une fois qu’elle fera partie intégrante des activités quotidiennes, en plus de collaborer efficacement avec des tiers.

À mesure que les organismes de soins de santé passent de l’étape de l’expérimentation à celle du déploiement, la capacité à encadrer, à surveiller et à gérer l’IA fera la différence entre les initiatives couronnées de succès et celles qui échouent. BLG continuera de collaborer avec les hôpitaux, les organismes de soins de santé, les entreprises de technologie et les autres acteurs du secteur pour les aider à relever les défis juridiques, réglementaires, opérationnels et de gouvernance qui accompagnent cette nouvelle phase d’adoption de l’IA.

Communiquer avec les personnes qui ont rédigé le présent article ou l’une des personnes-ressources dont le nom figure ci-après pour discuter de l’incidence que pourraient avoir sur votre organisation les enjeux de gouvernance de l’IA, d’approvisionnement et de respect de la vie privée ou les risques cliniques.

Nous vous invitons également à vous abonner à notre bulletin sur l’IA et les soins de santé (en anglais seulement).

McCarthy v. Bison Transport: Ontario court upholds just cause dismissal

Thu, 30 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

In McCarthy v. Bison Transport Inc., 2026 ONSC 3729, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice upheld a termination for just cause arising from an employee’s second failed drug test. The decision highlights the importance of clear workplace policies, consistent enforcement, and the limits of the duty to accommodate in the absence of an actual or perceived substance-dependency disability.

Key takeaways for employers on just cause dismissal

McCarthy v. Bison Transport Inc. confirms that employers in safety sensitive industries may rely on breaches of drug and alcohol policies as grounds for just cause termination, provided those policies are clearly communicated to employees, consistently enforced and impose consequences proportionate to the breach.

Employers may rely on a positive drug test to support termination where an employee knowingly violates a valid workplace policy.
The duty to accommodate does not apply where there is no actual or perceived substance-dependency disability.
Where an employee has, or is perceived to have, a substance-dependency disability, employers must accommodate to the point of undue hardship.
Clear documentation, signed acknowledgements and prior warnings can help employers show employees understood the policy and the consequences of breaching it.
Good faith, transparent termination processes can help reduce the risk of aggravated and punitive damages.

Background: failed drug tests and workplace policy enforcement

Mr. McCarthy worked for Bison Transport, a federally regulated employer, for four years as a long-haul driver. When he was hired, Mr. McCarthy attended mandatory training and signed an acknowledgement confirming his understanding that violations of Bison Transport’s Drug and Alcohol Policy (the Policy) could result in disciplinary action, including termination.

In November 2014, Mr. McCarthy failed a random drug test administered in accordance with Bison Transport’s Drug and Alcohol Testing Procedures. Bison Transport placed Mr. McCarthy on an unpaid leave of absence and required him to complete a return-to-work program, including educational programming and testing requirements. Later that month, Mr. McCarthy returned to work, undergoing further random drug testing, which he passed. Following his return to work, Mr. McCarthy signed a written warning expressly advising that any future failed drug or alcohol tests could result in his immediate termination.

In October 2017, Mr. McCarthy failed a second drug test. During a subsequent meeting, he again acknowledged the Policy and his understanding that a second violation could lead to his termination. Bison Transport terminated his employment for cause with immediate effect.

Mr. McCarthy commenced a wrongful dismissal action. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed his claim, holding that his termination was justified under the Policy, which was found to be a reasonable one for employees in safety sensitive positions.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice’s reasoning: policy clarity, good faith and evidentiary proof

A clear and consistently enforced workplace policy can support termination for just cause

Bison Transport argued that it had just cause to terminate Mr. McCarthy’s employment after he violated its Policy by failing a second drug test while employed in a safety sensitive position.

The Court agreed. In its decision, the Court reaffirmed that an employer relying on a breach of a corporate policy as grounds for termination must prove that the policy was well-known to the employee, that it was consistently enforced, and that it imposed consequences proportionate to the implications of the breach.

The evidence showed that the Policy had been clearly communicated to and understood by Mr. McCarthy and that it was consistently enforced by Bison Transport. The Court also noted that Mr. McCarthy had acknowledged, following his first failed drug test in 2014, that a second failed test could result in his immediate termination. Further, the Court found that the Policy itself was reasonable given the safety sensitive nature of Mr. McCarthy’s position.

Finally, the Court found no evidence that Mr. McCarthy had, or was perceived to have, a substance addiction or dependency issue that would have triggered Bison Transport’s duty to accommodate. The Court concluded that, given the “uncontradicted evidence” that Mr. McCarthy neither suffered from nor was perceived to suffer from a drug-related disability, Bison Transport had no obligation to accommodate him and was justified in terminating his employment for cause following his second failed drug test.

Honest and transparent termination processes can limit an employer’s damages exposure

Mr. McCarthy sought damages for breach of contract and breach of the Canadian Human Rights Act, as well as aggravated and punitive damages.

Having found that Mr. McCarthy was not wrongfully dismissed, the Court briefly considered the damages that would have been awarded had his claim succeeded. In doing so, it rejected his claim for damages under the Canadian Human Rights Act, emphasizing that there was no evidence that he suffered from a disability or was perceived to have one.

The Court also dismissed Mr. McCarthy’s claims for aggravated and punitive damages, finding no evidence to support the allegation that Bison Transport engaged in unfair, bad-faith or otherwise deliberate unlawful behaviour during his termination. In contrast, Bison Transport was found to have acted honestly and transparently throughout the process, motivated by legitimate public safety concerns. The Court concluded that, even if Mr. McCarthy had been wrongfully dismissed, Bison Transport's conduct during the termination process did not warrant an award of aggravated or punitive damages.

What McCarthy v. Bison Transport Inc. means for Ontario employers

Employers in safety sensitive industries may rely on workplace policies, including drug and alcohol policies, to justify termination for just cause. To do so, however, employers must ensure their policies are clear, well-communicated to employees, consistently enforced, and proportionate to the breach.
Employers should maintain complete and accurate records of policy documents, employee training, signed acknowledgements, warnings, testing results, and other documentation showing that employees understand applicable policies, procedures and consequences.
Random drug and alcohol testing may be permissible in safety sensitive workplace environments, particularly where the testing is connected to legitimate safety concerns and implemented through a reasonable workplace policy.
If human rights issues are engaged (for example, in the drug and alcohol context if the employee has or is perceived to have a drug or alcohol dependency), employers must remain mindful of the duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. On the other hand, recreational drug use alone, without a dependency, does not trigger an employer’s duty to accommodate.
Employers can reduce the risk of aggravated and punitive damages by handling disciplinary and termination decisions honestly, transparently and in good faith.

BLG’s Labour and Employment group can help

If you have questions about just cause dismissal or any other labour and employment matter, BLG's Labour & Employment Group provides strategic advice to employers across Canada. Reach out to the authors or key contacts for guidance tailored to your organization.

La CSC confirme que la Constitution garantit le droit au contrôle judiciaire pour des questions de fait et de droit

Thu, 30 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

Dans l’arrêt Démocratie en surveillance c. Canada (Procureur général), la Cour suprême du Canada a confirmé que la Constitutiongarantit la possibilité de recourir à un contrôle de la légalité à l’égard de tous les aspects d’une décision administrative. Les clauses privatives qui empêchent les cours de justice d’exercer cette fonction de surveillance sont inconstitutionnelles.

Selon la Cour suprême, la surveillance politique générale qu’exerce le Parlement envers le commissaire aux conflits d’intérêts et à l’éthique (le « commissaire ») ne représente pas un recours subsidiaire adéquat au contrôle judiciaire des décisions du commissaire. La Cour a également déclaré inconstitutionnelle une clause privative partielle qui cherchait à empêcher le contrôle judiciaire des décisions du commissaire sur des questions de fait et de droit.

Points à retenir

Tous les aspects d’une décision administrative sont susceptibles de contrôle judiciaire : Le contrôle de la légalité sur des questions de fait et de droit fait partie du pouvoir essentiel de surveillance dont les cours supérieures sont investies et qui est protégé par les articles 96 à 101 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867. La Cour n’a pas retenu la thèse voulant qu’un contrôle selon la norme de la décision raisonnable prévue dans l’arrêt Vavilov représente le seuil minimal garanti par la Constitution.
Les clauses privatives partielles sont inconstitutionnelles : La Constitution ne permet pas au pouvoir législatif d’écarter la compétence de surveillance essentielle des tribunaux au moyen de clauses privatives, même partielles. Toute clause privative qu’il n’est pas possible d’interpréter de façon conforme à la Constitution devrait être frappée de nullité.
Un recours subsidiaire adéquat doit comporter un contrôle de la légalité et une réparation appropriée : Une cour de justice peut refuser d’examiner une demande de contrôle judiciaire sur le fond au motif qu’il existe un « recours subsidiaire adéquat », mais l’autre entité compétente doit pouvoir contrôler la légalité de la décision contestée et offrir une réparation aussi appropriée que celle qu’un contrôle judiciaire aurait permise.
La surveillance politique générale ne peut pas adéquatement remplacer le contrôle judiciaire : Le Parlement dispose d’un pouvoir général de surveillance sur les actions du commissaire, mais ce pouvoir n’apportait pas à Démocratie en surveillance la réparation qu’un contrôle judiciaire aurait offerte, c’est-à-dire le contrôle de la légalité du rapport du commissaire.

Contexte

Dans un rapport déposé le 14 mai 2021, le commissaire a conclu que le premier ministre de l’époque, Justin Trudeau, n’avait pas enfreint la Loi sur les conflits d’intérêts, L.C. 2006, ch. 9 (la « LCI »), en lien avec deux décisions de financement impliquant l’organisme de bienfaisance UNIS. Démocratie en surveillance a ensuite demandé le contrôle judiciaire du rapport à la Cour d’appel fédérale, soutenant qu’il comportait des erreurs de fait et de droit. Le procureur général du Canada a déposé une requête en radiation de cette demande, faisant notamment valoir que la clause privative de l’article 66 de la LCI empêchait tout contrôle judiciaire des conclusions du commissaire sur les questions de fait et de droit et ne permettait un contrôle que sur les questions de compétence.

Une formation complète de la Cour d’appel fédérale a accueilli la requête du procureur général, au motif que Démocratie en surveillance disposait d’un autre recours approprié, à savoir la surveillance exercée par le Comité permanent de l’accès à l’information, de la protection des renseignements personnels et de l’éthique, auquel le commissaire rend compte de l’application de la LCI chaque année. La Cour d’appel fédérale s’est appuyée sur l’arrêt Canada (Vérificateur général) c. Canada (Ministre de l’Énergie, des Mines et des Ressources), dans lequel la Cour suprême a jugé que le vérificateur général disposait d’un recours adéquat (un mécanisme de reddition de comptes au Parlement) pour contester des décisions du gouverneur en conseil. Ainsi, la Cour d’appel fédérale a estimé que le pouvoir de surveillance parlementaire du commissaire constituait un recours subsidiaire adéquat pour Démocratie en surveillance. Dans une opinion minoritaire, le juge en chef de Montigny aurait également conclu que la clause privative de l’article 66 faisait barrage à un contrôle judiciaire, mais la majorité a jugé que la clause privative n’était pas exécutoire.

La décision de la Cour suprême du Canada

La Cour suprême a accueilli le pourvoi de Démocratie en surveillance. Dans un jugement unanime sous la plume du juge en chef Wagner, elle a statué que Démocratie en surveillance ne bénéficie d’aucun recours subsidiaire adéquat et que la Constitution impose un contrôle de la légalité de tous les aspects des décisions administratives, y compris sur les questions de fait et sur les questions de droit. Par conséquent, l’article 66 de la LCI, qui visait à exclure certains aspects de ce contrôle, a été jugé inconstitutionnel et déclaré sans effet dans la mesure où il fait obstacle au contrôle judiciaire des questions de fait et de droit.

Un processus politique pour faire appliquer la LCI ne constitue pas un recours subsidiaire adéquat

La Cour suprême a statué que la Cour d’appel fédérale avait eu tort de considérer que la reddition de comptes politique au Parlement, assurée par l’obligation du commissaire de déposer un rapport annuel, constituait un recours subsidiaire adéquat. Même si les tribunaux peuvent, à leur discrétion, refuser d’entendre une demande de contrôle judiciaire sur le fond lorsqu’il existe un recours subsidiaire adéquat, ce dernier n’est adéquat que s’il permet de contrôler la légalité de la décision administrative et d’ordonner une réparation appropriée.

La Cour suprême a établi une distinction entre l’arrêt Canada (Vérificateur général) — où le vérificateur général avait lui-même demandé un contrôle judiciaire malgré l’existence d’un recours subsidiaire de nature politique — et le cas de Démocratie en surveillance, qui a demandé un contrôle judiciaire en s’appuyant sur la qualité pour agir dans l’intérêt public et qui ne dispose d’aucun autre recours sous le régime de la LCI. La surveillance politique par le Parlement ne donne à Démocratie en surveillance aucun droit de faire contrôler la légalité du rapport du commissaire. En outre, l’article 47 de la LCI prévoit que les conclusions du rapport contesté sont définitives et que personne ne peut les modifier. La Cour suprême du Canada a donc souligné qu’il était « difficile de voir » quel recours politique le Parlement pourrait offrir à Démocratie en surveillance. En pratique, seul un recours judiciaire permettait à l’organisme de faire contrôler la légalité du rapport.

La Constitution garantit un contrôle de la légalité de décisions sur des questions de fait et de droit

La Cour suprême a aussi confirmé que la Constitution garantit un contrôle de la légalité portant sur tous les aspects d’une décision administrative, y compris les questions de fait et de droit. Au titre des articles 96 à 101 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867, les tribunaux assument une fonction constitutionnelle de surveillance de l’administration publique grâce au contrôle judiciaire de l’exercice des pouvoirs publics. Cette fonction est essentielle à la primauté du droit, laquelle exige que tout pouvoir juridique soit exercé dans le respect de ses limites. En soulignant l’importance du contrôle judiciaire pour la primauté du droit, la Cour suprême suit sa jurisprudence antérieure, comme l’arrêt Yatar c. TD Assurance Meloche Monnex, qui réaffirme le caractère constitutionnel du droit de solliciter un contrôle judiciaire.

Dans l’arrêt Crevier c. P.G. (Québec), la Cour suprême a reconnu qu’une clause privative ne peut pas empêcher le contrôle judiciaire d’une décision administrative sur une question de compétence. Elle précise maintenant que cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu’on puisse soustraire les questions de fait ou de droit au contrôle judiciaire. Selon la Cour, il faut lire l’arrêt Crevier dans son contexte historique, en tenant compte de l’évolution de la notion des « questions de compétence » et des modifications apportées à la norme de contrôle applicable. L’arrêt Crevier n’a jamais eu pour but de permettre aux clauses privatives de soustraire des conclusions de fait ou de droit déraisonnables au contrôle judiciaire.

Ceci étant dit, la Cour n’a pas retenu la thèse avancée par certaines parties et certains intervenants voulant que le contrôle d’après la norme de la décision raisonnable, telle qu’elle est énoncée dans l’arrêt Vavilov, représente le minimum constitutionnel garanti. Selon elle, les normes de contrôle issues de la common law ont évolué dans le passé et peuvent encore évoluer. Elle a donc choisi de réserver cette question pour une autre occasion.

En conséquence, toute disposition législative qui aurait pour effet de soustraire des décisions au pouvoir de surveillance des tribunaux est inconstitutionnelle. La Cour suprême a jugé que l’article 66 de la LCI, qui vise à exclure le contrôle judiciaire de questions de fait et de droit, ne pouvait pas recevoir une interprétation compatible avec la Constitution; elle l’a donc déclaré inopérant.

L’arrêt Démocratie en surveillance jouera un rôle déterminant dans l’affaire de La Compagnie des chemins de fer nationaux du Canada c. Alberta Pacific Forest Industries Inc. (42092), dont le plus haut tribunal du pays instruira l’appel en novembre. La Cour devra se prononcer sur la constitutionnalité de l’article 18.5 de la Loi sur les Cours fédérales, disposition qui soustrait à la compétence de la Cour fédérale les demandes de contrôle judiciaire de questions susceptibles d’être portées en appel devant le gouverneur en conseil. BLG représente le CN dans l’appel.

What CIRO is doing: Enforcement report for 2025-2026

Tue, 28 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

On July 22, 2026, the Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) released its enforcement report for the 2026 fiscal year, from April 1, 2025, to March 31, 2026 (the Report), which can be found here. The Report covers enforcement activities and priorities for both investment and mutual fund dealers over the past year and notes that most integration priorities have now been completed. CIRO “continues to modernize its regulatory approach by integrating systems, policies and processes to strengthen regulatory effectiveness.”

Key CIRO enforcement trends for investment and mutual fund dealers

We have excerpted some important findings from the Report and believe these trends will continue in the year ahead:

CIRO focuses on dealer supervision, gatekeeping and compliance systems:
1. CIRO continues to focus on cases involving system issues, dealer supervision and gatekeeping. While there are still individual misconduct cases, there is a noticeable shift toward scrutinizing firms’ compliance systems with a focus on preventing misconduct, not simply responding to it.
CIRO pursues fewer enforcement proceedings with higher fines:
1. Year over year, proceedings commenced and concluded have decreased, but sanctions and disgorgement have significantly increased. This means CIRO is prosecuting fewer cases but pursuing higher-value proceedings.
CIRO harmonizes MFDA and IIROC enforcement systems:
1. The Report emphasizes that the MFDA and IIROC systems have merged and are operating as one system.

CIRO enforcement activity in 2026 focuses on investor protection and market integrity

The Report highlights that in 2026, CIRO hearing panels imposed more than $15 million in sanctions. The Report also notes that suspensions and permanent bars were imposed, predominantly against individuals, and that CIRO continued to pursue disgorgement orders. The cases advanced focused on the effectiveness of supervision and internal controls, as well as the obligation of regulated entities and individuals to act as gatekeepers to the capital markets.

CIRO also continued to refer cases to the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA). In the 2026 fiscal year, 86 market-related cases were referred, including 32 manipulation cases, nine insider trading cases and 45 other Securities Act violations.

This year, the Report focuses on cases involving the protection of investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent practices, improving industry standards and promoting market integrity:

Against firms, the Report noted several decisions related to breaches of supervisory obligations and a lack of due diligence in the opening and operation of accounts.
Against individual regulated persons, the Report drew attention to decisions relating to discretionary trading, misappropriation of client funds and unauthorized transfers.

CIRO enforcement statistics show higher sanctions and changing complaint trends

The Report includes a detailed summary of statistics on sanctions imposed in 2026, the fine collection rate and the number of complaints, investigations and enforcement proceedings.

In 2026, there were a total of nine decisions against firms, compared with seven decisions in 2025 and 10 decisions in 2024. The quantum of monetary sanctions against firms more than doubled in 2026, reversing the decline seen between 2024 and 2025. Dealers were collectively ordered to pay a total of $4,097,500 in fines in 2026, up from $2,400,000 in 2025. Dealers were also ordered to disgorge a total of $4,305,790, a nearly sevenfold increase from $623,925 in 2025.

As for individuals, total fines ordered increased from $4,992,523 in 2025, in connection with 50 decisions, to $6,266,999 in 2026, in connection with 39 decisions. The quantum of disgorgement decreased from $1,718,059 in 2025 to $958,684 in 2026, though this amount remains higher than the $427,997 in disgorgement in 2024. There was also a decrease in the number of suspensions, conditions and permanent bars compared with 2025.

The number of Complaints and Settlement Reporting System (ComSet) complaints increased substantially, from 3,833 in 2025 to 6,426 in 2026. However, CIRO attributed the increase to several large mutual fund dealer members filing service-related and other events in ComSet that were not previously reported in the Member Event Tracking System (METS) and noted that the additional events did not raise regulatory concerns or increase the number of enforcement cases opened.

Notably, 2026 saw a year-over-year decrease in enforcement proceedings, both commenced and concluded, continuing the trend from 2024 to 2025. The majority of concluded proceedings were settlement hearings, with the firms or registered individuals involved agreeing to the imposed sanctions.

Increased scrutiny for regulated firms

CIRO’s 2025-26 enforcement report signals a continued focus on stronger supervision, effective compliance systems and meaningful consequences for misconduct. Regulated firms should review their internal controls, supervision practices and gatekeeping obligations to ensure they are prepared for increased scrutiny in the year ahead.

The clean economy ITC labour requirements: How they work, new CRA guidance and some residual issues

Mon, 27 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

NOTE: For a print-friendly version of this document that includes visuals and tables, please download and print the .pdf file.

Canada’s clean economy investment tax credits (ITCs) constitute a major tax policy expenditure supporting Canada’s efforts to achieve a net-carbon-zero economy by 2050. These ITCs, which are explained and summarized here, are often a critical element in the financial viability of many carbon capture, energy generation, battery storage and other clean economy projects.

While the details of the different clean economy ITCs vary somewhat, they generally follow a more or less common format:

eligible taxpayers, generally taxable Canadian corporations, incur expenditures that qualify for a particular clean economy ITC (“qualifying expenditures”), generally being the cost of specific tangible property designated as ITC-eligible, such as a wind turbine;
qualifying expenditures generally include the full cost of acquiring and installing ITC-eligible property and putting it into active service, but generally exclude “preliminary work activity” such as front-end design or engineering work; and
for each taxation year, the eligible taxpayer claims an amount of the particular clean economy ITC equal to total qualifying expenditures for that year, reduced by any “government assistance” received or receivable by the taxpayer, multiplied by the ITC rate for that particular clean economy ITC. This is done by completing and filing the prescribed form applicable to that particular clean economy ITC by the deadline permitted for so doing. Prescribed forms and other information can be found on the Canada Revenue Agency’s clean economy ITC webpage. The amount of ITC the taxpayer is entitled to is credited to the taxpayer’s CRA account and either reduces its taxes owing or is paid to the taxpayer.

Taxpayer’s $ ITC entitlement = ITC rate × $ taxpayer’s qualifying expenditures

When it comes to the ITC rate, the taxpayer has a choice to make when claiming the ITC and completing the required prescribed form (except for the Clean Technology Manufacturing ITC, to which the labour requirements do not apply). If a taxpayer elects to meet the “labour requirements” set out in s. 127.46 ITA, it may claim the particular clean economy ITC at the “regular tax credit rate.” This means the full ITC rate specified in the legislation, such as 30 per cent for the Clean Technology ITC, 15 per cent for the Clean Electricity ITC and so on. Otherwise, the taxpayer may claim only the “reduced tax credit rate,” being 10 percentage points lower than the “regular tax credit rate,” viz., 20 per cent for the Clean Technology ITC, five per cent for the Clean Electricity ITC and so on. It is not uncommon on major clean economy projects for the difference between the regular and reduced ITC rate to amount to tens of millions of dollars, or more on the largest projects.

If a taxpayer elects to meet the labour requirements (which consist of a “prevailing wage requirement” and an “apprenticeship requirement”) but does not in fact meet them, there are two possible outcomes as regards the ITC rate:

if the CRA determines that the taxpayer failed to meet those requirements “knowingly or in circumstances amounting to gross negligence” (the K/GN Standard), the taxpayer effectively suffers a 15 per cent ITC rate reduction, i.e., what would normally be a 30 per cent rate for the Clean Technology ITC essentially becomes 15 per cent instead, a catastrophic result for many clean economy projects; or
otherwise, the taxpayer gets the regular tax credit rate but must pay a per diem tax in ss. 127.46(6) or (7) to the CRA and top-up payments to any underpaid employees.

Hence, the K/GN Standard constitutes a fork in the road for establishing the consequences of labour requirements non-compliance.

The discussion that follows describes some of the interpretive and practical issues associated with the labour requirements, and reviews the conclusions reached by the CRA’s Income Tax Rulings Directorate (Rulings) in CRA document 2025-1081341E5, dated April 28, 2026 (the New CRA Guidance). In the New CRA Guidance, Rulings answers questions about a situation where the taxpayer has engaged a contractor whose employees (1) are not covered by an eligible collective agreement and (2) are paid less than what the labour requirements prescribe to be the compensation necessary to comply with the “prevailing wage” element of the labour requirements.

The New CRA Guidance makes the following interpretive determinations:

in a situation where no eligible collective agreement applies to covered workers who have been paid less than the prevailing wage, the taxpayer can correct this deficiency, i.e., pay these workers the shortfall to bring them up to the prevailing wage, any time before the taxpayer prepares and files their ITC claim for the relevant taxation year and be in full compliance with this element of the prevailing wage requirement. As a result of being in compliance, the per diem tax in s. 127.46(6) will not be applicable, and the late payment of these workers will not prevent the taxpayer from attesting to having met the labour requirements or risk transgressing the K/GN Standard if the taxpayer elects to meet the labour requirements and claim the regular tax credit rate;
in cases where the per diem tax in s. 127.46(6) does apply, it is computed with reference to the number of days of work for which the relevant worker was not paid the prevailing wage, viz., “each day” means “each day of work for which the worker was short-paid,” not “each day such shortfall remains unpaid” or any other interpretation;
a taxpayer who has actual knowledge of a prevailing wage requirement deficiency cannot remedy it so as to come into compliance by paying the top-up penalty described in s. 127.46(13) to the CRA;
a taxpayer who has actual knowledge of a prevailing wage requirement deficiency for a particular taxation year, elects to meet the labour requirements and claims the regular tax credit rate for that year risks transgressing the K/GN Standard and the very adverse consequences that entails, and should instead claim only the reduced tax credit rate for that year;
a taxpayer may claim the reduced tax credit rate in one taxation year without thereby disentitling itself from claiming the regular tax credit rate in other years, viz., the reference to “each installation taxation year” in s. 127.46(2) should not be interpreted as requiring a taxpayer to elect to meet the labour requirements for every installation taxation year in respect of any particular clean economy ITC; and
where a taxpayer does transgress the K/GN Standard in respect of a particular taxation year, the adverse implications of that are limited to that particular taxation year, viz., the reference in s. 127.46(9)(a) to being “not entitled to the regular tax credit rate” is limited to that taxation year (referred to in s. 127.46(9) as the “claim year”).

This article goes on to address an apparent legislative gap in the rules relating to the K/GN Standard that is problematic where an ITC claimant knows, or strongly suspects, some element of the prevailing wage requirement has not been met for one or more covered workers, and is practically unable to remedy the situation in a way that meets the definition of “compliance” within the meaning of the statute. For example, where a covered worker is an employee of a contractor or subcontractor retained by the taxpayer to work on the project, i.e., the taxpayer has no direct relationship with the relevant employee, the taxpayer may have no practical ability to ensure that any shortfall is paid to the employee if the contractor becomes unco-operative, goes out of business or loses contact with the employee.

Read literally, the rules as drafted would appear to prevent such a taxpayer from claiming the regular tax credit rate for fear of being found to have “knowingly or in circumstances amounting to gross negligence failed to meet those requirements” if they claim the regular tax credit rate. Such a taxpayer would thus be forced into claiming only the reduced tax credit rate because the compliance deficiency, no matter how small, they are aware of is one they do not have the ability to fix. The imposition of a 10 per cent ITC rate reduction for the entire amount of the taxpayer’s clean economy ITC claim for the year seems profoundly disproportionate and unfair in such circumstances.

Fundamentally, some mechanism is needed for allowing a taxpayer who is aware of a compliance deficiency and is willing to address it to do so in a way that is considered to constitute “compliance” with the labour requirements, allowing the taxpayer to claim the regular tax credit rate without fear of transgressing the K/GN Standard. For example, deeming self-reported compliance deficiencies not to meet the K/GN Standard would encourage taxpayers trying to meet the policy objectives of the labour requirements to do so rather than opt out of them and claim the reduced tax credit rate, a lose-lose outcome.

I. The labour requirements: Overview

The labour requirements are intended to “incentivize companies to create good jobs”. They are modelled on similar requirements that exist under comparable U.S. tax credit legislation, although they are used in the U.S. for other purposes and American taxpayers have decades of experience in dealing with them. The labour requirements have two distinct elements:

the “prevailing wage requirements”, which require “covered workers” to be adequately compensated for the “preparation or installation” of ITC-eligible property at the taxpayer’s work site (herein, P&I Work); and
the “apprenticeship requirements”, which require the taxpayer to make reasonable efforts to ensure that apprentices registered in Red Seal trades (or equivalent provincially registered trade) work at least 10 per cent of the hours worked during the year by “covered workers” who are Red Seal workers performing P&I Work at the taxpayer’s project site. For this purpose, a safe harbour rule deems the taxpayer to have met this requirement where it takes the prescribed actions.

“Covered workers”

A key concept of both labour requirements is “covered workers”, defined as an individual:

who is an employee (whether of the taxpayer or someone else, such as a contractor retained by the taxpayer or sub-contractor of such contractor) engaged in P&I Work;
whose duties at the taxpayer’s work site are primarily manual or physical; and
who is neither an administrative, clerical or executive employee nor a “business visitor to Canada” as described in section 187 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations.

The “covered worker” definition raises various interpretive questions. For example, the scope of what constitutes P&I Work is a matter of some judgment. As a general rule, it seems logical to presume that the scope of P&I Work would not include activities that are excluded from ITC eligibility. For example, one would think that activities excluded from eligibility for the CCUS ITC as “preliminary CCUS work activity” generally should not be considered to be “preparation or installation” of CCUS ITC-eligible property, by virtue of being “preliminary to the acquisition, construction, fabrication or installation of” such property.

To some degree, this is supported by a careful reading of the ITC legislation and, in particular, the “covered worker” definition, which refers to the preparation or installation “of” ITC-eligible property. Some looser connection between the preparation/installation work and the ITC-eligible property could have been used, such as preparation or installation activities “relating to” or “in respect of” ITC-eligible property. The choice was made to limit activities that are in-scope of the labour requirements as P&I Work to those with a closer, more direct link between ITC-eligible property and the in-scope activities created by the use of the preposition “of.”

In this regard, CRA document 2025-1081921E5, dated February 25, 2026, is interesting. It considered the case of a very large property described in Class 57(a) to be used in a carbon capture project. This property required a large hole to be excavated, and pilings installed in the hole in order to create a concrete foundation to permanently support the ITC-eligible property. The foundation constituted a Class 57(f) property¹ so as to be itself be ITC-eligible, leading Rulings to conclude as follows:

As a result, Canco would be subject to the labour requirements for the preparation or installation of the Foundation (a specified property), provided that Canco elects to meet the labour requirements under subsection 127.46(2). In our view, this would include the excavation of the hole into which the Foundation will be placed, the installation of the pilings and the pouring of the concrete to construct the Foundation. All of these activities are part of the installation of the Foundation and therefore would constitute the “preparation or installation of specified property” for purposes of the labour requirements in section 127.46.

Similarly, it will not always be clear whether a particular worker’s P&I Work duties are “primarily manual or physical in nature.” For example, a foreman directly supervising the activities of those who are engaged in manual P&I Work may not meet this test in many cases, depending on their actual duties, while a lead hand who is herself operating machinery while advising less-experienced workers often will. Presumably, the key distinction is how frequently a worker’s duties involve hands-on activity versus supervising those engaged in such work. This would be consistent with CRA document 2025-1070641E5, dated Oct. 2, 2025, where Rulings states: “It is our view that the phrase ‘manual or physical in nature’ as it appears in the definition of ‘covered worker’ within the Labour Requirements refers to those duties that involve physical exertion (including using tools or machines to perform the physical labour) as opposed to mental exertion.”

There is also CRA guidance as to what constitutes the taxpayer’s work site, being the geographic location where activities are potentially in-scope of the labour requirements. In CRA document 2025-1070641E5, Rulings stated as follows:

In our view, a work site will only be a designated work site of an incentive claimant if the work site is at the disposal of the incentive claimant, based on a textual, contextual and purposive analysis of section 127.46. This could include a work site that the incentive claimant owns, rents or to which the incentive claimant otherwise has legal access, provided that it has control over the work site and can access it at its own discretion.

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The prevailing wage requirements

The prevailing wage requirements consist of three distinct components: a compensation element (s. 127.46(3)(b)(i)), an attestation element (s. 127.46(3)(b)(ii)) and a notice element (s. 127.46(3)(b)(iii)). First, the compensation element mandates that all covered workers be compensated for their P&I Work either (1) in accordance with any eligible collective agreement applicable to that worker or (2) if no such eligible collective agreement applies, in an amount no less than the non-overtime wages and benefits specified in the eligible collective agreement that most closely aligns with the covered worker’s experience level, tasks and location. It is unclear whether the text is to be read literally as creating a substantively broader requirement when an eligible collective agreement applies, i.e., the taxpayer becomes non-compliant if any term of that eligible collective agreement isn’t fully met. To date, the CRA has not provided any guidance on this point, although from a tax policy perspective it seems counterintuitive to hold employers governed by an eligible collective agreement to a more stringent standard for ITC purposes than other employers.

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In addition, the notice element requires the taxpayer to meet a job site notice requirement, while the attestation element requires the taxpayer to attest that it has (1) in fact met the compensation element of the prevailing wage requirement for its own employees and (2) taken reasonable steps to ensure the employers of any other covered workers, i.e., contractors, subcontractors and others, have done likewise. The CRA has provided guidance online as to what “reasonable steps” means. The New CRA Guidance includes further commentary on how a taxpayer can demonstrate that “reasonable steps” have been taken.

The attestation element is not an attestation to having actually met the prevailing wage requirements. Instead, it requires the taxpayer to attest to having in fact met the prevailing wage requirements as regards its own employees, but only to having “taken reasonable steps to ensure that any covered workers employed by any other person” have been compensated in accordance with the required standard.

It is also important to understand that while the apprenticeship requirements can be definitively met by making “reasonable efforts” to achieve a specified result,² the same is not true of the prevailing wage requirements. To comply with the prevailing wage requirements, one must in fact achieve the prescribed results: reasonable efforts do not suffice.

There is thus a gap between what a taxpayer must attest to as part of meeting the prevailing wage requirements and what the taxpayer must actually achieve in order to meet them and thereby comply with the prevailing wage requirements. Specifically, while meeting the attestation element of the prevailing wage requirements requires only “reasonable steps” of the taxpayer as regards the employees of contractors and subcontractors, meeting the compensation element demands that all covered workers have in fact been compensated as required. In many cases, this is not always entirely within the taxpayer’s control.

There are two principal implications from the fact that making “reasonable efforts” to comply with the compensation element of the prevailing wage requirements is insufficient to have complied with the prevailing wage requirements:

if the “normal” compliance deficiency rules apply (i.e., the taxpayer’s actions do not meet the K/GN Standard), the applicable penalty/remediation provisions effectively hold the taxpayer strictly liable for any deficiency in paying the prevailing wage to all covered workers, not just the taxpayer’s own employees. Simply making “reasonable efforts” towards complying with the prevailing wage requirements is not enough to avoid the consequences of failing to actually meet them; and
a taxpayer who has taken reasonable steps to prevent a compliance deficiency as to the compensation element of a contractor’s covered employees but who is aware a deficiency exists (1) can truthfully make the necessary attestation, but (2) risks the consequences of s. 127.46(9) if it claims at the regular tax credit rate while having knowledge of the contractor’s compliance deficiency. Put another way, making reasonable efforts to ensure that contractors meet the compensation element of the prevailing wage requirements may not be good enough to claim the regular tax credit rate without transgressing the K/GN Standard if the taxpayer knows of, or perhaps strongly suspects, that a compliance deficiency exists.

II. Labour requirements compliance

As noted, taxpayers claiming clean economy ITCs have a choice. A taxpayer can choose not to elect to meet the labour requirements and simply claim the relevant ITC at the reduced tax credit rate. Alternatively, if a taxpayer elects to meet the labour requirements and is determined not to have fully complied with them, the consequences depend on whether the taxpayer’s actions are considered to have met the K/GN Standard or not.

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Non-compliance: Normal circumstances

In “normal” circumstances where the K/GN Standard is not met, the consequences of non-compliance are much less severe. The taxpayer’s entitlement to the regular tax credit rate remains undisturbed. However, a taxpayer who has not complied with the apprenticeship requirements is liable to pay, as additional Part I tax, an additional $50³ for each hour of work that was required to be performed by apprentices registered in Red Seal trades on P&I Work for the year in order to meet the statutory target but was not, under s. 127.46(7). A taxpayer that has not complied with the prevailing wage requirements faces two sanctions:

s. 127.46(6), which obligates the taxpayer to pay, as additional Part I tax, “an amount equal to $20⁴ for each day in the installation taxation year on which the covered worker was not paid the prevailing wage” (the s. 127.46(6) per diem tax); and
ss. 127.46(11)-(14), which applies where the CRA has notified the taxpayer of a compliance deficiency and which obligates the taxpayer to either make up any deficiency in the compensation element of the prevailing wage requirements (plus interest) to the short-paid employee (a top-up amount) or pay 120 per cent of that amount to the CRA as a penalty.

Amounts paid as additional tax or penalty are non-deductible, while penalties are potentially eligible for CRA relief under s. 220(3.1) in appropriate circumstances. Top-up amounts are treated as salary and wages and so are deductible to the payer when paid, but are excluded from being eligible for the relevant clean economy ITC under s. 127.46(14).

The wording of the per diem tax in s. 127.46(6) reads as follows:

(6) Unless subsection (9) applies, if an incentive claimant claims a specified tax credit at a regular tax credit rate in a taxation year but does not meet the prevailing wage requirements in respect of a covered worker for one or more days in an installation taxation year in respect of that specified tax credit, there shall be added to the tax payable under this Part for the installation taxation year by the incentive claimant an amount equal to $20 for each day in the installation taxation year on which the covered worker was not paid the prevailing wage.

There is some degree of interpretive uncertainty as to the scope of “each day in the installation taxation year on which the covered worker was not paid the prevailing wage.” Specifically, this phrase could be read as describing each day of work for which a particular worker received less than the prevailing wage, or potentially as each day during the year where the shortfall for any such underpaid work date remained outstanding and unpaid. The New CRA Guidance resolves this question, indicating that the former is the correct interpretation in the answer to Question 2.

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Non-compliance: Knowingly or in circumstances amounting to gross negligence

Alternatively, if the taxpayer is determined to have failed to comply knowingly or in circumstances amounting to gross negligence, ostensibly on any element of the labour requirements and in any amount, it effectively suffers a 15 per cent ITC rate reduction, i.e., what would normally be 30 per cent for the Clean Technology ITC effectively becomes 15 per cent. The maximum ITC claim allowed is the reduced tax credit rate, and a penalty amount equal to another five per cent ITC rate reduction applies, thus making the consequences of claiming the full rate where the K/GN Standard has been met much worse than simply claiming the reduced tax credit rate.

The framing of one-third of the adverse consequence as a penalty rather than a further reduction in the applicable tax credit rate in theory allows the CRA to waive it under s. 220(3.1), although presumably the scope for such relief will be limited given the “knowingly or grossly negligent” threshold for when this penalty applies. Logical cases for penalty relief would include ones where the amount of K/GN non-compliance was fairly minimal, or where the taxpayer self-reports after having made good-faith remediation efforts. The CRA’s policies on discretionary penalty relief are set out in IC07-1R1.

The phrase “knowingly or in circumstances amounting to gross negligence” as used in s. 127.46(9) is almost identical to the standard prescribed in s. 163(2) for penalties for false statements or omissions. As such, prima facie, one would expect the jurisprudence developed under that latter provision to be equally applicable to interpreting the K/GN Standard established in s. 127.46(9).

In Canada v. Paletta Estate (2022 FCA 86),⁵ the Federal Court of Appeal had occasion to review what the K/GN Standard entails and what differentiates it from “normal” negligence:

[65] Neglect under subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) refers to a lack of reasonable care. The duty of reasonable care is met if the taxpayer has “thoughtfully, deliberately and carefully assesse[d] the situation and file[d] on what he believe[d] bona fide to be the proper method”; in other words, “in a manner that the taxpayer truly believe[d] to be correct” (Regina Shoppers Mall Ltd. v. Canada, [1990] 2 C.T.C. 183, 90 D.T.C. 6427 (F.C.T.D.), aff’d (1991), 126 N.R. 141, 91 D.T.C. 5101 (F.C.A.); see also Canada v. Johnson, 2012 FCA 253, 435 N.R. 361, [2013] 1 F.C.R. D-2). This test is not disputed by the parties. The Court may also draw inferences of negligence from an omission to verify the validity of a taxpayer’s belief (Robertson v. Canada, 2016 FCA 303, 2016 D.T.C. 5131, at paragraphs 5 and 6).

[66] In contrast, subsection 163(2) requires that the false statement be made knowingly or in circumstances amounting to gross negligence. This burden can be met either directly or constructively, through a demonstration of wilful blindness (Wynter v. Canada, 2017 FCA 195, 2017 D.T.C. 5114 (Wynter), at paragraph 16):

In sum, the law will impute knowledge to a taxpayer who, in circumstances that suggest inquiry should be made, chooses not to do so. The knowledge requirement is satisfied through the choice of the taxpayer not to inquire, not through a positive finding of an intention to cheat.

[67] Wynter teaches that although wilful blindness and gross negligence often converge, they are conceptually different. Rennie J.A., writing for this Court, explains this difference as follows (Wynter, at paragraphs 18 and 19):

Gross negligence is distinct from wilful blindness. It arises where the taxpayer’s conduct is found to fall markedly below what would be expected of a reasonable taxpayer. Simply put, if the wilfully blind taxpayer knew better, the grossly negligent taxpayer ought to have known better.

Gross negligence requires a higher degree of neglect than a mere failure to take reasonable care. It is a marked or significant departure from what would be expected. It is more than carelessness or misstatements. The point is captured in the decision of this Court in Zsoldos v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FCA 338 at para. 21, 2004 D.T.C. 6672:

In assessing the penalties for gross negligence, the Minister must prove a high degree of negligence, one that is tantamount to intentional acting or an indifference as to whether the law is complied with or not. (See Venne v. R. (1984), 84 D.T.C. 6247 (Fed. T.D.), at 6256.)

[68] It can be seen from this that subsection 163(2) imposes a higher threshold with the result that conduct warranting the reopening of statute-barred years pursuant to subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) will not necessarily justify the imposition of a penalty under the former (see for example Van der Steen v. The Queen (1984), 2019 TCC 23, 2019 D.T.C. 1024; see also Venne v. The Queen, 84 D.T.C. 6247, [1984] C.T.C. 223 (F.C.T.D.)). The opposite is however true; conduct that justifies the imposition of a penalty under subsection 163(2) will necessarily meet the threshold contemplated by subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i).

The CRA’s interpretation of these concepts can be found in the relevant portion of the CRA’s Income Tax Audit Manual (Chapter 28), which discusses the terms “knowingly” and “gross negligence”:

28.4.2 Knowingly or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence

It is vital to understand the meaning of the term “knowingly or under circumstances amounting to gross negligence” to apply a gross negligence penalty.

Knowingly, as used in subsection 163(2) of the ITA, implies that a taxpayer knew or ought to have known that the amount of tax paid was less than should otherwise have been paid for the purposes of the ITA or that the amount of refund or rebate claimed was greater than the amount that the person was eligible to receive for the purposes of the ITA. Knew implies that a taxpayer deliberately or intentionally acted in such a manner, while ought to have known does not mean actual knowledge, but means that the taxpayer had in effect the means of knowledge.

Gross negligence, as used in subsection 163(2), covers a set of facts which clearly indicates either that the taxpayer knew or ought to have known that an offence was committed under this subsection or that the taxpayer acted so carelessly or so negligently that the way in which the taxpayer handled their affairs amounted to gross negligence (that is, negligence of conspicuous magnitude). The set of facts typically fall in the categories of “(a) the magnitude of the omission in relation to the income declared, (b) the opportunity the taxpayer had to detect the error, (c) the taxpayer's education and apparent intelligence, (d) genuine effort to comply.” [Lauzon v The Queen, 2016 TCC 71, para 29, and 2016 FCA 298] “Gross negligence may be established where a taxpayer is wilfully blind to the relevant facts in circumstances where the taxpayer becomes aware of the need for some inquiry but declines to make the inquiry because the taxpayer does not want to know the truth” [Strachan v The Queen, 2015 FCA 60, para 4] and “consequently, the law will impute knowledge to a taxpayer who, in circumstances that dictate or strongly suggest that an inquiry should be made with respect to his or her tax situation, refuses or fails to commence such an inquiry without proper justification.” [Panini et al v The Queen, 2006 FCA 224, paragraph 43].

Go to 28.4.18, Other gross negligence penalties, for a list of court cases that discuss “knowingly” and “gross negligence.”

The factors cited by the CRA as relevant to determining whether the K/GN Standard has been met include the following:

28.4.4 Specific factors to consider when imposing gross negligence penalties

To determine if gross negligence penalties should be applied, consider (not an exhaustive list):

materiality of the false statement or omission
taxpayer’s history of contact with the CRA
taxpayer’s knowledge of tax matters
nature of the false statement or omission
taxpayer’s involvement in preparing the return
misinterpretation of the legislation
books and records
number of sources of taxable income
disclosure of other sources of taxable income
taxpayer’s history of compliance
signature on the return

The burden the CRA must discharge in order to support a K/GN finding has been described by the courts as a “heavy”⁶ one, and “the imposition of gross negligence penalties is to be applied in the clearest cases with the [CRA] being required to prove intent or reckless misconduct, otherwise taxpayers should be given the benefit of the doubt.”⁷ However, because the sanctions contained in s. 127.46(9) for being found to have breached the K/GN Standard are so severe, and will likely also create serious adverse non-tax implications, e.g., under relevant financing agreements, taxpayers can be forgiven for having a very low willingness to risk the CRA applying s. 127.46(9).

One of the questions posed in the New CRA Guidance was whether a taxpayer who was aware of a compliance deficiency beyond its ability to remedy at the time its ITC claim was filed could claim the regular tax credit rate, on the basis that it was ready and willing to correct the deficiency but simply could not do so. Not surprisingly, Rulings’ response (in the answer to Questions 1 and 2) was that the taxpayer could not claim the regular tax credit rate without risking the application of the K/GN consequences of s. 127.46(9):

If Canco knows that it did not meet one or more of the Labour Requirements at the time that it claims its CCUS tax credit for its 2025 taxation year, then it should not elect under subsection 127.46(2) in respect of that claim. If it does, Canco could be subject to the gross negligence penalty in subsection 127.46(9), if the Minister determines that it elected to meet the Labour Requirements and knowingly failed to meet those Labour Requirements.

This conclusion was further reiterated in the answer to Question 3:

The hypothetical facts state that, at the time of making its CCUS tax credit claim for Canco's 2025 taxation year, the three covered workers were not compensated in accordance with subparagraph 127.46(3)(b)(i). Therefore, at that time, Canco is aware that it has not complied with all of the Labour Requirements and should not elect under subsection 127.46(2) in respect of that specified tax credit or it could be subject to the gross negligence penalty in subsection 127.46(9).

Canco may decide to wait to make its claim for the CCUS tax credit for the 2025 taxation year until the prevailing wage requirements are met.

In fairness, there is not really much other answer Rulings could have provided, given the text of the statute and the K/GN jurisprudence. The response referenced the CRA’s further comments on s. 127.46(9) made at the 2025 Canadian Tax Foundation Round Table, memorialized as CRA document 2025-108081, which described a K/GN determination as “a question of fact that can only be determined after an examination of all the relevant facts and circumstances.” In this previous statement, the CRA indicated that while an “inability to substantiate that covered workers employed by others were compensated in accordance with subparagraph 127.46(3)(b)(i) should not, in and of itself” support a finding that the K/GN Standard had been met, the failure to take reasonable steps to ensure such compliance could support such a finding, and that in such circumstances “the gross negligence penalty under subsection 127.46(9) should generally apply.”

The further question was asked whether such a taxpayer could pre-emptively pay the CRA the shortfall penalty described in s. 127.46(13) in order to come into compliance and legitimately claim the regular tax credit rate. The answer to this suggestion was also “No”:

The “top-up penalty” in subsection 127.46(13) that you referred to in your question is only applicable if Canco receives a notification from the Minister specifying that it did not meet the prevailing wage requirements for a designated work site for a taxation year, pursuant to subsection 127.46(11). This is referred to as a Corrective Measure, and it is initiated by the CRA. There is no mechanism available to Canco to voluntarily pay the top-up penalty without having received this notification from the Minister.

This would also seem to be an accurate interpretation of the statute, as strictly speaking the procedure described in s. 127.46(13) is a sanction for non-compliance, and its text does not characterize payment as constituting compliance with the labour requirements. This then leaves a taxpayer with knowledge of a compliance deficiency that it cannot remedy in the unsatisfactory position of either claiming the reduced tax credit rate, which is bad, or claiming the regular tax credit rate and risking the consequences of s. 127.46(9), which is worse.

Non-compliance: Common problems

In practice most issues associated with labour requirements compliance arise from the compensation element of the prevailing wage requirement. Common problem areas include the following:

failing to correctly determine that a worker’s duties are primarily manual or physical, such that someone who was thought not to be a “covered worker” in fact is;
determining the scope of P&I Work too narrowly for one or more workers, such that more work and/or workers are in-scope of the labour requirements than originally thought; and
for a covered worker to whom no eligible collective agreement applies, incorrectly determining the regular wages and benefits applicable under the closest comparable eligible collective agreement.

This could occur for either the taxpayer’s own employees or, more typically, employees of a contractor or subcontractor, in respect of whom the taxpayer has less information and control and where the employer, i.e., not the taxpayer, generally has less incentive to achieve labour requirements compliance since it does not bear the cost of failure, subject to contractual allocation of consequences. For example, where a covered worker is an employee of a contractor or subcontractor retained by the taxpayer to work on the project, i.e., the taxpayer has no direct relationship with or information about the relevant employee, the taxpayer may have no practical ability to ensure that any shortfall is paid to the employee.

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On large ITC-eligible projects with hundreds or thousands of covered workers and dozens of contractors, subcontractors and sub-subcontractors, the reality is that there will very often be situations where the taxpayer knows or has very good reason to think someone has been paid less than the prevailing wage. Taxpayers can try to remedy this, but there will not always be a solution offering reasonable certainty that compliance can be achieved. For example, contractors or subcontractors go out of business or become non-co-operative over contractual disputes, or their covered workers move away, sometimes without leaving contact information. This is often simply the on-the-ground reality. In such circumstances, the taxpayer’s ability to claim the regular ITC rate by electing into the labour requirements and in fact meeting the prevailing wage requirement is effectively frustrated by the inability to actually meet that requirement for literally each and every in-scope worker the taxpayer knows has, or believes may have, been underpaid.

One such potential compliance concern relates to when covered workers are paid the prevailing wage. Particularly on larger projects with numerous contractors and subcontractors, prevailing wage shortfalls arising from any of the foregoing reasons (or others) are virtually inevitable. If a taxpayer discovers a particular covered worker has been paid less than she should have been, can this be corrected in such a manner as to be considered compliant with the compensation element of the prevailing wage requirements?

There is no time specified in s. 127.46 by which the required compensation must be paid to the covered worker. Hence, at least in cases where no eligible collective agreement applies to the covered worker, so long as the required amount of compensation has been paid to the covered worker by the time the taxpayer files its ITC claim, it can truthfully attest to having met (past tense) the compensation element of the prevailing wage requirement. This was confirmed in the New CRA Guidance, where Rulings states in its Response to Questions 1 and 2:

Canco can elect to meet and attest that it met the Labour Requirements at the time that it makes its claim for the CCUS tax credit for its 2025 taxation year, provided that, at the time of making the claim, the three short-paid covered workers were compensated in accordance with the applicable Compensation Requirement above, based on the hypothetical facts.

This determination is both consistent with the text of the statute and the tax policy underlying the labour requirements: incentivizing employers to create good jobs that pay the prescribed level of wages. Given the severe potential consequences for non-compliance with the labour requirements, there is no apparent policy reason to find employers non-compliant if they pay the required wages but do so past an arbitrary deadline. The same tax policy would seem to be applicable in cases where an eligible collective agreement does apply, although the CRA has not expressed a view on this.

Non-compliance: Electing the reduced rate vs. s. 127.46(9) consequences

A taxpayer with actual knowledge or strong suspicion of a labour requirements deficiency has the unenviable choice of either claiming the reduced tax credit rate or claiming the regular tax credit rate and taking their chances that the CRA considers their circumstances to have met the K/GN Standard such that the punitive consequences of s. 127.46(9) apply. Both alternatives raise interpretive questions which the New CRA Guidance addresses.

Can one elect the reduced tax credit rate in one year and the regular rate in another?

A taxpayer considering whether to choose not to meet the labour requirements in a particular year and simply claim the reduced tax credit rate will want to understand the consequences of doing so. Specifically, if the choice to opt out of labour requirements compliance for one year has consequences in other years, this would greatly diminish the viability of doing so.

The operative labour requirements rule in s. 127.46(2) reads as follows:

(2) Despite sections 127.44, 127.45, 127.48 and 127.491, the applicable rate for each specified tax credit of an incentive claimant is the reduced tax credit rate unless the incentive claimant elects in prescribed form and manner to meet the prevailing wage requirements under subsection (3) and the apprenticeship requirements under subsection (5) for each installation taxation year in respect of the specified tax credit.

Paraphrasing, this provision establishes the reduced tax credit rate as the taxpayer’s applicable ITC rate unless the taxpayer elects to meet the labour requirements “for each installation taxation year”. A literal reading of this provision raises some concern that unless a taxpayer elects to meet the labour requirements for every installation taxation year in respect of any particular clean economy ITC, the applicable ITC rate for that particular ITC will be the reduced tax credit rate for every such year. Put another way, the legislative text does not make explicit that electing into the labour requirements in respect of a particular year only impacts that year, and that not electing for one year does not affect other years.

Fortunately, the New CRA Guidance provides a definitive interpretation that this is indeed the case, a common-sense result that is very helpful to have clarified. This is provided in the last sentence of the response to Question 4:

Response to Question 4

Since the subsection 127.46(2) election is made with a claim for a specified tax credit, and the hypothetical facts strongly suggest that Canco will not meet the Labour Requirements in 2025 (specifically the Compensation Requirement), Canco should not elect, and should claim the CCUS tax credit for the 2025 taxation year at the reduced tax credit rate. However, the hypothetical facts state that Canco will meet the Labour Requirements in 2026 and in 2027, therefore Canco can elect under 127.46(2) when it makes its claims for the CCUS tax credits for its 2026 and 2027 taxation years.

This response effectively reads the legislation as inferring the words “for any particular installation taxation year” after the words “the applicable rate”, and the reference to “each” installation taxation year as “that” installation taxation year. Interpreting the provision in a textual, contextual and purposive manner, it is eminently logical to conclude that electing to meet the labour requirements (or not) and claim the regular (or reduced) tax credit rate is a year-by-year exercise. In this manner, a taxpayer who cannot (or chooses not to) meet the labour requirements in one year is not disincentivized from trying to meet them (and thereby claim the regular tax credit rate) in other years.

Does a “knowingly/gross negligence” finding in one year affect other years?

As noted, the consequences of being found to have been non-compliant in a manner that reaches the K/GN Standard are severe. The text of s. 127.46(9) reads as follows:

(9) If an incentive claimant has claimed a specified tax credit at the regular tax credit rate in a taxation year (referred to in this subsection as the “claim year”) but has failed to meet the prevailing wage requirements or the apprenticeship requirements for an installation taxation year in respect of that specified tax credit and the Minister determines that the incentive claimant knowingly or in circumstances amounting to gross negligence failed to meet those requirements, then

(a) the incentive claimant is not entitled to the regular tax credit rate, and is entitled to not more than the reduced tax credit rate, for the specified tax credit; and

(b) the incentive claimant is liable to a penalty for the claim year equal to the amount determined by the formula

50 per cent × (A − B)

where

A is the amount of the specified tax credit claimed by the incentive claimant at the regular tax credit rate for the claim year, and
B is the amount that the incentive claimant would have been entitled to claim as a specified tax credit at the reduced tax credit rate for the claim year.

Unlike in paragraph (b) where the penalty is explicitly stated to be “for the claim year”, the disentitlement to the regular tax credit rate in paragraph (a) makes no reference to any particular year. This raises the question of whether denial of the regular tax credit rate applies to more than the particular year in which the K/GN Standard was found to have been met.

Once again, the New CRA Guidance interprets the legislation in a textual, contextual and purposive manner to clarify that the disentitlement to the regular tax credit rate should be read as referring only to “the claim year.” This is contained in the response to Question 5:

Response to Question 5

Assuming that the conditions of subsection 127.46(9) only apply to Canco for its claim for the CCUS tax credit for its 2025 taxation year (not the other claim years), the implications imposed under subsection 127.46(9) will only apply to its 2025 claim year (not the other claim years).

This is demonstrably the right answer, and the certainty it provides is helpful.

III. The labour requirements: Problems and suggestions

A taxpayer claiming clean economy ITCs to which the labour requirements apply has basically two choices:

forego meeting the labour requirements, and claim at the reduced tax credit rate (i.e., for the Clean Technology ITC, at the 20 per cent rate instead of the regular 30 per cent rate); or
decide to meet the labour requirements, invest the time and effort required to pursue compliance with them, and then formally elect to meet them for the year and claim the regular tax credit rate, on the basis that while compliance may not be perfect there are no compliance deficiencies that meet the K/GN Standard, so that the worst-case scenario is entitlement to the regular tax credit rate but possible per diem taxes and/or top-up payments.

As the law presently stands, a taxpayer who knows or has good reason to believe non-compliance exists with some element of the labour requirements and who nonetheless elects to meet them risks a result worse than claiming at the reduced tax credit rate.

Do the existing rules create the optimal incentives?

Some of the most common compliance problems highlight an important policy issue. It is very much in the interests of both taxpayers seeking clean economy ITCs and governments encouraging labour requirements compliance that any deficiencies that taxpayers become aware of be “curable,” in the sense of taxpayers having some avenue for taking corrective steps that both meet the relevant tax policy objectives and are deemed to constitute “compliance” with the labour requirements generally and the compensation element of the prevailing wage requirements specifically. If taxpayers are left in the position of finding compliance deficiencies that they are ready and willing to fix but that either:

they are practically unable to fix, for reasons outside their control; or
if fixed in a substantive sense, do not technically constitute full “compliance” with the labour requirements,

whatever time and effort they have spent trying to comply with the labour requirements is potentially for naught:

if such a taxpayer elects to meet the labour requirements and claims the regular tax credit rate, the danger is that the CRA applies s. 127.46(9) on the basis that the taxpayer did so “knowing” that it did not pay 100 per cent of the full amount required to be the “prevailing wage”, or paid it but in some way not within the legislative definition of “compliance”; and
alternatively, such a taxpayer must absorb the cost of claiming the reduced tax credit rate on the taxpayer’s entire qualifying expenditure for the year.

The problem is that the application of s. 127.46(9) is binary: it either applies to the taxpayer’s entire claim for a particular clean economy ITC in a given year, or it doesn’t apply at all. As a result, a taxpayer who knows, or perhaps merely suspects, that any amount of non-compliance with the labour requirements has occurred and remains unremedied at the time the ITC claims form is completed takes the risk that s. 127.46(9) will apply to their entire clean economy ITC claim for the year. Put simply,

the cost of suffering either a 10 per cent or 15 per cent reduction in the taxpayer’s ITC claim for the year bears no relationship (and may be completely disproportionate) to the degree of labour requirements non-compliance; and
no legislative safety valve exists for a taxpayer who wants to correct a known or suspected compliance deficiency but cannot, for whatever reason.

There is no explicit discretion within the legislation for the CRA to waive or ignore situations where, despite making good-faith efforts to achieve 100 per cent compliance, at the time the taxpayer makes its ITC claim it knows or has very good reason to believe compliance has been less than perfect, e.g., some number of covered workers have been paid something less than the prevailing wage for some number of work days. While a particular CRA auditor ultimately reviewing the claim might exercise such discretion, the consequences of that not happening are so severe as to make it completely impractical to claim the regular tax credit rate and risk s. 127.46(9) applying in the hope of that discretion. Moreover, most clean economy ITC-eligible projects of any size are going to be audited by an accounting firm that will force a taxpayer in such circumstances who claims the regular tax credit rate to report an uncertain tax position or a reserve in their financial statements, which will be completely unacceptable to lenders and other stakeholders. As such, many taxpayers in this position who cannot know with confidence that all labour requirements non-compliance they know of, or they believe is likely to exist, can somehow be remedied will simply forego trying to remediate any non-compliance and just claim at the reduced tax credit rate.

This is a lose-lose outcome for taxpayers and government alike if the result is that no matter how much time and effort the taxpayer has put in towards achieving full compliance, a fairly de minimis amount of known non-compliance can effectively disentitle a taxpayer from millions or tens of millions of dollars of clean economy ITCs, by forcing claims at the reduced tax credit rate. On a larger project, such situations can easily occur, which can in turn incentivize a taxpayer at the outset of a project to not bother incurring the cost and effort of trying to achieve labour requirements compliance at all, and just accept the reduced tax credit rate, a result that benefits no one and does not achieve the policy objectives of the labour requirements.

Suggested legislative improvements

Taxpayers who know or suspect they have a compliance issue and want to fix it deserve to be treated differently from those who don’t care or who make minimal compliance efforts and claim the regular tax credit rate anyway. Viewed within the overall tax policy context of wanting to provide fiscal support to green economy projects while generating well-paying jobs in Canada, it seems unfair, and counterproductive, to deny the regular tax credit rate to taxpayers who become aware of a compliance deficiency before they file their ITC claims and are willing to remedy it, but cannot do so in a way that constitutes compliance within the meaning of s. 127.46.

There are at least two ways in which the labour requirements could usefully be amended to better achieve the government’s underlying tax policy objective of encouraging taxpayers to pursue labour requirements compliance on clean economy projects while providing taxpayers with greater certainty and fairness:

provide a mechanism to remedy known or suspected compliance deficiencies before the time the taxpayer makes its ITC claim for the year that is deemed to bring the taxpayer into labour requirements “compliance”, so as to allow the taxpayer to claim the regular tax credit rate without fear of s. 127.46(9) applying; and
eliminate the all-or-nothing consequences facing taxpayers legitimately trying to address compliance deficiencies, and make the consequences of non-compliance meeting the K/GN Standard proportionate to degree of non-compliance.

As to the first point, effectively what is required is some mechanism whereby a taxpayer who has made reasonable efforts to achieve full compliance and finds itself at a dead end can take action that is deemed to constitute compliance with the prevailing wage requirements. For example, the U.S. version of the prevailing wage requirement in 26 CFR § 1.45-7 includes such relief in some cases. Specifically, the following rule in § 1.45-7(c)(1)(v) applies:

Special rule for laborers and mechanics who cannot be located. A taxpayer will be deemed to have paid a correction payment, under this paragraph (c)(1), to a laborer or mechanic who cannot be located if the taxpayer can establish that correction payments have been made. A taxpayer may establish that correction payments have been made by demonstrating compliance with the applicable State unclaimed property law and all Federal and State withholding and information reporting requirements with respect to the payments.

In its simplest form, such a mechanism could be an addition or appendix to the ITC claims form whereby the taxpayer self-reports any known compliance concerns with the compensation element of the prevailing wage requirements, much like a disclosure schedule for representations and warranties in a share purchase agreement operates. If considered necessary or desired, such mechanism could include paying estimated amounts to the CRA or a trusted third party, although this may not really be needed given the existing consequences for “normal” non-compliance. In either case, self-reported compliance concerns would be deemed to be outside the scope of s. 127.46(9), and the “normal” sanctions for non-compliance (i.e., the s. 127.46(6) per diem tax and s. 127.46(11) obligation to pay top-up amounts) could be made applicable. This seems like a simple and costless way in which the government can incentivize taxpayers to do the right thing and pursue labour requirements compliance without penalizing those who have taken reasonable steps towards compliance (the attestation element of the prevailing wage requirement already establishes this baseline) but are aware of potential deficiencies.

Such action would go a long way towards relieving the risk of disproportionately adverse consequences from conduct that is found to reach the K/GN Standard. However, the binary, all-or-nothing nature of s. 127.46(9) remains potentially draconian, and this seems needlessly punitive. Gross negligence penalties in s. 163(2) based on the same K/GN Standard apply on an issue-by-issue basis, rather than to the taxpayer’s entire tax owing for the year. Some consideration could usefully be given to limiting the scope of s. 127.46(9) to something more proportionate to the scope of the taxpayer’s knowing or grossly negligent conduct, either by expressly amending the consequences of that provision to that effect or at least creating a statutory authority within its text to give the CRA discretion to reduce its impact in appropriate circumstances. Not all conduct meeting the K/GN Standard is equal and ensuring that the crime fits the punishment is a reasonable and appropriate result that does not dilute the deterrence effect on those who are truly bad actors seeking to take advantage of a relatively generous tax expenditure program.

Smoot-Hawley revived: a never-before-used Depression-era law is invoked against Canadian trade

Mon, 27 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

“Anyone, anyone?”

Mr. Lorensax, the Economics Teacher

On July 20, 2026, the president of the United States signed three proclamations covering motor vehicles, alcoholic beverages and dairy, imposing additional 50 per cent tariffs on Canadian goods said to account for roughly US$20 billion in annual imports. Although there is some question about exactly how many of the listed products Canada exports into the United States, and how much, if we take that figure at face value, it would be just over five per cent of the US$380 billion in goods U.S. private interests and public procurement authorities buy from Canadian exporters each year.

The accompanying fact sheet characterizes the measures as a response to Canadian “discrimination” against U.S. exports. The annexed lists deal with products ranging from wine and cement to furniture, textiles, machinery and hockey sticks, and thus extend well beyond the three named sectors. The duties purport to apply to goods entered for consumption on or after 12:01 a.m. ET on Aug. 19, 2026.

Like the section 232 tariffs, the new measures apply regardless of CUSMA origin. This means that the “rule of origin” shield that has protected the majority of Canadian exports from IEEPA and section 122 tariffs since March 2025 does not apply.

And, of course, like the IEEPA or the section 122 tariffs, the legal authority invoked, Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, has never before been used to impose tariffs in its near century on the statute books.

This explainer situates the new measures within the full arc of the dispute, which we have tracked since before the first tariff proclamation was signed, canvasses Canada’s responses, and assesses what Section 338 is, why it was chosen, and where this goes next.

The U.S. measures: Threats and tariffs since the “fentanyl” announcement

The current dispute dates to Nov. 25, 2024, when the then president-elect announced that among his first executive acts would be a 25 per cent tariff on all Canadian and Mexican goods, tied to fentanyl and the border. Our analysis at the time drew on the 2018 steel and aluminum experience to anticipate what followed: unilateral measures, retaliation, remission frameworks and negotiation under duress. What we did not anticipate was quite how many statutory vehicles the exercise would consume.

a. The IEEPA phase (February 2025 – February 2026)

On Feb. 1, 2025, the president signed Executive Order 14193: “Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border” imposing a 25 per cent tariff on nearly all Canadian goods (10 per cent on a defined set of energy resources), invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Following a negotiated 30-day suspension (Executive Order 14197), the tariffs took effect March 4, 2025. A critical feature emerged days later: goods qualifying for preferential treatment as CUSMA-originating were exempted. That carve-out transformed origin compliance from a duty-savings exercise into the difference between zero and 25 per cent and, because a substantial share of Canadian exports had historically entered under MFN rates without claiming preference (where MFN was already zero, certification cost outweighed benefit), it sent companies scrambling to qualify goods, assemble certifications and document regional value content for the first time.

b. The Section 232 sectoral architecture (2025–2026)

In parallel, the administration built out sectoral tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the national-security authority, on steel and aluminum (March 2025), automobiles and parts (Proclamation 10908, effective April 3, 2025, for vehicles and by May 3, 2025, for parts, with a temporary exemption for CUSMA-eligible parts pending a content-based assessment system), copper, and later medium- and heavy-duty vehicles (October 2025), timber and lumber, and pharmaceuticals. Crucially, none of the foregoing comes with a standing exemption for CUSMA-compliant goods.

The auto measures came with their own relief valve: an “import adjustment offset” of 3.75 per cent of the MSRP of U.S.-assembled vehicles in year one, stepping down thereafter, which is a regime that has since expanded to the medium- and heavy-duty sector. In September 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce added a petition process allowing U.S. producers to seek expansion of the Section 232 autoparts scope, an accretion mechanism that continues to pull new tariff lines into coverage.

c. Learning Resources and the post-IEEPA scramble

On Feb. 20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that IEEPA does not authorize broad-based import tariffs, invalidating the centrepiece of the 2025 architecture. As we wrote at the time, the decision left the availability, timing and mechanics of refunds uncertain. Businesses that paid IEEPA-based tariffs were advised to assess steps to preserve refund rights, particularly where entries had not yet liquidated. That advice has aged well, and it applies with equal force to what follows.

The administration’s response was a statutory scramble: temporary 10 per cent across-the-board tariffs under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, capped at 150 days absent congressional extension and largely exempting CUSMA-compliant goods. Those tariffs expire this week. The administration also accelerated its Section 301 investigations. We flagged in March that Section 301, with its USTR investigations, consultations, and findings, would become the workhorse for targeted action; it has since produced 25 per cent tariffs on Brazil and forced-labour-related measures targeting Canada. But Section 301 takes time and process. Section 338, as we discuss below, requires neither.

One further development frames everything: earlier this month, at the first joint review, the United States declined to renew CUSMA in its current form. The agreement remains in force, but the non-renewal opens rolling annual reviews that could run to the agreement’s 2036 sunset and converts every U.S. tariff measure into negotiating leverage for that process.

Canadian responses

d. Measures imposed, and removed

Canada responded swiftly:

March 4, 2025. Twenty-five per cent counter-tariffs on C$30 billion in U.S.-origin goods, including food products, wine, spirits, beer, appliances, apparel, cosmetics, pulp and paper, with a second phase to expand coverage to C$155 billion. The tariffs applied only to goods originating in the U.S. under the CUSMA marking rules, a mirror image of the origin logic on the U.S. side.
March 12, 2025. C$29.8 billion in counter-tariffs responding to the U.S. steel and aluminum measures.
April 9, 2025. Twenty-five per cent surtaxes on non-CUSMA-compliant U.S. fully assembled vehicles and certain parts, the auto countermeasures and associated quota administration that the U.S. motor-vehicles proclamation now cites as “discrimination”.
Relief in parallel. From the outset, Ottawa paired retaliation with a remission framework under which importers could seek relief where inputs could not be sourced domestically or from non-U.S. suppliers, or in other exceptional circumstances with severe economic impacts, the same two-ground structure we saw in 2018. The United States Surtax Remission Order (2025) granted six-month remissions for manufacturing, food and beverage packaging, and public health and safety inputs (later extended); a performance-based remission framework supported automakers maintaining Canadian production; and the Large Enterprise Tariff Loan Facility provided liquidity.
Sept. 1, 2025. The pivot: Canada removed retaliatory tariffs on CUSMA-covered U.S. goods, roughly 90 per cent of U.S. imports by coverage, to match the U.S. exemptions and restart negotiations, while maintaining countermeasures on steel, aluminum and autos pending resolution of the corresponding Section 232 tariffs.
Dec. 26, 2025. Canada tightened steel tariff-rate quotas against global imports, reducing quota levels for non-FTA countries to 20 per cent of 2024 volumes, protecting domestic producers from supply diverted by U.S. measures, while honouring the CUSMA carve-out.
Provincial measures. Nearly every provincial and territorial liquor authority delisted U.S. alcohol from public shelves, the measure the alcoholic-beverages Proclamation now targets, and to which we return below.

e. The dispute settlement track

Canada also litigated. In March 2025, Canada requested WTO consultations on the IEEPA and steel/aluminum tariffs; on April 3, 2025, it initiated WTO dispute proceedings challenging the Section 232 auto tariffs as inconsistent with the GATT 1994, including the U.S.’s bound tariff commitments under Article II and MFN obligations under Article I. The U.S. response was telling: it invoked Article XXI, asserting that national-security measures are self-judging and beyond the reach of WTO dispute settlement, a position panels have repeatedly rejected, but which the U.S. can maintain indefinitely because the Appellate Body’s paralysis lets it appeal any adverse panel report “into the void.” The consultations remain, formally, pending. The merits are strong; the remedy is the problem.

f. The search for diversified trade

The track for Canadian trade diversification has been quieter but real: more than 20 new economic and security partnerships since early 2025; the September 2025 strategic-industries measures; public consultations on CUSMA (September 20 to November 3, 2025) feeding Canada’s positions for the joint review; and sustained outreach to the EU, the U.K., and the Indo-Pacific under existing agreements. The results are measurable if modest: the U.S. share of Canadian goods exports fell from nearly 76 per cent in 2024 to just under 72 per cent in 2025. Diversification is a decade-long project, but the effects should prove noticeable quarter to quarter.

The new measures

a. Scope

Each of the three July 20, 2026, proclamations imposes an additional 50 per cent ad valorem duty on a distinct annex of HTSUS tariff lines applicable to goods entered for consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01 a.m. ET on Aug. 19, 2026, the 30-day minimum lead time the statute itself requires. Key parameters:

No CUSMA carve-out. The duties apply whether or not goods qualify as originating. This severs, for the first time, the link between origin compliance and tariff protection that has structured the entire dispute since March 2025. A valid certification of origin is simply irrelevant to a covered line.
Coverage well beyond the named sectors. Although the three proclamations are framed around autos, alcohol and dairy, the annexes reach foodstuffs, wood products, paper, textiles, machinery, furniture and consumer goods. The measures are calibrated to Canadian export exposure, not to the sectors in which discrimination is alleged. They comprise retaliation across the tariff schedule, not a mirror-image response.
Exclusions. Energy, potash, critical minerals, fish, and goods already subject to Section 232 duties are excluded. Note the phrasing: autos, steel, aluminum, lumber, and pharmaceuticals escape the Section 338 duties only because they already face Section 232 tariffs. This is an anti-stacking rule, not an exemption. The exclusions spare Canada’s largest export categories, which is why the measures reach “only” US$20 billion.
No sunset, and an escalation mechanism. Unlike Section 122’s 150-day cap, the proclamations advance an interpretation that the Tariff Act allows Section 338 tariffs to continue indefinitely unless the president reduces, modifies or terminates them. Section 338 also contains a further step no other modern tariff authority replicates: if the president finds the discrimination is maintained or increased after duties are imposed, the statute authorizes him to exclude the country’s products from importation altogether. The ceiling on escalation, in other words, is not a higher rate, it is an embargo.

b. What is Section 338?

Section 338 (19 U.S.C. § 1338) is a surviving fragment of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, descended from Section 317 of the Tariff Act of 1922. This section authorizes the president to impose duties of up to 50 per cent on imports from a country he “find[s] as a fact” discriminates against U.S. commerce, directly or indirectly, by law, administrative regulation or practice, in a manner that disadvantages U.S. commerce relative to that of third countries, with the duties calibrated to offset the resulting burden. There is no public record of tariffs actually imposed under the provision since at least 1949. The provision was conceived for a world of bilateral tariff bargaining, before the GATT, before MFN as a multilateral norm, before trade agreements with built-in dispute settlement, and its anachronisms are now glaring:

“Discrimination” is undefined. In a world of MFN obligations, preferential agreements that discriminate by design (every FTA treats parties better than non-parties, that is the point), and treaty-sanctioned countermeasures, the term is doing enormous unexamined work. The measures Washington complains of are themselves responses to prior U.S. tariffs, many imposed in violation of CUSMA. Whether lawful countermeasures can constitute “discrimination” under a 1930 statute is, to put it gently, open.
The dairy grievance has already been litigated, under CUSMA. The United States twice challenged Canada’s dairy TRQ allocation practices under CUSMA Chapter 31. The first panel (2021) found Canada’s process of reserving TRQ pools inconsistent with the agreement. Canada revised its practices, and the second panel (2023) largely rejected the renewed U.S. claims. The dairy Proclamation thus recasts, as unilateral “discrimination,” a grievance the U.S. pursued through the agreed mechanism and substantially lost. The comparison to EU access under CETA misses the mark: differential treatment across trade agreements is what trade agreements do.
The provincial dimension. The alcoholic-beverages Proclamation attributes to “Canada” the demarketing decisions of provincial liquor monopolies. State attribution of sub-federal measures is familiar terrain in trade law. GATT Article XXIV:12 and CUSMA both address it through undertakings to engage in consultations in such circumstances. A presidential “finding of fact” that sweeps in the purchasing decisions of provincial Crown retailers, without any collaborative discussion or investigative process, compounds the statute’s core due-process problem.
The ITC’s role has never been tested. Section 338 sits in the part of the Tariff Act concerning the International Trade Commission (ITC) and assigns the Commission a duty to keep itself informed of discrimination and bring matters to the President’s attention with recommendations. Whether that is a procedural prerequisite or merely an advisory channel is unresolved. The Proclamations proceed on presidential findings alone, with no apparent ITC process.
The offset mismatch. The statute directs duties calibrated to offset the burden on U.S. commerce. The White House’s own figures put the alleged injury at roughly US$5.6 billion in lost auto exports and US$582 million in alcohol. A uniform 50 per cent rate, the statutory maximum, applied to US$20 billion in products largely unrelated to the affected sectors sits uneasily with a remedial, offset-based design.
Implicit supersession. There is a respectable argument that Section 338 was superseded by the modern, process-laden authorities Congress enacted decades later, Section 301 in particular, which occupies precisely the same field (foreign practices that burden or discriminate against U.S. commerce) but conditions action on USTR investigation, consultation, and findings. On this view, reading Section 338 as a process-free bypass renders Congress’s later procedural architecture optional.

Prospects

U.S. courts. Litigation is certain, and Learning Resources frames it: a broad, undefined, never-used delegation invoked for sweeping economic measures is the fact pattern that attracts major-questions scrutiny. The government’s position is not without foundation. Section 338, unlike IEEPA, expressly speaks of duties, expressly caps them at 50 per cent, and expressly places the power in the hands of the President. But the missing ITC process, the elasticity of “discrimination,” the offset mismatch, and the supersession argument all offer footholds.

For affected entities, the practical lesson of the IEEPA litigation is that real remedies may not emerge quickly from the court system. The Supreme Court vindicated the challengers in Learning Resources, and yet the refund mechanics remain unresolved months later.

Trade law. Fifty per cent duties on originating goods are flatly inconsistent with U.S. tariff commitments under CUSMA and exceed U.S. bound rates under GATT Article II; applied to Canada alone, they raise Article I MFN questions. Expect Canada to supplement its pending WTO consultations and to consider CUSMA Chapter 31 proceedings, where, unlike at the WTO, panel reports cannot be appealed into the void, and where Canada’s success in the dairy TRQ disputes shows the mechanism can work. The constraint is time: panels take the better part of a year at best. The remedy is prospective, and CUSMA itself is under renegotiation, a negotiation in which these tariffs are, transparently, leverage.

The negotiating table. The USTR statement is explicit that Canada’s sin is retaliation: only Canada and China responded to the 2025 tariffs with countermeasures rather than negotiated deals. The Section 338 action is thus designed, at least in part, to price retaliation itself, and its embargo endgame is the threat that gives the pricing teeth. Ontario Premier Doug Ford has urged a dollar-for-dollar response; the prime minister’s statement calls the measures a direct violation of CUSMA while signalling readiness to engage intensively. Ottawa’s dilemma is acute: the domestic politics of the past 18 months reward firmness, but Section 338’s escalation mechanism means counter-retaliation invites a finding that discrimination has “increased.” Expect Canada to pursue all three tracks at once: a calibrated response, dispute settlement and an intensified push at the CUSMA table, with the Sept. 1 precedent (concede the symbolic but hold the sectoral tariffs) as the likely template.

What businesses should do before August 19

The 30-day window is short, and duties attach based on the date of entry for consumption, not order, shipment or border-crossing dates for goods in transit. Canadian exporters and U.S. importers of Canadian goods should:

Map exposure against the annexes at the HTSUS line level. Coverage does not always track sector intuition. Classification determinations may now determine whether a good faces a tariff of 0 or 50 per cent. See our overview on goods classification and CUSMA rules of origin.
Do not rely on CUSMA origin, but do not abandon it. Origin provides no shelter from Section 338 duties but remains important for the Section 122 regime’s CUSMA exemption while it lasts, Canada’s countermeasures and any negotiated resolution.
Confirm the interaction with Section 232. Goods subject to Section 232 duties are excluded from Section 338, an anti-stacking rule that makes scope determinations under the 232 programs, including the expanding auto-parts petitions and the offset regimes, newly consequential.
Accelerate entries where commercially feasible. Goods entered before 12:01 a.m. ET on Aug. 19 escape the duties. Warehouse withdrawals count as entries. Inventory sitting in bonded warehouses should be evaluated now.
Review contracts and pricing. Tariff-allocation clauses, price-adjustment mechanisms, hardship and force majeure provisions, and Incoterms determine who bears a 50 per cent duty. Revisit both existing agreements and templates and, as we have advised since the first round, build express tariff language into new contracts rather than litigating silence later.
Preserve refund rights from the first entry. Document duty payments, monitor liquidation, and consider protests.
Monitor Ottawa. Canadian counter-measures, remission frameworks (with their two-ground test and documentary template), and support programs have followed every previous round of U.S. action. Businesses that assembled remission files in 2025 should keep them current; those that did not should start.
Engage. CUSMA consultations, remission processes, and any U.S. comment opportunities are channels through which affected businesses shaped outcomes in earlier rounds, including the September 1 removals and the exclusion architecture itself.

BLG’s International Trade and Investment group is monitoring the annexes, the litigation, and any Canadian response, and has advised clients through every phase of this dispute, including on origin qualification, remission requests, classification and scope determinations, contractual risk allocation, and refund preservation. For assistance, contact any member of our team, and follow developments on our Tariffs and Trade Resource Centre and The Tariff Home Companion podcast.

Cross-examining receivers, monitors and trustees in Alberta insolvency proceedings: An exceptional remedy

Fri, 24 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

Court-appointed receivers, monitors and trustees play a central role in Canadian insolvency proceedings. As officers of the court, they are expected to act independently and impartially, and in accordance with their statutory and court-ordered duties. Given this role, a recurring question in Alberta insolvency practice is whether parties may cross-examine a court officer on the contents of a report.

There is a clear general principle in Alberta: receivers, monitors and trustees are not ordinarily subject to cross-examination on their reports, and any such examination is exceptional rather than routine. Courts retain discretion to permit questioning where circumstances warrant, but applicants must demonstrate a legitimate and compelling basis for doing so.

The general rule: Cross-examination is exceptional

Alberta courts have consistently recognized that receivers and monitors are officers of the court whose neutrality should be protected. As a result, they are not generally subject to questioning absent unusual or exceptional circumstances. In Coast Automotive Group Inc (Re), the Alberta Court of Appeal reaffirmed that parties seeking to examine a monitor must establish exceptional circumstances before further questioning will be permitted. The Court emphasized that officers of the court are entitled to protection from irrelevant or improper questioning and that their neutrality should not be compromised through unnecessary involvement in adversarial disputes.

This principle reflects the broader policy objective of ensuring that court officers can perform their duties without becoming embroiled in litigation between stakeholders or being subjected to fishing expeditions designed to support collateral claims.

Cross-examination of receivers

The leading Alberta authorities concerning receivers stress that examination rights are limited and must be tied to specific concerns about the receiver’s conduct or reports.

In Re Big Sky Living Inc. (Bankrupt), the Court held that a party seeking to examine a receiver must provide cogent or compelling reasons and identify the particular conduct at issue. Mere dissatisfaction with a receiver’s actions or generalized allegations will not suffice. The Court adopted the criteria in Re Ravelston Corp., recognizing that a court officer may be examined in unusual circumstances, particularly where the officer refuses to co-operate in clarifying a report or declines to provide reasonable explanations regarding matters contained in it.

Importantly, the Court observed that formal cross-examination is often unnecessary because clarification can frequently be achieved through less intrusive means, such as written questions, correspondence or informal discussions.

A similar approach was taken in Edmonton Region Community Board v Aboriginal Partners & Youth Society. There, the Court held that only legitimate questions directed at clarifying statements in a receiver’s reports or explaining the receiver’s conduct should be permitted. The Court expressly cautioned against allowing examinations to become fishing expeditions or mechanisms for disgruntled stakeholders to build claims against the receiver. However, it acknowledged that questions genuinely aimed at obtaining information related to statements made in a receiver’s reports may be appropriate.

Accordingly, while examination of a receiver is possible, Alberta courts require a focused and demonstrably legitimate purpose before permitting it.

Trustees in bankruptcy: A slightly different framework

Trustees in bankruptcy stand in a somewhat different position because the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) expressly provides that a trustee’s report constitutes evidence on an application for a bankrupt’s discharge. Because trustee reports may significantly influence the outcome of a discharge hearing, courts have recognized circumstances in which examination may be appropriate.

In Klapstein, Re, the Court held that a bankrupt may seek to examine a trustee pursuant to s. 163(2) of the BIA where a serious dispute exists regarding the contents of the trustee’s report. The Court acknowledged that such examinations may be justified when concerns have been raised in a timely and substantive manner. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that examination remains a matter of judicial discretion and is not an automatic right.

Thus, although trustees may be more susceptible to examination than receivers or monitors due to the evidentiary status of their reports, the applicant must still establish a legitimate reason for the examination and persuade the court that it is necessary in the circumstances.

Conclusion

The Alberta authorities establish a consistent theme across receiverships and bankruptcies: court-appointed insolvency professionals are not ordinarily subject to cross-examination on their reports. Receivers, monitors and trustees are officers of the court whose neutrality and independence warrant protection. Consequently, parties seeking to examine them must demonstrate more than disagreement with a report or a desire for broad discovery.

Cross-examination may be permitted where there are specific and exceptional circumstances, such as a genuine need to clarify material contained in a report or to address a serious dispute supported by particularized concerns. However, fishing expeditions, collateral attacks and attempts to draw court officers into adversarial disputes will generally be rejected. The governing principle remains that examination is the exception, not the rule.

One step closer to harmonization: CIRO's proposed Incorporated Approved Person Compensation model

Thu, 23 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

The Canadian Investment Regulatory Organization (CIRO) has published rule amendments to harmonize advisor compensation (the Amendments). Following CIRO’s 2024 position paper that consulted on three potential regulatory approaches to allow payment of advisor compensation to advisor-owned corporations for all CIRO-regulated dealer members (Dealers), the Amendments propose to adopt the Incorporated Approved Person compensation option.

In a material shift from the 2024 proposals, under the proposed Amendments, both ancillary activities and regulated Canadian financial services sector activities can be conducted by the advisor’s corporation (Incorporated Approved Person) on behalf of the sponsoring Dealer, subject to certain constraints. CIRO views the proposed Amendments as addressing the lack of flexibility, consistency and tax certainty under the current directed commission model, which will be phased out.

We encourage firms and advisors to review the potential impact of the proposed Amendments on their business model and provide feedback to CIRO by the November 6 comment deadline.

We invite you to REGISTER for our webinar on September 22, 2026, from noon to 1 p.m. EST, during which we will share additional insights on the proposed Amendments.

What the proposed Amendments do

The proposed Amendments are designed to harmonize CIRO’s advisor compensation rules by:

Repealing the directed commission arrangement option for mutual fund dealers’ client-facing Approved Persons. This option is currently available to client-facing advisors with mutual fund dealer firms or firms dually registered as both mutual fund dealers and investment fund dealers;
Retaining the current option for advisors to be either employees or agents of their Dealer; and
Introducing the option that all client-facing advisors may adopt an Incorporated Approved Person arrangement with their sponsoring Dealer, which would allow permitted regulated Canadian financial services sector activities, and ancillary activities, to be carried out by the Incorporated Approved Person.

While Dealers are not required to make the Incorporated Approved Person option available to their advisors, CIRO notes that there may be competitive advantages in terms of attracting and retaining talent for those Dealers who do make it available, versus Dealers that do not provide this option.

What does the Incorporated Approved Person model entail?

The Amendments propose the following requirements in connection with the Incorporated Approved Person model:

Who can have an Incorporated Approved Person and for what purposes?

The individual associated with the Incorporated Approved Person must be a client-facing Approved Person of the sponsoring Dealer.
The Incorporated Approved Person must be registered in the required category (or exempt from registration) in the applicable Canadian jurisdictions in which it operates.
An individual using an Incorporated Approved Person must be approved by CIRO (to ensure there is a chain of accountability between CIRO, the Dealer and the Approved Person).
The Incorporated Approved Person may only carry out activities that have been approved in advance by the Dealer, are not contrary to securities laws and do not bring the industry into disrepute. The activities are limited to being:
- Ancillary to the activities performed by the Incorporated Approved Person on the Dealer’s behalf; or
- Regulated Canadian financial services sector activities, provided the Approved Person is a qualified individual financial services advisor in the Canadian jurisdiction where the activities are being performed, who is not prohibited from engaging in such activities.

CIRO is requesting stakeholder feedback on the appropriate scope and prohibitions of the activities that can be performed, whether more than one client-facing Approved Person sponsored by the Dealer should be able to be employed by the Incorporated Approved Person, and any associated conflicts of interest that should be considered and managed.

Relationship between Approved Person, Incorporated Approved Person and Dealer

The proposed Amendments prescribe the key terms of the written agreement that will be required between the Incorporated Approved Person, the Dealer and the individual Approved Person. However, we anticipate that tax considerations will drive the structure of these tripartite agreements and advice should be sought at the outset to ensure that the desired tax benefits are able to be realized.

CIRO prescribes the following contents for the agreement:

Compliance with all applicable laws, securities laws and CIRO requirements (indeed, CIRO retains the discretion to require a Dealer to obtain a legal opinion in support of this compliance);
The Approved Person must conduct all securities and derivatives-related business for the Dealer through the Incorporated Approved Person;
The Dealer must be responsible for supervision of the Approved Person and the activities of the Approved Person conducted for the Dealer through the Incorporated Approved Person;
The Approved Person must provide disclosure to impacted clients of the nature of the incorporated advisor relationship; and
The Incorporated Approved Person must obtain prior approval from the Dealer before engaging in activities other than those being conducted on behalf of the Dealer.

Dealers are required to supervise each Incorporated Approved Person as they would an employee, are responsible for ensuring that the Approved Person and the Incorporated Approved Person comply with applicable laws and CIRO requirements, and are liable to clients and other third parties for the Approved Person and Incorporated Approved Person’s conduct for activities performed on behalf of the Dealer.

We anticipate the adoption of an Incorporated Approved Person model will increase Dealers’ supervisory burden, as CIRO will expect adequate systems to approve, monitor and supervise Incorporated Approved Person activities and prevent unpermitted outside activities, a risk which may be greater under these new structures.

We may also see an uptick in client complaints of misrepresentations related to confusion about the legal relationship among the Dealer, the Approved Person and the Incorporated Approved Person. To mitigate this risk, Dealers will want to ensure clear and consistent client disclosure.

In the event that CIRO or a securities regulatory authority commences an investigation related to misconduct by the Approved Person or Incorporated Approved Person, or in the event the Dealer has reasonable grounds to believe that the Approved Person or Incorporated Approved Person has breached CIRO requirements or securities laws, the Dealer is permitted to immediately, without notice, assume direct responsibility for the impacted clients, to the exclusion of the Approved Person and Incorporated Approved Person. The Dealer is permitted to designate another qualified person to provide services to the impacted clients, and that person may receive remuneration that would otherwise have been paid to the Approved Person and the Incorporated Approved Person.

Legal structure of the Incorporated Approved Person

A single Approved Person is the only permitted voting shareholder of an Incorporated Approved Person. This Approved Person must also be the sole director. The voting shareholder, as well as family members who qualify as a “related person” to the voting shareholder under the Income Tax Act (Canada), can be non-voting shareholders.

Approved Persons sponsored by other Dealers, and anybody subject to sanctions, are prohibited from being a voting or non-voting shareholder of an Incorporated Approved Person.

CIRO poses several questions about the appropriateness of these shareholder/owner limitations, including whether non-client-facing Approved Persons who meet certain criteria should be permitted to conduct business through, and own voting or non-voting shares in, the Incorporated Approved Person.

Critical tax considerations

Tax considerations will be central to the viability and structure of any Incorporated Approved Person arrangement. In particular, the written agreements among the Dealer, the Approved Person and the Incorporated Approved Person will need to be carefully structured so that the services being compensated are properly provided through the Incorporated Approved Person and so the arrangement can withstand the security of the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and Revenu Québec and avoid negative tax consequences.

If the arrangement is off-side applicable tax rules, the consequences may not be limited to the Incorporated Approved Person: the individual Approved Person owner may be assessed personally, including where amounts paid to the Incorporated Approved Person are treated as having been directed, transferred or assigned by the individual Approved Person. The potential tax implications for the Incorporated Approved Person can be significant, including loss of deductibility of certain expenses, loss of access to favourable corporate tax rates, punitive tax treatment applicable to personal services businesses (PSB) and potential double taxation. When structured in accordance with applicable tax laws and the proposed Amendments, an Incorporated Approved Person can provide individual Approved Persons with considerable tax benefits including (i) deductions for certain expenses not available to an employee; and (ii) potential tax deferral on the income. For example, in Ontario, services income earned by an individual is subject to a tax rate of 53.53 per cent, whereas a corporation earning such income may be subject to a corporate tax rate of 12.2 (for income that qualifies for the small business deduction) or 26.5 per cent (for all other active business income). This income will be subject to further tax (at 47.74 per cent and 39.34 per cent, respectively) when paid to individual shareholders as dividends, resulting generally in tax integration when the income is ultimately distributed to the individual.

Dealers and Approved Persons should seek tax advice at the outset, prior to structuring the new relationship, as the tax analysis will drive key terms of the agreements, including the persons entering each agreement, the terms of each agreement, the allocation of services, the legal and factual relationship among the parties, and the documentation needed to support the intended tax treatment.

While the tax considerations in Québec generally mirror the federal rules, Québec-specific issues should also be considered, including the risk of PSB treatment, which must be analyzed in light of the Québec Taxation Act and the Civil Code of Québec. Moreover, Revenu Québec has repeatedly indicated that its concern is not the commission-sharing arrangement itself, but rather determining who is legally entitled to the remuneration based on the parties’ contractual arrangements. On that basis, Revenu Québec has audited a number of mutual fund advisors who allocated commission income to their corporations (using the ‘directed commission’ model), taking the view that the income remained personally attributable to the advisor for tax purposes. Whether this position will be revisited following CIRO’s proposed Amendments remains uncertain. Several reassessments issued by Revenu Québec are currently under objection and are being held for review by a Revenu Québec officer pending the outcome of a similar case before the Québec court.

Practical implications of the proposed Amendments

New corporations

When evaluating whether and how to make Incorporated Approved Person arrangements available, Dealers and advisors will want to assess:

Whether the tripartite agreement between the Dealer, the Approved Person and the Incorporated Approved Person will permit each party to have the desired level of control or flexibility.
The cost, resources, and other practicalities of structuring the arrangement in a way that is compliant with both securities regulatory expectations and tax requirements.
While the proposed Amendments are intended to provide greater flexibility for Approved Persons, the parties will need to carefully manage the allocation of risk and responsibility among the Dealer, the Approved Person and the Incorporated Approved Person. In particular, Dealers may face increased regulatory and litigation exposure as a result of being required to supervise the activities of an Incorporated Approved Person. Disputes could also arise over whether conduct was Dealer-related or whether it was outside of the Dealer-approved scope of activities for the Incorporated Approved Person.

Existing mutual fund dealer directed commission structures

Existing directed commission structures for representatives of mutual fund dealers will need to be assessed to determine:

Whether existing share ownership and director structures align with the requirements in the proposed Amendments.
How to restructure the existing corporation to comply with the proposed Amendments in a manner that is tax efficient.
Whether CIRO is proposing a sufficient transition period and transition guidance (given the remaining ambiguities) for existing directed commission corporations to become compliant Incorporated Approved Person arrangements.

CSA registrants: Portfolio managers and EMDs too?

While the Amendments are not proposed to apply to CSA-registered portfolio managers or exempt market dealers, such registrants should consider whether to advocate for the inclusion of a non-individual registration category being equally available to them.

The path ahead

We see a lengthy path ahead before the proposed Amendments can be enacted.

The extent of the Canada Securities Administrators’ (CSA) support for the proposed Amendments is as-yet unknown. Changes to securities law will be required, including to the securities legislation of various Canadian jurisdictions (Acts) and to National Instrument 31-103 – Registration Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations (NI 31-103) to allow for advisor-owned Incorporated Approved Persons to carry out registrable activities and impose the corresponding regulatory obligations. Changes to the Acts will require provincial and/or territorial legislative changes by the relevant government, while changes to NI 31-103 will require public consultation, evaluation of the feedback, publication of finalized amendments and ministerial approvals. Currently, it is unclear whether changes to the Acts and NI 31-103 will (i) create an exemption from registration for Incorporated Approved Persons that carry out securities-related activities or, (ii) establish a new, less burdensome, non-individual registration category for Incorporated Approved Persons.

CIRO poses transition period questions in the proposed Amendments. Stakeholders will want to consider the extent of the efforts required to restructure, draft and negotiate these arrangements, as well as repaper policies and procedures to address the new requirements, and other considerations, to assess the sufficiency of the transition time proposed.

We urge Dealers and advisors to carefully consider how these proposed Amendments will apply to them and to provide suggestions and comments to CIRO by the November 6 comment deadline.

The Supreme Court clarifies Canada’s methods of medical treatment doctrine

Fri, 17 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

On July 17, 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada released its long-awaited decision in Pharmascience Inc. v. Janssen Inc., 2026 SCC 26, providing the most significant guidance in decades on the patentability of methods of medical treatment in Canada. While the Court ultimately upheld Janssen's patent, which the Court characterized as being for dosing regimens for formulations used to treat schizophrenia, the broader significance of the decision lies in its clarification of how subject matter should be assessed to determine if it defines non-patentable methods of medical treatment.

Background

The evolution of the method of medical treatment doctrine

Unlike many exclusions from patentability, the prohibition of patenting methods of medical treatment (MMT) does not appear anywhere in the Patent Act. Instead, it emerged through the common law, most notably from the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee Eastman.

In Tennessee Eastman, the Court held that a surgical method did not constitute patentable subject matter because it related to the exercise of professional skill rather than an “art” within the meaning of the Patent Act.

Over the decades that followed, that reasoning expanded beyond surgical procedures, and Courts were increasingly asked whether therapeutic methods involving pharmaceuticals likewise crossed the line into unpatentable subject matter. While a new drug could constitute patentable subject matter, greater difficulty arose where patents claimed how a drug should be administered, particularly where treatment depended on dosage adjustments, treatment schedules, or patient-specific considerations.

In attempting to distinguish patentable pharmaceutical inventions from unpatentable methods of medical treatment, the Canadian Courts considered a variety of recurring factors when attempting to assess if a claim required the exercise of professional skill and judgement, including:

whether the claim recited a fixed dosage regimen or a range requiring adjustment;
whether treatment required ongoing individualized clinical decision-making; and
whether the claimed invention more closely resembled a vendible product than the exercise of a professional medical skill.

The difficulty was that professional skill and judgement is not referred to in the Patent Act itself and no single factor led to a comprehensive legal framework.

The dispute before the Supreme Court

The present dispute arose with respect to Janssen’s Canadian Patent No. 2,655,335, whose claims recite specific dosage regimens for paliperidone used in the treatment of schizophrenia. The patent teaches a dosing schedule involving the administration of particular loading and maintenance doses.

The Federal Court in Janssen Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc., 2022 FC 1218 recognized that the existing jurisprudence related to methods of medical treatment had largely developed around a distinction between fixed and variable dosing regimens. Under that line of inquiry, claims directed to specific dosage amounts and fixed administration schedules were generally considered patentable subject matter, whereas claims requiring a physician to select a dose or treatment schedule from within a range were more likely to be characterized as unpatentable methods of medical treatment. Although the Federal Court questioned the theoretical foundation of this dichotomy, it acknowledged that this remained the prevailing state of the law.¹

The Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) in Pharmascience Inc. v Janssen Inc., 2024 FCA 23 held, and what ultimately became the guiding rule until now, was that the fixed versus variable dosage distinction was not the correct test. Rather, the proper inquiry was whether use of the invention (not whether to use it) required the exercise of skill and judgement. Importantly, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that this assessment inherently turned on the particular claims and evidence in each case.²

At the heart of Pharmascience's appeals was the contention that Janssen's patented dosing regimen crossed the line from a patentable pharmaceutical innovation into an unpatentable method of medical treatment that attempted to monopolize a physician’s judgement on “how” and “when” to administer the drugs.

The Supreme Court’s analysis

Before turning to Janssen's patent itself, the Supreme Court addressed the broader question: Are methods of medical treatment non-patentable subject matter under Canadian law?

The Court's answer was unequivocal.

From the opening paragraphs of the decision, the Court repeatedly characterized the doctrine as settled Canadian law. For more than fifty years, Canadian courts have consistently treated methods of medical treatment as unpatentable subject matter, and the Court emphasized that no Canadian court has held otherwise. In language rarely seen on a question of patent doctrine, the Court noted that it was being asked to "disrupt this settled law" and declined to do so.³

Importantly, the Court rejected Janssen's submission that the MMT doctrine disappeared with the repeal of former section 41(1) of the Patent Act. The Court concluded that the doctrine has been reaffirmed repeatedly by subsequent jurisprudence, is rooted in the broader principle that professional skills are not patentable and has become an established part of Canadian patent law independent of the former statutory provision.

In doing so, the Court effectively closed the door on arguments that the prohibition on methods of medical treatment ceased to exist as a distinct exclusion following the repeal of former section 41(1) of the Patent Act.

Adopting the Federal Court of Appeal's framework for methods of medical treatment

Neither Pharmascience nor Janssen succeeded with their competing positions. Instead, the Court expressly endorsed the framework previously articulated by the Federal Court of Appeal, describing it as a "balanced approach" grounded in the purpose of the doctrine itself.

Under that approach, the ultimate question remains whether the claimed subject matter amounts to professional medical skill and judgment. Put differently, the inquiry is whether the claim seeks to "fence in" an area of medical practice.⁴

The Court emphasized that this assessment begins with purposive claim construction and focuses on the “real subject matter of the claim.”⁵ Citing the Federal Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court emphasized that what matters in this part of the analysis is substance, not form.⁶

Professional skill and judgement

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the decision appears in the Court's discussion of professional skill and judgment.⁷

The Court drew a distinction between whether a claimed invention amounts to professional medical skill and judgement, or whether professional medical skill and judgement would be used in selecting the invention for a particular use.

By way of example, the Court stated that a medical professional prescribing a drug to a patient exercised clinical judgement in deciding whether it was appropriate, but that does not itself make the drug unpatentable. Rather, it is the prescribing decision that is the unpatentable subject matter. Further, once selected, a medical professional may still need to monitor a patient and decide whether to continue, stop or alter treatment. The Court affirmed that the mere existence of those decisions does not render the treatment unpatentable subject matter.⁸

The test for methods of medical treatment⁹

The most significant contribution of the decision may be the Supreme Court's clarification of how the methods of medical treatment doctrine is to be applied. Although the Court declined to draw a bright line between patentable medical innovations and unpatentable methods of medical treatment, it endorsed the Federal Court of Appeal's approach and identified three key considerations to guide the analysis.

First, the need for professional skill and judgement in determining whether a treatment is appropriate for a patient will generally not affect its patentability. The decision to prescribe a treatment is distinct from the invention itself.

Second, the more a claimed invention requires tailoring to the circumstances of individual patients, the more likely it is to amount to a method of medical treatment. Conversely, inventions capable of broad application without individualized adjustment are less likely to constitute methods of medical treatment.¹⁰

Third, the analysis must remain connected to the rationale underlying the doctrine. The more a medical professional would naturally develop, refine, or improve the subject matter through ordinary professional practice, the more likely it is that the subject matter is a non-patentable method of medical treatment.¹¹

Importantly, the Court emphasized that these are not bright-line rules. Rather, they are guideposts in what the Court repeatedly described as a "factually suffused" inquiry.

Moving beyond the fixed-versus-variable dosage debate

Endorsing the Federal Court of Appeal's approach, the Court held that the fixed-versus-variable dosage distinction "skirts the ultimate issue" and is, at best, an evidentiary proxy for the real inquiry of whether the claimed invention amounts to professional medical skill and judgment.¹² A variable dosage regime is therefore not inherently unpatentable, nor is a fixed dosage regimen automatically patentable, subject matter.

Application to Janssen’s Patent

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the subject matter of Janssen's claimed invention did not amount to professional medical skill and judgment. The claimed subject matter did not require the kind of individualized clinical decision-making that characterizes an unpatentable method of medical treatment. The claims therefore remained patentable subject matter, and the appeal was dismissed.

Implications

The Supreme Court’s decision confirms that methods of medical treatment remain excluded from patentable subject matter in Canada. At the same time, the Court held that a claim is not unpatentable merely because it concerns variable dosages or timing. The analysis remains fact-specific and turns on the substance of the claim, including whether implementing the claimed subject matter requires a physician or other health professional to exercise individualized skill and judgment. Claim form may be relevant to that assessment, but the decision does not suggest that form alone is determinative.

Le projet de loi C-31 propose des modifications à la Loi sur la production de défense et l’approvisionnement en défense

Wed, 15 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

Le 3 juin 2026, la Chambre des communes a terminé la deuxième lecture du projet de loi C-31, Loi n^o 2 d’exécution du budget de 2025 (projet de loi C-31), qui passera maintenant à l’examen du Comité sénatorial permanent des finances nationales. En plus de nombreux changements à la stratégie canadienne d’approvisionnement en matière de défense, le projet de loi C-31 prévoit des modifications à la Loi sur la production de défense, L.R.C. 1985, ch. D-1 (la LPD)¹.

Les changements proposés témoignent de l’importance que le Canada accorde à la défense et à la sécurité.

I. Changements dans les définitions et la portée – Gouvernement associé et services de défense

Le projet de loi C-31 propose notamment de modifier des définitions clés de la LPD, ce qui, du même coup, modifiera la portée de la loi. Globalement, les modifications visent à reconnaître des fonctions de défense et de sécurité lorsque le Canada participe à des initiatives de défense coopératives avec des gouvernements alliés « associés », ce qui vise maintenant expressément l’Union européenne et ses États membres. Elles élargissent aussi considérablement la définition de « service de défense », qui englobe tout ce qui est nécessaire ou utilisé pour la défense ou la sécurité nationales et tout ce qui est utilisé pour la production ou la fourniture de tels services.

Plus précisément, on propose :

de modifier la définition de « gouvernement associé » de façon à ce qu’elle englobe les gouvernements ou les organisations internationales partenaires en règle de l’OTAN ainsi que l’Union européenne et ses États membres²;
d’élargir la définition de « ouvrage de défense » de façon à ce qu’elle englobe les ouvrages relatifs à des communautés résidentielles situées sur des immeubles fédéraux et, de façon générale, les ouvrages « requis pour la sécurité nationale »³;
d’élargir la définition de « contrat de défense » de façon à ce qu’elle englobe les contrats conclus avec le gouvernement du Canada, ou avec un gouvernement associé, et qui porte « de quelque façon » sur des services de défense⁴;
d’ajouter une définition pour le terme « service de défense » englobant tout ce qui est requis ou utilisé en lien avec la défense ou la sécurité nationales ou avec des efforts concertés pour la défense ou la sécurité menés par le Canada et un gouvernement associé, les embarcations et tout ce qui est utilisé pour la production de ces choses⁵.

II. Pouvoirs du ministre

Aux termes de la version actuelle de la LPD, le « ministre » autorisé à agir en lien avec celle-ciest le ministre des Travaux publics et des Services gouvernementaux⁶. Le projet de loi C-31 propose que cela demeure le cas relativement à la partie 2 de la loi (qui concerne la réglementation de l’accès aux marchandises contrôlées), mais que, relativement à la partie 1 (qui concerne la fourniture de matériel de défense), il s’agisse du ministre désigné en vertu de l’article 3 de la Loi sur l’Agence de l’investissement pour la défense, une nouvelle loi que le projet de loi 31 propose d’édicter⁷. Cet autre ministre n’est pas nommé, mais il serait désigné par décret du gouverneur en conseil⁸.

Le projet de loi C-31 dispose aussi que les attributions conférées par la LPD ont préséance sur la Loi sur le ministère des Travaux publics et des Services gouvernementaux⁹.

L’article 312 du projet de loi clarifie les attributions du ministre, qui peut par ailleurs, avec l’autorisation du gouverneur en conseil, prendre pour le compte d’un gouvernement associé toute mesure que la loi l’habilite à prendre¹⁰. Cette disposition vise certainement les futurs partenariats en défense, comme l’Accord entre l’Union européenne et le Canada concernant la participation au titre de l’Instrument SAFE.

Le ministre peut aussi prélever sur le Trésor jusqu’à un milliard de dollars en lien avec (1) l’accumulation de stocks, (2) de l’aide financière et (3) l’acquisition de services de défense, de matériel de défense et d’ouvrages de défense¹¹.

III. Demandes de renseignements et accumulation de stocks

Le ministre peut demander de l’information sur le matériel de défense et les services de défense qu’une personne fournit ou envisage de fournir, notamment sur la source d’approvisionnement et sur les installations qui sont à la disposition de la personne qui fournit le matériel ou les services ou construit les ouvrages de défense¹². Ce type de demande peut être adressée à quiconque fournit des services de défense ou dont les activités commerciales sont susceptibles de convenir à la fourniture de services de défense¹³. Auparavant, ces demandes étaient limitées aux personnes fournissant du matériel de défense ou des ouvrages de défense¹⁴ – elles peuvent maintenant également viser les personnes qui fournissent des services de défense, dont la définition est très large.

Le ministre peut aussi accumuler des matières désignées dans plus de circonstances. Avant, l’accumulation de stocks était limitée aux matières désignées par le gouverneur en conseil comme étant indispensables aux besoins de la collectivité pour en prévenir la pénurie. Le projet de loi C-31 élargit ce pouvoir à toute chose qui est « indispensable aux besoins nationaux ou à ceux d’une collectivité au Canada ou ailleurs ou d’un gouvernement associé » en lien avec la défense nationale, la sécurité nationale et la sécurité économique¹⁵.

IV. Approvisionnement en défense

Plusieurs nouvelles dispositions et modifications touchent les fournisseurs potentiels des processus d’approvisionnement en matière de défense.

a. Aide financière

Le projet de loi C-31 propose d’élargir le pouvoir du ministre d’offrir de l’aide financière à des fins liées à la production, à l’approvisionnement ou aux investissements relativement à la défense nationale, ainsi qu’à des fins liées à du matériel de défense, à des services de défense ou à des ouvrages de défense et pour l’accumulation de stocks. Il peut s’agir de consentir des prêts, de faire des paiements anticipés, d’accorder des subventions ou des contributions, ou de conclure d’autres accords de nature financière, avec l’autorisation du gouverneur en conseil¹⁶.

b. Renseignements sur l’entreprise

Le projet de loi C-31 confirme qu’aucun renseignement recueilli sur une entreprise dans le cadre de la loi ne peut être communiqué sans consentement, sauf à un ministère qui en a besoin pour l’accomplissement de ses fonctions, aux fins de poursuite pour une infraction à la loi ou aux fins de toute autre procédure judiciaire (avec le consentement du ministre)¹⁷.

c. Exception relative à la sécurité nationale

Le projet de loi C-31 confirme que l’exception relative à la sécurité nationale peut être invoquée en lien avec un accord ayant trait au commerce intérieur ou international auquel le Canada est partie¹⁸. Parmi les accords pertinents se trouvent l’Accord de libre-échange canadien (pour le commerce intérieur), l’Accord économique et commercial global entre le Canada et l’Union européenne et l’Accord sur les marchés publics de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce.

De façon générale, l’exception relative à la sécurité nationale permet au Canada de déroger aux procédures normales d’un processus d’approvisionnement afin de protéger des intérêts de sécurité nationale (par exemple : approvisionnement non concurrentiel, restriction des protections procédurales offertes aux fournisseurs potentiels ou des recours possibles).

d. Approvisionnement concurrentiel en défense

Même s’il confirme que l’exception relative à la sécurité nationale peut être invoquée, le projet de loi C-31 prévoit aussi une exigence générale obligeant le ministre à mener un processus d’approvisionnement concurrentiel avant de conclure un contrat, sous réserve de certaines exceptions¹⁹.

Un processus concurrentiel n’est par exemple pas requis :

pour les contrats visant à répondre à un besoin opérationnel urgent;
lorsque l’omission est nécessaire pour conduire des opérations militaires, en lien avec des ouvrages de défense essentiels ou pour veiller à la sécurité nationale;
lorsqu’il est question de soutenir un secteur de l’économie du Canada qui est important pour la défense nationale, pour la sécurité nationale ou pour la sécurité économique;
pour les contrats visant du matériel ou des services de défense qui sont interopérables ou interchangeables avec du matériel, des services ou des ouvrages de défense du Canada ou d’un gouvernement associé;
pour les contrats visant une technologie sensible;
pour les contrats qu’une seule personne est en mesure d’exécuter;
pour les contrats qui, pour des raisons opérationnelles, visent à combler un besoin provisoire;
pour les contrats afférents aux contrats visant à combler un besoin provisoire;
pour les contrats visant la recherche, le développement et l’innovation concernant du matériel ou des services de défense;
pour les contrats visant du matériel ou des services de défense ayant fait l’objet de financement du Canada pour la recherche, le développement ou l’innovation;
pour les contrats devant être conclus avec une entité administrative, aux termes d’un accord ou d’un arrangement avec une entité administrative ou en vertu d’une procédure d’une organisation internationale dont le Canada est membre;
lorsqu’une exception prévue par un règlement pris en vertu de la Loi sur la gestion des finances publiques s’applique;
lorsqu’un règlement le prescrit.

Même en l’absence d’exception, le ministre peut exclure toute personne d’un processus d’approvisionnement concurrentiel s’il a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’elle ou toute chose qu’il est proposé d’employer pose un risque pour la défense ou la sécurité nationales ou pour la sécurité publique. Il n’est pas tenu de fournir à la personne ainsi exclue les motifs de cette décision.

V. Règlements et examens futurs

Le gouverneur en conseil peut prendre des règlements, notamment au sujet des pouvoirs d’accumulation de stocks du ministre, de la fourniture de renseignements sur les coûts des contrats d’approvisionnement et de la procédure des processus d’approvisionnement concurrentiels, et pour fixer des conditions réputées faire partie intégrante des contrats d’approvisionnement en défense. Des règlements peuvent aussi prévoir d’autres détails et définitions pour les exceptions aux processus d’approvisionnement concurrentiels, par exemple sur le sens de « besoin opérationnel urgent », de « technologie sensible » et de contrat avec une « entité administrative »²⁰.

Le ministre serait tenu de procéder à un examen de la loi dans les trois ans suivant l’entrée en vigueur et de soumettre un rapport au Parlement²¹.

VI. Incidences des modifications à la LPD proposées par le projet de loi C-31

Les modifications proposées par le projet de loi C-31 n’ont pas encore été adoptées. Au moment de rédiger cet article, la deuxième lecture du projet de loi à la Chambre des communes était terminée et le projet était dans les mains du Comité sénatorial permanent des finances nationales.

On peut tout de même penser dès maintenant aux répercussions qu’elles auront sur les secteurs de la défense et de la fabrication de biens à double usage.

a. Meilleur accès au marché et plus de processus d’approvisionnement avec des gouvernements associés

L’ajout des gouvernements et des organisations internationales partenaires en règle de l’OTAN ainsi que de l’Union européenne (UE) et ses États membres à la définition de « gouvernement associé » est un signal clair de la volonté d’accentuer la coopération industrielle et de défense entre les alliés transatlantiques. Cette proposition s’ajoute à l’accord récent entre le Canada et l’UE donnant aux entreprises canadiennes un accès privilégié aux processus d’acquisition en défense financés au titre de l’instrument Security Action for Europe (SAFE).

De nouvelles occasions pourraient ainsi se présenter dans le secteur de la défense, particulièrement pour ce qui est d’accéder et de participer à des processus d’approvisionnement multinationaux et à des chaînes d’approvisionnement intégrées au titre de modèles comme l’instrument SAFE.

Cela dit, la participation aux processus d’approvisionnement menés par des alliés ou l’UE vient avec un lot de considérations réglementaires complexes. En plus des exigences canadiennes relatives à la sécurité nationale, à l’examen des investissements et à l’approvisionnement, les entreprises feront face à des attentes plus élevées en matière de conformité, d’interopérabilité et d’autorisation de sécurité. Selon la structure du processus d’approvisionnement, elles pourraient aussi être assujetties aux exigences des régimes d’approvisionnement et de sécurité du gouvernement allié. Il faudra savoir respecter ces cadres pour profiter des avantages de l’accès élargi au marché.

b. Portée élargie : services de défense

Comme l’application de la LPD a été élargie aux « services de défense » en plus du « matériel de défense » et des « ouvrages de défense », et à un plus grand nombre d’ouvrages liés à la défense, plus d’entités (y compris des fournisseurs de services, des entreprises du secteur des technologies et des fabricants de biens à double usage) ont accès à des processus d’approvisionnement et à des contrats régis par la loi. Vu l’importance accrue accordée à la protection de la collectivité et à la sécurité économique, les entreprises participant à la construction d’infrastructures clés et œuvrant dans des secteurs névralgiques de l’économie pourraient aussi être exposées à des occasions et à des demandes de renseignements découlant du régime de la LPD.

Si ces changements entrent bien en vigueur, un plus grand nombre de contrats gouvernementaux seront qualifiés de contrats de défense régis par la LPD. Ainsi, des entreprises qui ne sont pas habituellement considérées comme œuvrant dans la défense ou qui fabriquent des biens à double usage pourraient devoir donner de l’information sur leurs chaînes d’approvisionnement et leur capacité à fournir du matériel.

Les entreprises qui fournissent des services dans l’écosystème de défense, de même que celles qui souhaitent pénétrer le secteur ou participer à des approvisionnements en défense, doivent vérifier si leurs activités sont maintenant visées. Une évaluation précoce et une bonne préparation sont essentielles pour gérer un fardeau réglementaire plus lourd et plus complexe.

c. Centralisation des pouvoirs en approvisionnement

L’octroi à une seule entité de larges pouvoirs pour l’encadrement de l’approvisionnement en défense et sécurité nationale est un changement qui était fort attendu. La préséance donnée à la LPD par rapport à la Loi sur le ministère des Travaux publics et des Services gouvernementaux est probablement le changement le plus significatif proposé par le projet de loi C-31. Il pourrait entraîner un changement dans le rôle que jouent le ministre des Travaux publics et SPAC dans l’approvisionnement en défense. La centralisation de la prise de décisions pourrait permettre de réaliser des projets plus rapidement – surtout ceux qui sont urgents ou d’une grande importance stratégique – tout en améliorant la coordination et la cohérence des contrats d’approvisionnement d’envergure.

Ce nouveau modèle s’accompagnera toutefois probablement de nouveaux processus d’approbation et d’un cadre moins prévisible à court terme (le temps que les pratiques évoluent) que les parties prenantes devront apprivoiser.

d. Clarification de la distinction entre les processus d’approvisionnement concurrentiels et non concurrentiels

Si les modifications proposées clarifient que le processus d’approvisionnement en défense est par défaut concurrentiel, la longue liste d’exceptions – dont certaines sont très largement formulées – laisse croire que plusieurs ne le seront pas complètement.

La nouvelle structure de la LPD donne toutefois des indices sur la nécessité ou non d’un processus concurrentiel. Actuellement, l’exception relative à la sécurité nationale est généralement invoquée dans un approvisionnement en défense pour déroger aux exigences procédurales habituelles visant à assurer la concurrence entre des fournisseurs potentiels. Comme la norme est celle de l’applicabilité des exigences de concurrence, un processus non concurrentiel doit correspondre à l’une des exceptions établies. En évaluant la probabilité qu’une exception s’applique à un processus d’approvisionnement donné, les fournisseurs peuvent avoir une meilleure idée du déroulement de ce processus.

Certaines exceptions peuvent aussi ouvrir des portes. L’une d’elles concerne le soutien d’un secteur de l’économie canadienne lié à la défense, ce qui devrait créer des processus d’approvisionnement qui favorisent les fournisseurs canadiens ou excluent les fournisseurs non canadiens. Une autre concerne l’approvisionnement en matériel ou services de défense liés à la recherche et au développement, ce qui pourrait encourager la participation aux programmes et subventions du Canada en R et D. Enfin, l’exception relative aux contrats conclus avec une entité administrative ou dans le cadre d’une procédure d’une organisation internationale pourrait faciliter des processus d’approvisionnement adaptés aux ententes internationales et la participation de fournisseurs de contenu du Canada et d’ailleurs, notamment au titre de l’Accord entre l’Union européenne et le Canada concernant la participation au titre de l’Instrument SAFE.

Le projet de loi C-31 semble indiquer que des règlements pourraient venir préciser la portée de certaines exceptions et fixer des conditions réputées faire partie intégrante des contrats en défense, ce qui aiderait les fournisseurs potentiels à mieux comprendre la répartition du risque pour une catégorie donnée de contrat.

e. Utilisation accrue des outils de politique industrielle

L’élargissement des pouvoirs en matière d’aide financière (prêts, subventions, paiements anticipés, etc.) reflète la volonté du gouvernement de s’impliquer plus activement dans le développement industriel de la défense, particulièrement avec des investissements directs. Les entreprises devraient se tenir à l’affût des occasions de financement, qui viendront toutefois avec des conditions liées aux priorités de sécurité nationale.

Les prêts, subventions et paiements anticipés aideront grandement à démocratiser la participation aux projets de défense, mais des réformes sur la répartition des risques doivent encore être menées pour qu’il y ait une véritable adhésion dans l’industrie. Par exemple, la réticence habituelle du Canada d’accepter une limitation de responsabilité ou des dispositions d’indemnisation favorables aux entrepreneurs dans les contrats est depuis longtemps une caractéristique centrale de sa philosophie en approvisionnement. Conjuguée à la valeur élevée et à la complexité des projets, cette approche peut créer un risque contractuel rebutant, surtout pour les petites et moyennes entreprises.

Le gouvernement fédéral a signalé son intention de moderniser son approche quant à la répartition des risques dans l’approvisionnement en défense, mais, pour ses principales positions sur la transmission des obligations, la limitation de responsabilité et l’indemnisation, il est peu probable que cela passe par des modifications législatives. Il est à parier que l’évolution se fera plutôt au moyen des orientations stratégiques et des pratiques d’approvisionnement de l’Agence de l’investissement pour la défense.

f. Souplesse accrue pour l’accumulation de stocks

Le retrait de restrictions sur les types de stocks qui peuvent être accumulés est un signal clair que le Canada entend adopter une approche plus proactive et stratégique quant à la résilience de la chaîne d’approvisionnement, notamment pour ce qui est des considérations de sécurité économique. Ce changement devrait augmenter la demande en production intérieure et soutenir des arrangements à long terme plus prévisibles pour l’approvisionnement dans la base industrielle de défense.

Qui plus est, la proposition reflète un revirement dans la philosophie traditionnelle du Canada en approvisionnement. Le gouvernement semble repositionner l’industrie, autrefois vue principalement comme un moyen de réaliser des projets uniques, comme un partenaire stratégique dans le développement et le maintien à long terme des capacités souveraines en défense.

Cette approche correspond mieux à celles des proches alliés du Canada et démontre que l’on reconnaît qu’une meilleure intégration de l’industrie est nécessaire pour que le pays soit paré aux éventualités et à l’avant-garde des technologies. Le Canada signale aussi son intention de mieux se positionner dans un environnement défini par une concurrence accrue avec les adversaires de force égale ou quasi égale où la défense nationale dépend de plus en plus de la capacité industrielle et de la sécurité de la chaîne d’approvisionnement.

VII. Conclusion

Ensemble, les modifications proposées représentent une véritable évolution du régime d’approvisionnement en défense et de la politique industrielle du Canada. Elles ne sont pas encore en vigueur, mais elles annoncent l’adoption d’une approche plus centralisée, multifacette et axée sur la sécurité qui cadre mieux avec celles d’alliés clés. Cela créera des occasions intéressantes pour les acteurs du secteur, surtout sur les marchés alliés et pour le développement des capacités intérieures, mais accentuera aussi la complexité de la réglementation et les attentes en matière de conformité.

Les organisations ont avantage à évaluer dès maintenant les répercussions de ces changements sur leurs activités, leurs contrats et leurs stratégies de croissance. Celles qui agiront vite, qui se prépareront aux nouvelles exigences réglementaires et qui s’arrimeront aux priorités du gouvernement auront de bonnes chances de gérer agilement la transition et de saisir les nouvelles occasions.

Interdiction des acheteurs étrangers au Canada : Ce que l’échéance de 2027 laisse présager pour les investisseurs

Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:00:00 Z

Près de quatre ans après l’adoption de la Loi sur l’interdiction d’achat d’immeubles résidentiels par des non-Canadiens (la « Loi »), laquelle doit échoir bientôt, le gouvernement fédéral examine différentes façons d’assouplir ses restrictions. Si le gouvernement Carney a maintenu la décision de l’administration précédente de prolonger l’interdiction jusqu’à la fin de 2026, il a également annoncé son intention de rouvrir le marché aux investissements étrangers dans certaines circonstances.

Points à retenir

L’interdiction pour les étrangers d’acheter une propriété résidentielle au Canada échoit en 2027, et le gouvernement Carney souhaite adopter une nouvelle approche plutôt que prolonger les mesures actuelles.
Les effets mesurables de Loi sont limités : les étrangers ne représentaient que 1,1 % des acheteurs de résidences en Colombie-Britannique en 2021, et les prix moyens de l’immobilier au Canada ont tout de même bondi de plus de 20 % pendant la période de restriction.
Le système d’exemption à paliers de l’Australie, qui permet aux étrangers d’investir dans des constructions neuves, des projets de réaménagement d’envergure et des terrains vacants, fait partie des cadres dont le Canada pourrait s’inspirer pour sa stratégie d’après 2027.
L’État prévoit déjà, en vertu de la Loi, des exonérations permanentes pour les terrains vacants et certains achats liés à des projets de réaménagement, ainsi que pour des sociétés sous contrôle étranger qui sont cotées en bourse et constituées au Canada.
Les investisseurs et les promoteurs immobiliers devraient suivre de près l’évolution de la législation à l’approche de l’échéance de 2027, notamment l’ajout de dérogations liées à l’offre qui permettraient de rouvrir certains segments du marché résidentiel aux capitaux étrangers.

Crise du logement au Canada : L’interdiction a-t-elle permis de calmer le jeu?

La Loi, qui empêche de manière générale les ressortissants étrangers et les entreprises non canadiennes d’acquérir des actifs résidentiels au Canada, fait partie des mesures mises en place pour remédier à la grave pénurie de logements que connaît le pays.

La Société canadienne d’hypothèques et de logement prévoit que les mises en chantier devront pratiquement doubler – et atteindre de 380 000 à 430 000 unités par année jusqu’en 2035 – pour répondre à la demande projetée. Le gouvernement a donc cherché à limiter le nombre d’acquéreurs étrangers, estimant qu’ils tiraient les prix vers le haut et écartaient ainsi des acteurs canadiens du marché. Cependant, les experts se demandent encore si le fait d’exclure les acheteurs internationaux peut véritablement faire augmenter l’offre de logements ou améliorer l’accessibilité.

En 2021, l’année précédant l’annonce de l’interdiction, les achats étrangers ne représentaient que 1,1 % des transactions immobilières résidentielles en Colombie-Britannique (une baisse de 3 % par rapport à 2017). Depuis, les prix moyens de l’immobilier au Canada ont malgré tout grimpé de plus de 20 %.

Peu après l’adoption de la Loi, l’État a assoupli ses restrictions afin d’autoriser les non-Canadiens à acheter des terrains vacants et des biens immobiliers résidentiels destinés à être réaménagés, reconnaissant ainsi le rôle que jouent les sociétés sous contrôle étranger dans l’élargissement de l’offre de logements et l’abordabilité.

Nouvelle approche réaliste du fédéral

Depuis son arrivée au pouvoir, l’administration Carney se montre pragmatique en matière d’investissements étrangers. Le ministre du Logement, Gregor Robertson, a indiqué que l’État voyait désormais les capitaux étrangers comme un moyen de combler les lacunes du marché immobilier canadien¹; pour sa part, le gouvernement fédéral a fait savoir qu’il envisageait une réforme fiscale pour attirer les grands investisseurs internationaux².

Le décalage entre la visée et l’effet de l’interdiction permet d’expliquer cette volte-face. La Loi vise principalement les résidences unifamiliales à vocation spéculative, plutôt que les grands multiplex ou les projets commerciaux d’envergure. Comme les étrangers ne représentent qu’une faible proportion des acheteurs des propriétés concernées, leur exclusion n’a guère contribué à remédier aux problèmes les plus criants du marché. L’évolution des prix pendant la période de restriction a été davantage influencée par les tendances macroéconomiques générales que par la mise sur pause des achats étrangers. En conséquence, on envisage de plus en plus de remplacer l’interdiction tous azimuts par des dérogations ciblées liées à l’offre qui permettraient de canaliser les capitaux étrangers vers la construction d’habitations, les réaménagements d’envergure et la réalisation de projets sur des terrains vacants.

Comparaison des cadres de restriction australien et canadien

L’Australie est confrontée à une pénurie de logements similaire à celle du Canada et prévoit construire 1,2 million de nouvelles résidences entre 2025 et 2029. Les achats de résidences existantes par des intérêts étrangers y représentaient 32,9 % du total des transactions en 2023.

Le pays a donc promulgué sa propre interdiction le 1^eravril 2025 pour limiter l’accès des étrangers au marché immobilier résidentiel. Toutefois, le cadre australien prévoit certaines exceptions, notamment :

les investissements permettant d’accroître le parc de logements de plus de 20 unités;
les acquisitions réalisées en vue d’un réaménagement qui augmentera l’offre commerciale d’habitations (villages de retraités, ressources d’hébergement, résidences universitaires, etc.);
les achats de constructions neuves;
les acquisitions de terrains vacants.

La plupart des dérogations accordées aux ressortissants étrangers en Australie sont soumises à l’approbation d’une commission d’examen et assorties de conditions strictes.

Alors que l’interdiction devait initialement prendre fin le 31 mars 2027, le gouvernement australien l’a récemment prolongée jusqu’au 30 juin 2029; on peut donc en conclure qu’il considère ces restrictions comme une réponse pérenne aux problèmes de logement, bien qu’il continue à permettre les investissements dans la construction neuve et le réaménagement.

Le ministre Robertson a affirmé que le Canada pourrait adopter un cadre semblable à celui de l’Australie après l’expiration de sa Loi en 2027, et précisé qu’il était probable que la mise en chantier de résidences et de logements locatifs haut de gamme fasse partie des exceptions en faveur des investisseurs étrangers. Quelle que soit la structure retenue, le Canada semble plus enclin à adopter une approche nuancée qu’à maintenir une interdiction élargie.

Exemptions en vigueur au Canada

Contrairement au régime australien, où toute transaction faisant l’objet d’une dérogation doit généralement être approuvée par une commission d’examen, la Loi canadienne permet que des achats autrement interdits soient réalisés par certaines catégories d’acquéreurs, sans que des autorisations au cas par cas soient octroyées.

En outre, la Loi ne s’applique qu’aux biens immobiliers situés dans des régions métropolitaines de recensement ou des agglomérations de recensement, et exclut certaines propriétés en milieu rural ainsi que des biens meubles se trouvant sur des terrains loués. Sa définition du terme « immeuble résidentiel » n’englobe généralement pas les grands bâtiments d’habitation non divisés en copropriétés ni les projets d’aménagement.

En réponse aux commentaires formulés par le secteur, le gouvernement fédéral a modifié sa Loi en 2023 pour y soustraire les terrains vacants et certains achats liés à des projets de réaménagement, de même que pour instaurer une exception pour les sociétés sous contrôle étranger qui sont cotées en bourse au Canada et constituées en vertu de la législation fédérale ou d’un régime provincial. Dans leur ensemble, ces changements visaient à faciliter l’injection de capitaux étrangers dans des projets de réaménagement susceptibles d’aider le gouvernement à atteindre ses objectifs en matière de logements.

La principale différence entre les régimes canadien et australien actuels porte sur les constructions neuves; l’Australie permet expressément l’achat de certaines d’entre elles, contrairement au Canada, qui limite ses dérogations aux terrains vacants, aux projets de réaménagement et à certaines catégories d’acquéreurs.

Éléments à surveiller à l’approche de la levée de l’interdiction en 2027

Le gouvernement n’a pas encore annoncé sa décision concernant l’avenir de la Loi. Cependant, vu les exceptions déjà admises et les récentes déclarations gouvernementales, les investisseurs étrangers doivent s’attendre à une refonte du cadre réglementaire, laquelle tiendra compte du type de bien immobilier et des visées d’un projet d’aménagement, plutôt qu’à une réouverture complète du marché. Nous continuerons de suivre de près l’évolution de la situation et mettrons cet article à jour en conséquence.

Cette publication de nature strictement générale ne constitue pas un avis juridique.

BLG peut vous aider

Par ses conseils avisés, le groupe Droit immobilier commercial de BLG aide les promoteurs immobiliers, les acheteurs, les entrepreneurs, les consultants, les autorités publiques et les autres acteurs du secteur à surmonter les écueils les plus complexes entourant la construction de logements. Pour toute question sur cet article ou sur un projet de construction auquel vous prévoyez participer, communiquez avec les personnes-ressources ci-dessous.