Filtered-Insights

Independent obligations endure: CCAA releases don’t extinguish surety indemnity claims

Fri, 29 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

In Intact Insurance Company v. Edward Collins Contracting Limited, 2026 NLSC 49, the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador dismissed an application to strike a surety’s claim under an indemnity agreement, confirming that releases granted in Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceedings do not automatically extinguish independent contractual obligations of indemnitors.

Case summary: Intact v. Collins Contracting (2026 NLSC 49)

Background: surety claim and CCAA release defence

The plaintiff (Intact) commenced an action seeking payment under an Indemnity Agreement executed in connection with losses it suffered as surety under various Performance Bonds and Labour and Material Payment Bonds. The defendant (an individual Indemnitor) applied to strike the claim, arguing that releases granted under an Approval and Vesting Order (AVO) in prior CCAA proceedings barred the claim.

The Indemnitor relied on the AVO, asserting that the release provisions had discharged him from personal liability to the surety as he was a director and officer of the insolvent Principal. He also advanced arguments grounded in res judicata, issue estoppel, and abuse of process.

Court decision: motion to strike dismissed

Justice Browne dismissed the application to strike. The Court held that, on the face of the pleadings, it was not “plain and obvious” that the surety’s claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The Court emphasized that an indemnity agreement creates a primary and independent contractual obligation, distinct from liabilities arising solely by reason of a person’s status as a director or officer. As pleaded, the surety’s claim properly set out the existence of the Indemnity Agreement, the losses incurred, and the Indemnitor’s obligation to reimburse those losses.

CCAA release scope: limits on director and indemnity claims

A central issue was whether the AVO releases extended to the defendant’s personal indemnity obligations. The Court found that they did not.

When the AVO and the earlier oral reasons were read together, the releases were intended to protect parties in their representative capacities, not to extinguish personal contractual obligations caught by section 5.1(2) of the CCAA.

Section 5.1(2) of the CCAA expressly limits the compromise of director claims in plans of arrangement where they relate to contractual rights of creditors or involve allegations of wrongdoing. Courts have held that this limitation also applies to releases granted upon sale approvals in CCAA proceedings, outside of plans of arrangement. The Court noted that jurisprudence consistently treats personal guarantees and indemnities as independent contractual undertakings relating to the contractual rights of creditors and thus not releasable. While the AVO release language contained a general release of indemnities, it also concluded with the qualifier that no claim was released that was not permitted to be released by section 5.1(2) of the CCAA.

In the oral reasons accompanying the AVO, the Court confirmed that it was not releasing directors in their personal capacities and was not releasing any claim that section 5.1(2) barred it from releasing.

Res judicata and abuse of process: not applicable

The Court rejected the argument that the claim was barred by res judicata or issue estoppel. The earlier CCAA proceedings addressed the approval of a sale transaction and related releases – not the enforceability of the personal indemnity.

Because the merits of the indemnity claim were not adjudicated in the CCAA proceeding, the essential elements of res judicata were not met. Similarly, advancing the indemnity claim did not constitute an abuse of process, as it concerned rights that the CCAA process had not conclusively addressed.

Key takeaways for sureties and creditors

This decision provides important guidance for sureties and other creditors:

CCAA releases are not all-encompassing: They will not extend to independent contractual obligations such as personal indemnities or guarantees.
Personal indemnities remain enforceable: Courts will treat indemnity agreements as primary obligations that survive insolvency restructurings.
Procedural defences have limits: Res judicata and abuse of process arguments will not succeed where the underlying issue has not been previously adjudicated.

For sureties, the case reinforces the continued reliability of Indemnity Agreements and personal Indemnitors as a key risk mitigation tool, even in the context of complex insolvency restructurings.

Intact was represented in this motion by Borden Ladner Gervais LLP.

Note: The Indemnitor has filed a notice of appeal, which might be heard. BLG will provide supplemental updates on this matter.

CRA delays GST/HST changes on trailing commissions to 2028

Thu, 28 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

On May 13, 2026, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) advised industry groups that the application of its revised administrative position on the taxability of trailing commissions will not proceed on July 1, 2026, as previously indicated. Subsequently on May 26, 2026, the CRA released a revised version of GST/HST Notice 344 – Application of the GST/HST to Mutual Fund Trailing Commissions (Notice 344), formalizing the previously announced deferral of enforcement until Jan. 1, 2028.

CRA’s shift on GST/HST treatment of trailing commissions

On Feb. 10, 2026, the CRA announced a major change to the goods and services tax/harmonized sales tax (GST/HST) treatment of mutual fund trailing commissions (trailing commissions). Notice 344 originally confirmed an earlier GST/HST Ruling provided to industry stakeholders in late 2025 and advised that, effective July 1, 2026, Trailing Commissions would be treated as taxable supplies. This represented a reversal of the CRA’s long-standing position that such payments were consideration for exempt financial services.

Following consultation with industry stakeholders, the CRA has now announced that it will delay enforcement of this change until Jan. 1, 2028, to allow affected taxpayers sufficient time to implement the necessary operational and compliance changes.

What the deferral means for industry

Industry will welcome the formal announcement of an extension on May 26, 2026. Given the significance of the operational changes required to comply with the CRA’s revised position on the application of GST/HST to trailing commissions, affected stakeholders should continue their efforts to implement the necessary changes to their tax compliance processes.

Industry had consistently indicated that the approximate six-month implementation period previously provided was insufficient. That position was articulated during consultations preceding the GST/HST Ruling released in December 2025, as well as in formal submissions made prior to the release of Notice 344 in February 2026. As a result, while the deferral is welcome, this announcement may nonetheless give rise to some frustration within the industry. More broadly, the pattern of announcing deferrals to significant tax changes after their initial release is unfortunate.

Stakeholders will also be watching for corresponding announcements from Revenu Québec, which only announced last month its intention to align the QST treatment of trailing commissions with GST/HST.

With respect to the prospect of legal challenges to the revised administrative position, most stakeholders are currently focused on complying with the CRA’s revised position. That said, from a technical perspective, the fact that this change has been introduced through a CRA ruling rather than a legislative amendment may provide a basis for challenge. In particular, existing jurisprudence has recognised trailing commissions as exempt financial services and has emphasised that the characterization of a supply should be determined from the perspective of the recipient, rather than solely by reference to the supplier’s activities—an approach that appears to have been adopted in the technical ruling underlying this change.

Questions on CRA GST/HST changes to trailing commissions and the delay to 2028?

Contact BLG’s Tax Group. Our team advises clients across the investment and financial services sector on GST/HST matters, including the treatment of trailing commissions, compliance requirements and audit risk. We can help you assess the impact of the CRA’s revised position and support your preparation for the 2028 implementation.

Projet pilote des ACVM sur la communication semestrielle d’information : tendances et perspectives

Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

Les Autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières (« ACVM ») autorisent les émetteurs émergents admissibles à opter pour la communication semestrielle d’information financière en vertu de la Décision générale coordonnée 51-933 relative aux dispenses permettant les rapports semestriels pour certains émetteurs émergents (la « décision générale »).

Après un examen des documents déposés dans SEDAR+, nous analysons la cadence d’adoption et le profil des émetteurs participants – bourse, secteur d’activité, capitalisation boursière – ainsi que les pratiques émergentes relativement à la communication semestrielle d’information et aux obligations d’information connexe. Nous formulons également des observations pertinentes pour les émetteurs qui pensent opter pour la communication semestrielle d’information et indiquons la voie à privilégier pour informer efficacement les marchés.

Points à retenir

L’adoption de la communication semestrielle d’information s’accélère. Un nombre grandissant d’émetteurs admissibles optent pour la communication semestrielle d’information, et le mouvement s’accélère depuis quelques semaines.
Les pratiques d’information pour faire connaître cette décision varient grandement et doivent être examinées avec soin. Même si la décision générale ne l’exige pas, beaucoup d’émetteurs expliquent leur décision d’opter pour la communication semestrielle. Par contre, la profondeur et la visibilité de ces explications varient considérablement d’un émetteur à l’autre.
La communication semestrielle d’information suscite aussi un intérêt à l’étranger, ce qui pourrait faire émerger des divergences réglementaires. Aux États-Unis, des chantiers visant à établir la communication semestrielle d’information pour les émetteurs du pays pourraient entraîner une réévaluation des régimes d’information trimestrielle.

Contexte : le projet pilote

Dans l’article Perspectives de BLG du mois d’avril 2026, nous indiquions qu’une décision générale permettait aux émetteurs émergents admissibles de déposer des états financiers intermédiaires et le rapport de gestion connexe sur une base semestrielle (le « projet pilote »). La décision générale prévoit des dispenses à l’obligation de déposer des rapports financiers intermédiaires et des rapports de gestion connexes pour les premier et troisième trimestres d’un exercice.

Pour bénéficier de ces dispenses, un émetteur doit satisfaire à certaines conditions, notamment :

être un émetteur émergent avec des titres inscrits à la cote de la Bourse de croissance TSX (« TSXV ») ou de la Bourse des valeurs canadiennes (« CSE »);
être un émetteur assujetti depuis au moins 12 mois au Canada;
avoir des produits des activités ordinaires n’excédant pas 10 millions de dollars, selon ses plus récents états financiers annuels audités;
être à jour dans toutes les obligations d’information périodique et occasionnelle;
publier et déposer sur SEDAR+ un communiqué annonçant son choix de se prévaloir de la communication semestrielle d’information.

La communication semestrielle d’information en chiffres

Depuis l’entrée en vigueur de la décision générale le 19 mars 2026, selon notre examen des documents déposés dans SEDAR+, 111 émetteurs ont annoncé qu’ils passaient à la communication semestrielle d’information (les « participants ») (au 8 mai 2026). Selon nos estimations, plus de 1 750 émetteurs¹ sont admissibles au projet pilote, ce qui voudrait dire qu’environ 6,5 % des émetteurs ont déjà décidé d’y participer.

De plus, le mouvement s’accélère : 63 % des participants ont annoncé leur décision dans les trois dernières semaines. Cette tendance témoigne de la confiance des émetteurs à l’égard du projet pilote et, plus largement, de la communication semestrielle d’information.

D’ailleurs, les annonces des participants ne semblent avoir eu aucun effet notable sur le cours de leurs titres, ce qui laisse supposer un niveau d’adhésion comparable chez les investisseurs à l’égard de ce nouveau mode de fonctionnement, ou à tout le moins leur indifférence.

Selon nos propres données, 68 % des participants sont inscrits à la cote de la TSXV, et les 32 % restants à celle de la CSE. Environ 73 % des émetteurs admissibles sont inscrits à la cote de la TSXV, ce qui voudrait dire que ceux inscrits à la cote de la CSE sont, en proportion, plus nombreux à opter pour la communication semestrielle d’information.

Une part importante des participants exercent leurs activités dans le secteur minier (60 %); l’adoption de la communication semestrielle d’information est aussi notable dans les secteurs des technologies (10 %) et des sociétés de capital de démarrage (11 %).

Ces données sont relativement proportionnelles par rapport au nombre d’émetteurs admissibles dans ces secteurs; en effet, la répartition des participants est tributaire de la pertinence du projet pilote pour les émetteurs œuvrant dans des secteurs où les investissements sont importants, où la mise en valeur ou en production prend du temps et où les revenus à court terme sont limités.
La sous-représentation des services financiers (12 % des émetteurs admissibles, mais seulement 3 % des participants) parmi les participants vient confirmer cet état de fait.

La capitalisation boursière moyenne des participants s’établit à environ 13,6 millions de dollars², avec la médiane à 4,4 millions de dollars. De plus, 93 % des participants ont une capitalisation boursière de moins de 50 millions de dollars.

Cette répartition s’aligne sur le cadre établi dans la décision générale : il limite la participation aux petits émetteurs et aux émetteurs en démarrage, qui profiteront le plus de l’allègement du fardeau administratif et financier qu’offre la communication semestrielle d’information. Il n’en reste pas moins que sept participants ont une capitalisation boursière de plus de 50 millions de dollars, la plus élevée avoisinant les 235 millions de dollars.

Faire connaître sa décision : pratiques d’information émergentes et facteurs à considérer

Même si la décision générale ne l’exige pas, environ 42 % des participants motivent leur décision d’opter pour la communication semestrielle d’information dans leur annonce. Par contre, le niveau de détail des explications varie considérablement d’un émetteur à l’autre.

La plupart se contentaient d’une seule phrase, tandis que d’autres y allaient plus généreusement, ce qui témoignait de l’écart dans l’évaluation des attentes des actionnaires et des marchés. Dans bien des cas, les explications approfondies comprenaient une analyse des économies attendues et des capacités de gestion supplémentaires qui seraient affectées.

Nous croyons que tout émetteur qui entend opter pour la communication semestrielle d’information devra considérer ce facteur, car le niveau de détail approprié sera probablement tributaire de facteurs propres à chaque émetteur, par exemple : nature de l’émetteur; activités; caractère cyclique des activités et de la production de recettes; composition de l’actionnariat; conjoncture du marché.

Plusieurs participants ont annoncé qu’ils optaient pour la communication semestrielle d’information dans un communiqué de presse traitant de plusieurs sujets. Il y a même des cas où on ne faisait aucune mention de cette décision dans le titre du communiqué, et où les investisseurs pouvaient facilement manquer le passage à la communication semestrielle de l’information. Même si cette pratique ne semble pas contrevenir aux exigences de la décision générale, elle pourrait ne pas cadrer avec la position des ACVM concernant le communiqué de presse, c’est-à-dire « indique[r] au marché de façon transparente la fréquence des prochains dépôts de l’émetteur ».

Dans un cas, un émetteur a annoncé qu’il optait pour la communication semestrielle d’information, mais s’est rétracté par la suite, après avoir déterminé qu’il ne pouvait se prévaloir de la décision générale. Même si la décision générale n’impose pas ce type de rectification, il est néanmoins conforme aux lignes directrices des ACVM, qui incitent les émetteurs à publier un communiqué de presse quand ils cessent de se prévaloir de la décision générale et reviennent à la communication trimestrielle de l’information.

États-Unis : projet de règlement de la SEC

Les ACVM ne sont pas les seules autorités à aller de l’avant avec la communication semestrielle d’information. Le 5 mai 2026, la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a proposé de nouvelles règles pour permettre à tous les émetteurs des États-Unis de produire l’information semestriellement et non plus trimestriellement (la « proposition de la SEC »).

Selon cette proposition, les émetteurs participants n’auraient qu’à produire un rapport annuel (formulaire 10-K) et un semestriel (formulaire 10-S) par exercice financier.

Soulignons que la proposition de la SEC ne s’applique pas aux obligations d’information des émetteurs étrangers privés, notamment les émetteurs canadiens sous le régime d’information multinational qui ne sont pas assujettis aux obligations d’information trimestrielle (formulaire 10-Q). Par contre, si elle est adoptée dans sa forme actuelle, la proposition de la SEC pourrait entraîner une divergence sensible entre les pratiques d’information des émetteurs assujettis canadiens, surtout ceux qui ne sont pas admissibles au projet pilote, et celles de leurs homologues aux États-Unis.

Prochaines étapes

Nous nous attendons à ce que la participation au projet pilote augmente encore et que les pratiques d’information continuent d’évoluer. Les émetteurs qui entendent opter pour la communication semestrielle d’information doivent évaluer leur admissibilité rigoureusement et bien choisir comment informer efficacement les marchés de leur décision.

L’autrice du présent article tient à remercier Joshua Lewis, stagiaire chez BLG, pour sa contribution.

Canada’s new electricity strategy: Powering an electrified future by 2050

Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

The federal government recently released Powering Canada Strong: A National Strategy for an Electrified Canadian Economy, a national electricity strategy with the stated objective of doubling Canada’s electricity capacity by 2050 while advancing reliability, affordability, competitiveness and decarbonization. The plan calls for consultation with territories, Indigenous communities, utilities, regulators, industrial customers, labour organizations and private sector stakeholders. The consultation process will inform both the implementation framework and future legislative and regulatory measures tied to electricity infrastructure development and electricity policy.

The consultation phase will be a key step in developing the federal government’s plan into executable steps given the practical and regional differences across the Canadian electricity landscape. Provinces remain at different stages of decarbonization, reserve margins, demand growth and transmission capability. As a result, the industry can be expected to focus not only on funding opportunities, but also on questions of reliability standards, interprovincial cost allocation, permitting timelines, Indigenous equity participation, and the extent to which federal policy may accommodate differing provincial resource mixes and market structures. The consultation process may itself serve as a forum for utilities and large industrial consumers to address the financing of accelerated electrification and large-scale capital deployment.

Key takeaways for industry and investors: Implementation, risks and opportunities

Canada aims to double electricity capacity by 2050, supporting electrification and decarbonization goals.
Stakeholder consultations will shape implementation, especially across provinces with different energy systems.
Transmission expansion and grid modernization are central to the national electricity strategy.
The plan emphasizes investment, tax credits and federal financing tools to accelerate infrastructure development.
Provincial jurisdiction remains a critical factor, requiring alignment between federal and provincial governments.
The cost of electrification could exceed C$1 trillion, with implications for ratepayers and taxpayers.
The strategy is a policy framework rather than a final plan, with key execution details still emerging.
Significant opportunities are expected in project development, transmission infrastructure, grid technology, Indigenous partnerships and supply chain expansion as electrification accelerates.

Electrification roadmap: Key pillars for expanding Canada’s electricity grid

The roadmap is built around four themes:

building new generation and grid infrastructure;
improving east-west-north transmission connections;
developing the skilled workforce required for the buildout; and
increasing domestic manufacturing of grid components.

The federal government is contemplating amendments to the Clean Electricity Regulations to provide greater flexibility for existing assets, offsets and natural gas-fired generation for reliability purposes.

For market participants, the most significant medium-term implications are in project development, transmission planning, financing and permitting. The strategy contemplates expanded use of investment tax credits, Canada Infrastructure Bank financing and other federal tools, together with a new Transmission InterConnect Investment Strategy and a reiteration of the Major Projects Office’s role in electricity projects of national significance.

Provincial jurisdiction and regulatory considerations in Canada’s power sector

The constitutional and rate-regulated context that underpins Canada’s electricity system remains critical. Electricity projects in Canada largely fall within provincial jurisdiction, particularly the development, conservation and management of sites and facilities for generation and production of electrical energy. Federal policy can help coordinate, fund and incentivize, but new generation, transmission and distribution infrastructure will ultimately need to be approved, integrated and paid for within provincial and territorial systems.

Cost of electrification in Canada: Infrastructure investment and ratepayer impacts

The federal government’s ambition requires provincial and, in some cases, municipal implementation. The federal strategy is anchored in long term potential system-wide savings. In the near to medium term, the capital cost of new electricity infrastructure is substantial, with estimates exceeding $1 trillion by 2050. Those costs will ultimately be borne in some combination by taxpayers, project proponents and, most directly in regulated utility systems, ratepayers in each jurisdiction.

Clean Electricity Investment Tax Credits and federal support for transmission projects

The proposed expansion of the 15 per cent Clean Electricity Investment Tax Credit (one of a suite of clean economy ITCs enacted by the federal government, described here) represents a new frontier for federal financial support of the transmission grid. At present the transmission infrastructure eligible for the Clean Electricity ITC is limited to qualified interprovincial transmission equipment. The federal strategy proposes expanding eligibility to include certain major high-voltage intra-provincial transmission projects, complementing existing support for interprovincial interties. If implemented, that would amount to meaningful federal financial support in an area typically left to provincial governments.

National electricity strategy next steps

The strategy is best understood as an important federal signal rather than a complete execution plan. Its success will depend on provincial buy-in, practical cost allocation, timely regulatory approvals, Indigenous participation, supply-chain capacity and whether governments can align affordability objectives with the scale of investment required. For developers, investors and utilities, the consultation period will be important: the details of financing, intertie planning, regulatory flexibility and procurement design will likely determine how quickly projects move from policy ambition to construction reality.

Contact BLG’s energy and tax lawyers for guidance on Canada’s electricity strategy

BLG is monitoring developments related to this roadmap closely and will continue to share updates. If you have questions about the strategy or what it could mean for your business, contact our Energy – Power or Tax groups for more information.

Commercial leasing: New liability regime for landlords comes into force July 1, 2026

Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

On May 14, 2026, the Lieutenant Governor of Ontario signed Order in Council 758/2026, which will bring most provisions of the Measures Respecting Premises with Illegal Drug Activity Act, 2025 (the Act) into force on July 1, 2026. Unless exempted by a future regulation, the Act creates a provincial offences regime under which commercial landlords may be prosecuted for knowingly permitting leased premises within their building to be used for producing or trafficking controlled substances, precursors, or cannabis.

While the Act may apply to residential landlords in the future, it remains unclear whether certain classes of landlords (such as not-for-profit, and community and supportive housing landlords) may be exempt.

Legislative background and offence framework

On June 5, 2025, Ontario enacted Bill 10, Protect Ontario Through Safer Streets and Stronger Communities Act, 2025 (Bill 10). This omnibus legislation amended multiple Ontario laws with the stated aim of enhancing public safety.

Among other things, Bill 10 created new obligations for sureties; expanded access to restraining orders; enhanced monitoring of persons who have been convicted of a sexual offence against a child; and provided the police expanded authority to seize tools used in auto theft.

Though not proclaimed into force at the time, Schedule 8 of Bill 10 contained the Act, which creates new provincial offences that:

prohibit landlords from knowingly permitting premises within their buildings to be used in connection with prescribed offences; and
prohibit any person from knowingly possessing the proceeds of an offence under the Act.

The Act imposes harsh penalties for committing these offences, shifting primary responsibility for preventing drug‑related activity onto property owners and operators.

On conviction for knowingly permitting a prescribed offence to occur in their building, an individual landlord may face fines ranging from $10,000 to $250,000 and/or imprisonment for up to 2 years less a day, with fines on a subsequent conviction of $5,000 to $100,000 per day from the date upon which the offence occurred.

A corporate landlord may be fined up to $1,000,000 for a first conviction, and on a subsequent conviction, be fined $10,000 to $500,000 per day from the date upon which the offence occurred.

The Act also grants broad enforcement powers, including authorizing police to close a non‑residential premises, barring entry until final disposition of a charge unless a court orders otherwise. Even with a court order, the landlord must post a cash bond of at least $10,000, which may be forfeited if another charge is laid under the Act in respect of the same premises.

The Act provides that it is a defence to the charge of knowingly permitting a prescribed offence to occur on premises within the landlord’s building where the landlord demonstrates it took “reasonable measures” to prevent the activity giving rise to the offence. While the Act does not offer any guidance as to what might constitute “reasonable measures,” it is anticipated that courts would make a context-specific determination on the particular facts of each case as to whether a landlord took reasonable and proportionate measures in the circumstances.

Coming-into-force scope and practical implications for commercial landlords

A person is a landlord of a premise under the Act if:

the person has leased the premises to a tenant for residential use;
the person has leased the premises to a tenant for commercial use; or
the person is a tenant to whom the premises is leased, whether for residential or commercial use, and has sublet the premises to another person.

Order in Council 758/2026 brings the Act into force on July 1, 2026, but only in respect of commercial landlords under subparagraph (b).

Prosecution under the Act is dependent on regulations prescribing the underlying offences. On Feb. 11, 2026, the Ontario government opened a consultation regarding its proposal to include section 7.1(1)(a) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (being that “No person shall possess, produce, sell, import or transport anything intending that it will be used to produce a controlled substance, unless the production of the controlled substance is lawfully authorized”) as a prescribed offence under the Act. There has been no public update on the result of this consultation, but further information on the regulations under the Act is expected to be released shortly.

Commercial landlords that suspect that drug-related activities may be taking place on premises within their building should consider adopting measures now to assist in establishing a “reasonable measures” defence under the Act. Such measures may include including robust prohibitions in lease agreements, scheduling and documenting regular inspections, promptly reporting suspicious activity, and other measures to demonstrate that the landlord is not a willing or passive participant in their tenant’s drug-related conduct.

Outstanding issues and regulatory uncertainty

For now, there has been no public indication as to when the remainder of the Act will come into force and include landlords who either (a) lease premises to tenants for residential use, or (b) sublet leased premises for either residential or commercial use.

Should residential landlords be brought within the purview of the Act, such landlords will need to be mindful of tenant protections under the Residential Tenancies Act (such as prohibiting landlords from interfering with reasonable enjoyment of the property and from entering residential premises without written notice), as well as the Ontario Human Rights Code when conducting any surveillance or other preventative measures.

It is also not clear at this time whether the government will exempt any classes of landlords from the application of the Act. In the February 2026 consultation, the government sought input on exempting the following classes of persons from the definition of “landlord”:

landlords of retirement homes defined under the Retirement Homes Act, long-term care homes defined under the Fixing Long-Term Care Act, 2021, or educational accommodations (such as student residences or institutional housing);
landlords of premises offering rehabilitative services, therapeutic services, services intended to support employment, services intended to support life skills development, or short-term respite care;
landlords of premises that are subject to the Homes for Special Care Act, or a premises that is a supported group living residence or an intensive support residence under the Services and Supports to Promote the Social Inclusion of Persons with Developmental Disabilities Act, 2008;
landlords of living accommodations subject to the Public Hospitals Act, the Private Hospitals Act, the Ministry of Correctional Services Act, or the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017;
landlords of community, supportive, and transitional housing, including non-profit housing providers, housing cooperatives, municipalities, district social services administration boards, local housing corporations, and other non-profit organizations; and
private market landlords of community or supportive housing units (such as private market landlords who own or operate units that receive a government-funded rent supplement).

The results of this public consultation have not been released, and the government has not yet given direction on which (if any) of these aforementioned landlord categories may be exempt.

Several organizations have raised concerns regarding the financial burden and risk the Act places on not-for-profit landlords, whose limited resources may be further depleted by the Act’s implicit expectation that landlords take proactive and preventative measures. The Act also sits in tension with harm-reduction models of care. Some providers have expressed concern that increased surveillance of their tenants may undermine trust-based approaches and deter vulnerable individuals from accessing supportive housing. In this respect, the Act aligns with the province’s broader policy shift away from harm-reduction measures and towards addiction treatment.

We continue to monitor these developments and will update this article as they arise. Should you desire assistance with understanding whether your organization may be subject to the Act beginning July 1, 2026, or developing measures to establish a defence under the Act, BLG lawyers would be happy to assist; reach out to the authors or key contacts below.

No more automatic stay: Five judge panel overrules Handley Estate

Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

On Monday May 19, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal for Ontario overruled Handley Estate v. DTE Industries Limited, 2018 ONCA 324, the decision that, for the last eight years, had imposed an automatic stay of the proceeding of any party who failed to immediately disclose a partial settlement agreement that "entirely changed the litigation landscape." In its place, the Court has restored a discretionary abuse-of-process framework and confirmed that the new Rule 49.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, now governing partial settlement agreements, operates consistently with that common law approach.

The problem with the rule in Handley Estate

Under Handley Estate and the cases that followed it, a partial settlement that was found to have altered the litigation landscape had to be disclosed immediately. Failure to do so was automatically treated as an abuse of process, and the only available remedy to judges was a stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal noted that although the rule was intended to deter strategic non-disclosure, it generated significant criticism within the legal community, including academic articles and judicial attempts to create exceptions to avoid its harshness through flexible interpretations of what constituted a change that “entirely” altered the landscape and what qualified as “immediate” disclosure. The Court also noted that new Rule 49.14, which came into force in 2025, was enacted specifically to address the uncertainty and harsh consequences that had developed under the Handley Estate line of cases.

The Court of Appeal therefore convened a five-judge panel to hear four appeals¹ from decisions that engaged in the Handley Estate analysis and consider whether to overrule the Court’s earlier precedent. The unanimous five-judge panel concluded that Handley Estate—which was decided less than a decade ago—was wrongly decided and should be overruled.

The Court held that its previous decision in Handley Estate was inconsistent with the foundational principles of abuse of process, as these principles require a contextual, discretionary inquiry into unfairness, prejudice, oppression, or harm to the administration of justice, and a proportionate remedy. The decision in Handley Estate and the considerable jurisprudence that followed was contrary to these principles as it mandated a finding of abuse of process without any inquiry into prejudice, and the most severe remedy regardless of the gravity of the conduct. The Court held that overruling Handley Estate would prevent disproportionate outcomes, resolve uncertainty around its interaction with the new Rule 49.14, and assist other provinces that had begun importing the rule in recent years.

The new order—judicial discretion is restored

With Handley Estate overruled, the Court confirmed that the common law and Rule 49.14 now operate harmoniously. Overall, Rule 49.14 establishes a clear procedural regime for partial settlements in multi-party proceedings, including when disclosure must be made and what information must be provided to the court and to non-settling parties. In doing so, it expands the disclosure obligation to all partial settlement agreements, rather than only those that “entirely” change the litigation landscape and replaces the automatic stay with a range of discretionary remedies.

The Court of Appeal emphasized that a breach of r. 49.14 is a “strong indicator” of abuse of process, but is not determinative, and whether an abuse has occurred, and what remedy is appropriate, remains a contextual and discretionary exercise under both the Rule and the common law. In this way, the Court held that Rule 49.14 reflects, rather than displaces, the approach that the common law would have reached had it continued to develop free from the rigid framework imposed by Handley Estate.

Key takeaways

The decision has immediate practical implications for litigants. Firstly, a stay of proceedings is no longer the default remedy for a failure to disclose a partial settlement agreement, and will likely be reserved for the clearest cases. Parties seeking a stay will need to establish meaningful prejudice to their litigation position or to the integrity of the judicial process.

At the same time, because of Rule 49.14, the disclosure obligation is broader than it was under Handley Estate, as Rule 49.14 applies to all partial settlement agreements, not only those that significantly alter the litigation landscape.

Finally, the Court clarified appellate jurisdiction in this context. Orders granting a stay remain final and are appealable to the Court of Appeal as of right. Orders denying a stay, or imposing lesser remedies, are generally interlocutory and appealable to the Divisional Court with leave.

Federal Financial Institutions Legislative and Regulatory Reporter – March 2026

Tue, 19 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

The Reporter provides a monthly summary of Canadian federal legislative and regulatory developments of relevance to federally regulated financial institutions. It does not address Canadian provincial financial services legislative and regulatory developments. In addition, purely technical and administrative changes (such as changes to reporting forms) are not covered.

March 2026

Published	Title and Brief Summary	Status (if applicable)
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)
March 30, 2026	Notice of Changes to Minimum Base Assessments OSFI has issued a letter to all federally-regulated financial institutions that lays out adjusted minimum base assessments applicable to federally regulated financial institutions for the 2026/27 fiscal year (April 1, 2026 – March 31, 2027), pursuant to section 3(2) of the Assessment of Financial Institutions Regulations, 2017.	Covers the 2026/27 fiscal year (starting April 1, 2026).
March 23, 2026	FIFAI II: AI Risks and Opportunities: Adopting an AGILE Framework in Canadian Financial Services Between May and November 2025, four workshops sponsored by Global Risk Institute (GRI) with a combination of OSFI, Finance Canada, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC), and the Bank of Canada across them, examined AI risks, mitigants, and opportunities. Interim reports covered: Security & Cybersecurity (May 29) Financial Crime (October 1) Financial Stability (October 29) Financial Well-being & Consumer Protection (November 13) This FIFAI II final report outlines the AI risks and opportunities raised at forum workshops and introduces the AGILE framework for financial-industry stakeholders to navigate the evolving impacts of AI. It reflects views and insights from individual FIFAI speakers and participants.
March 20, 2026	2026 Memorandum - Earthquake Exposure Data OSFI has issued a letter to Property and Casualty Companies reminding them that they must file the Earthquake Data Form for the reporting year 2026 by May 31, 2026. OSFI has also requested that insurers submit, on a voluntary basis, additional data as a supplemental filing to support their exploratory analysis of catastrophe risk.	Form is due May 31, 2026.
March 19, 2026	2026 Mortgage Insurer Capital Adequacy Test - Filing Instructions All federally regulated mortgage insurance companies are required to complete a uniform Mortgage Insurer Capital Adequacy Test (MICAT) return each quarter. The MICAT return is designed to enable regulators to monitor the financial condition and operating results of mortgage insurers, as well as certain compliance requirements. OSFI has issued filing instructions for the Mortgage Insurer Capital Adequacy Test and is also soliciting feedback on the MICAT return and instructions.	No deadline provided for feedback.
Bank of Canada
March 27, 2026	Expanded Responsibilities for the Bank In an email bulletin to stakeholders, the Bank of Canada notes that, with Budget 2025 Implementation Act, No. 1 (Bill C-15) having received Royal Assent, its responsibilities are being expanded to include digital finance and payments, and that it will assume two new mandates: supervision of stablecoin issuers and oversight of the framework for consumer-driven banking. It states that it will work closely with the Department of Finance Canada as it develops and implements these regimes. Its work in the coming months will include: contributing to the development of regulations; developing supervisory policies and guidelines; engaging with industry and other stakeholders; preparing operational frameworks for oversight.
March 3, 2026	Retail Payments Supervision: Annual Reporting Deadline – March 31 In an email bulletin to stakeholders, the Bank of Canada issued a reminder to registered Payment Service Providers (PSPs) to submit their annual report. The bulletin also notes that the Bank has updated its wording in registration notices to reinforce expectations about how PSPs may communicate their registration status to the public.	Deadline for submitting annual reports was March 31, 2026.
Finance Canada
March 30, 2026	Consultation – National Anti-Fraud Strategy This consultation seeks feedback on proposed measures for a National Anti-Fraud Strategy designed to enhance anti-fraud efforts across Canada's financial and telecommunications sectors, as well as digital platforms.	Comments were due by April 28, 2026.
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC)
March 2, 2026	Guideline on Disclosure in Sales and Business Practices: Code of Conduct for the Payment Card Industry in Canada The Financial Consumer Agency of Canada has issued a Guideline on Disclosure in Sales and Business Practices: Code of Conduct for the Payment Card Industry in Canada. This states its expectations with respect to the obligations of Payment Card Network Operators (PCNOs) and their Acquirers and Downstream Participants to disclose information in accordance with Policy Element 1 of the Code of Conduct for the Payment Card Industry in Canada (the Code). The Code was introduced in 2010 and revised in 2024; it requires PCNOs adopting the Code to abide by its requirements and require compliance by their participants; and incorporate the Code, in its entirety, into the contracts they use with their participants or into their governing rules and regulation. They are expected to read this Guideline together with the Code and all applicable legislation, regulations, and FCAC guidance.	Effective March 2, 2026.
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC)
March 2, 2026	March 2, 2026 – FINTRAC Advisory: Financial Transactions Related to Countries Identified by the Financial Action Task Force This document, issued following the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) plenary meeting in February 2026, advises reporting entities of concerns about deficiencies in the anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist activity financing systems of certain countries.
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
March 24, 2026	Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Basel III Monitoring Report To assess the impact of the Basel III framework on banks, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision monitors the effects and dynamics of the reforms. As such, a semiannual monitoring framework has been set up for the risk-based capital ratio, the leverage ratio and liquidity metrics, using data collected by national supervisors on a representative sample of institutions in each country. The Committee has issued its latest Basel III Monitoring Report, a quantitative impact study setting out the impact of the Basel III framework, as of June 2025. Highlights of the monitoring exercise include: Basel III liquidity ratios increased in the first half of 2025 while risk-based capital and leverage ratios remained stable. The average impact of the Basel III framework on the Tier 1 minimum required capital (MRC) of Group 1 banks decreased, driven by implementation progress.
March 23, 2026	Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Finalization of Technical Amendment and Frequently Asked Questions The Basel Committee has issued a final technical amendment to the Basel Framework. The amendment had been published for consultation in June 2025; it has been finalized with some adjustments. The technical amendment is related to the standardized approach to operational risk, and it is meant to clarify the treatment of “rental income from investment properties” under the business indicator (BI), which is used as a key input in calculating operational risk capital requirements. This document also adds an FAQ to the Basel Framework, and amends related FAQs, which are shown in marked-up versions.	Basel Committee has committed to implement final revised standard by April 1, 2029.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
March 3, 2026	Targeted Report on Stablecoins and Unhosted Wallets - Peer-to-Peer Transactions FATF has issued Targeted Report on Stablecoins and Unhosted Wallets, which highlights that stablecoins have expanded rapidly, with over 250 in circulation by mid-2025 and a market capitalization exceeding US$300 billion. The report highlights illicit finance risks linked to criminals' misuse of stablecoins, particularly through peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions via unhosted wallets, and sets out recommended actions for countries and the private sector to strengthen controls to protect the integrity of the financial system.
Financial Stability Board (FSB)
March 12, 2026	FSB Kicks off New Implementation Phase to Enhance Cross-Border Payments through Public-Private Partnership At its FSB Cross-border Payments Summit, FSB announced a new phase of its work to implement the G20 Roadmap to enhance cross-border payments. This next phase will focus on two aspects of the Roadmap: Encouraging the development of jurisdictional and regional action plans by public authorities to drive domestic and regional implementation; and Promoting private-sector action and closer private-public collaboration, with industry playing a decisive role in delivering real benefits for end users.
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)
March 31, 2026	IAIS Concludes Multi-Year Cycle of Holistic Framework Implementation Assessments IAIS reports that it has completed a cycle of assessing implementation of the supervisory material of the Holistic Framework for systemic risk in the insurance sector. In connection with this milestone, it has issued two publications: 2025 Targeted Jurisdictional Assessment (TJA), which evaluates six new jurisdictions supervising 10 Internationally Active Insurance Groups (IAIGs), following an original assessment of 10 major markets in 2022; An update on progress made by the 10 original major insurance market jurisdictions in addressing implementation gaps identified in the 2022 TJA. These two reports are intended to provide a full picture of the global insurance sector’s progress in systemic risk mitigation, particularly in macroprudential supervision and international crisis management, while identifying areas for improvement, including resolution and liquidity risk disclosure.
Legislation
March 26, 2026	Budget 2025 Implementation Act, No. 1, SC 2026, c. 3 (Bill C-15) Bill C-15 received Royal Assent on March 26, 2026. Among its provisions to implement the 2025 Federal Budget, the following measures of Bill C-15 affect federally regulated financial institutions. Division 9 of Part 5 repeals the Consumer-Driven Banking Act and enacts a new Consumer-Driven Banking Act to ensure that individuals and businesses can safely and securely share their data with the participating entities of their choice. That Act addresses, among other things, accreditation, national security, data sharing, security safeguards, consent, authentication, liability, complaints, administration and enforcement and screen scraping. The Division also makes related amendments to the Access to Information Act, the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act and the Budget Implementation Act, 2024, No. 1. Division 10 of Part 5 amends the Trust and Loan Companies Act, the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act to extend the period during which federal financial institutions governed by those Acts may carry on business. Division 11 of Part 5 amends the Trust and Loan Companies Act, the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act to, among other things, modernize prudential limits by repealing certain provisions that impose limits on federally regulated financial institutions with respect to debt obligations and borrowing, consumer and commercial loans and investments in real property and equity. Division 12 of Part 5 amends the Bank Act, the Trust and Loan Companies Act and the Insurance Companies Act to allow for the electronic delivery of certain documents to shareholders, members and policyholders without their consent, while ensuring that they receive paper copies if they request them. Division 13 of Part 5 amends the Trust and Loan Companies Act, the Bank Act and the Insurance Companies Act to increase the equity threshold related to the public holding requirement from $2 billion to $4 billion and to make changes to other provisions that include that threshold. Division 14 of Part 5 amends the Trust and Loan Companies Act, the Bank Act, the Insurance Companies Act and the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act to, among other things, (a) clarify the powers of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions in respect of the adherence by federally regulated financial institutions to their policies and procedures to protect themselves against threats to their integrity or security; (b) provide the Superintendent of Financial Institutions with powers to issue directions of compliance in respect of unsafe or unsound practices in the conduct of the affairs of those financial institutions; and (c) provide that the Superintendent of Financial Institutions is not prevented from disclosing information to any federal government agency or body for purposes related to the Superintendent’s regulation or supervision of financial institutions. Division 15 of Part 5 amends the Bank Act to raise the amount of funds that can be withdrawn immediately from a retail deposit account after the deposit of a cheque or other instrument and to remove the delay for the withdrawal of funds deposited by a cheque or other instrument that is not deposited in person. Division 16 of Part 5 amends the Bank Act to, among other things, (a) prohibit the activation of certain capabilities for a personal deposit account in Canada without the express consent of the natural person in whose name the account is kept; (b) permit a natural person in whose name such an account is kept to deactivate certain account capabilities; (c) permit a natural person in whose name such an account is kept to adjust certain transaction limits on the account; (d) require institutions to establish policies and procedures for detecting and preventing consumer-targeted fraud and mitigating its impacts; and (e) require institutions and the Commissioner of the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada to prepare annual reports on consumer-targeted fraud. Division 17 of Part 5 amends the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation Act, the Bank Act and the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act to support the growth of federal credit unions, including by way of amalgamation or asset acquisition and by permitting them to engage in motor vehicle leasing in certain circumstances. Division 18 of Part 5 makes amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act consequential to amendments to the Special Economic Measures Act. Division 37 of Part 5 amends the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act to (a) clarify that all regulations made under that Act are to be made on the recommendation of the Minister of Finance; (b) clarify that paragraph 36(3.‍01)‍(b) of that Act applies to donations that are not charitable donations; and (c) prohibit the disclosure of reports, or the information contained in them, related to discrepancies in information discovered in the course of verifying the identity of persons having beneficial ownership or control of an entity. It also amends the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations to (a) clarify that paragraph 138(5)‍(b) of those Regulations applies to donations that are not charitable donations; and (b) clarify the application of those Regulations to mortgage administrators, mortgage brokers and mortgage lenders. Division 45 of Part 5 enacts the Stablecoin Act, which imposes duties on persons that create stablecoins and make them available for purchase, directly or indirectly, by persons in Canada. That Act sets out the objects of the Bank of Canada in respect of stablecoin and requires the Bank to maintain a public registry of stablecoin issuers. That Act also addresses, among other things, the redemption of stablecoins by issuers, the reserve of assets that issuers must maintain to fulfill their redemption obligations and the policies that they must establish. The Division also makes consequential and related amendments to the Access to Information Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and the Retail Payment Activities Act.	Royal Assent March 26, 2026 Part 5, Division 9 in force March 26, 2026. Part 5, Division 10 in force March 26, 2026. Part 5, Division 11 in force on proclamation. Part 5, Division 12 in force March 26, 2026. Part 5, Division 13 in force March 26, 2026. Part 5, Division 14 in force March 26, 2026. Part 5, Division 15 in force on proclamation. Part 5, Division 16 in force on proclamation. Part 5, Division 17 in force on proclamation, except ss. 337, 339(1), 340, 343, 344, 348, 349, 351 in force March 26, 2026. Part 5, Division 18 in force March 26, 2026. Part 5, Division 37 in force on Royal Assent, except s. 584 deemed to have come into force on October 1, 2025 immediately after the coming into force of section 8 of the Regulations Amending Certain Regulations Made Under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, SOR/2024-267. Part 5, Division 45, s. 600 (enacting the Stablecoin Act) in force on proclamation; ss. 601 to 605 in force on proclamation.
March 26, 2026	Strengthening Canada’s Immigration System and Borders Act, SC 2026, c. 4 (Bill C-12) Bill C-12 received Royal Assent on March 26, 2026. Bill C-12 enacts provisions put forward by Bill C-2, Strong Borders Act that are aimed at combating transnational organized crime, money laundering and the immigration system. Bill C-12 would amend several Acts and regulations impacting financial institutions. Part 9 amends the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act to, among other things, (a) Increase the maximum administrative monetary penalties that may be imposed for certain violations and the maximum punishments that may be imposed for certain criminal offences under that Act; (b) Replace the existing optional compliance agreement regime with a new mandatory compliance agreement regime that, among other things, (i) Requires every person or entity that receives an administrative monetary penalty for a prescribed violation to enter into a compliance agreement with the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (the Centre), (ii) Requires the Director of the Centre to make a compliance order if the person or entity refuses to enter into a compliance agreement or fails to comply with such an agreement, and (iii) Designates the contravention of a compliance order as a new violation under that Act; (c) Require persons or entities referred to in section 5 of that Act, other than those already required to register, to enroll with the Centre; and (d) Authorize the Centre to disclose certain information to the Commissioner of Canada Elections, subject to certain conditions. Part 9 also makes consequential and related amendments to the Retail Payment Activities Act and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations and includes transitional provisions. Part 10 amends the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act to make the Director of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada a member of the committee established under subsection 18(1) of that Act. It also amends the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act to enable the Director to exchange information with the other members of that committee.	Royal Assent March 26, 2026 Part 9 largely in force March 26, 2026, with sections 76(3), 77, 80, 82, 87(2), (4), 88, 89(1), 91 to 93, 105(2) and 113 to come into force on proclamation. Part 10 in force March 26, 2026.
March 26, 2026	Bill C-8, Act Respecting Cyber Security, Amending the Telecommunications Act and Making Consequential Amendments to other Acts Bill C-8 establishes a regulatory framework to protect systems and services essential to public safety or national security. Part 1 amends the Telecommunications Act to add the promotion of the security of the Canadian telecommunications system as an objective of the Canadian telecommunications policy and to authorize the Governor in Council and the Minister of Industry to direct telecommunications service providers to do anything, or refrain from doing anything, that is necessary to secure the Canadian telecommunications system. Part 2 enacts the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA) to provide a framework for the protection of the critical cyber systems of services and systems that are vital to national security or public safety and that are delivered or operated as part of a work, undertaking or business that is within the legislative authority of Parliament. The CCSPA imposes onerous cyber security obligations on “designated operators” of federally regulated critical cyber systems. These operators carry out vital services or systems (that is, infrastructure essential to preserving national security and public safety). These obligations include, among others: Developing, maintaining, and regularly reviewing cyber security programs (CSPs); Reporting material changes in ownership, control, or use of third-party products and services to the appropriate regulator, as to mitigate supply-chain and third-party risks; and preserving detailed records of cyber security programs and incidents. The CCSPA delegates broad, sector-specific powers to the appropriate regulators, including banking systems overseen by OSFI and the clearing and settlement systems overseen by the Bank of Canada. The CCPSA will allow the regulators to, inter alia, enter any place (subject to limitations) to examine records and data, order internal audits, and issue compliance orders. The CCPSA also introduces significant administrative monetary penalties for violations. While the proposed regime is designed to promote compliance, fines could amount to $15 million per violation, per day, for organizations, and $1 million per violation, per day, for individuals. Moreover, directors and officers of designated operators could be held personally liable if they were complicit in committing a violation.	Passed by the House of Commons March 26, 2026; Senate First Reading March 26, 2026 Act in force on proclamation.
March 26, 2026	Bill C-13, Act to implement the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership Bill C-13 implements the Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, done July 16, 2023. It includes consequential amendments to the definition of “regulated foreign entity” in sections 2 of the Bank Act, Insurance Companies Act and Trust and Loan Companies Act respectively.	Senate Second Reading March 26, 2026. Act comes into force on proclamation.

Disclaimer

This Reporter is prepared as a service for our clients. It is not intended to be a complete statement of the law or an opinion on any subject. Although we endeavour to ensure its accuracy, no one should act upon it without a thorough examination of the law after the facts of a specific situation are considered.

U.S. expands Tariff Offset Regime to medium and heavy-duty vehicle sector

Tue, 19 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

On May 15, 2026, the United States has expanded its Section 232 tariff mitigation framework to include medium- and heavy-duty vehicle (MHDV) manufacturers.

Key takeaways

These measures broaden the access to import adjustment offsets and aligning treatment across the automotive sector considering the overlap in automotive and MHDV supply chains. The offsets are a form of tariff relief that allow eligible U.S. manufacturers to reduce duties payable on imported vehicle parts based on the value of vehicles they assemble domestically and may be carried forward until fully utilized. Manufacturers in both sectors may now use these offsets to reduce tariffs across both automobile and MHDV parts, reflecting the overlap in their supply chains.

What’s new?

The Department of Commerce has amended its offset procedures to implement Proclamation 10984. U.S. domestic MHDV manufacturers can now apply for import adjustment offsets—previously available only to automobile manufacturers—for tariffs imposed on MHDV and automobile parts.

How the Regime works

Eligible U.S. manufacturers may offset tariff liability by an amount equal to 3.75 per cent of the value of vehicles assembled domestically during specified annual periods through 2030. Offsets may be applied against tariffs on both MHDV parts and automobile parts and can be carried forward indefinitely until fully used.

Important limitation

Certain heavy-duty vehicle assembly operations determined to be “limited production operations” are excluded from being eligible for the offset. This means that heavy-duty vehicle production that includes incorporating an imported chassis, chassis glider, chassis with engine, or engine in the vehicle, is not eligible for offsets under the Offset Process. No equivalent restriction currently applies to automobiles or medium-duty vehicles.

Compliance burden and documentation

Applicants must submit detailed annual filings, including production forecasts, valuation methodologies, tariff exposure estimates, and certifications. The U.S. Department of Commerce retains oversight authority and may adjust offsets based on actual production outcomes.

What this means for industry

Expanded offset access for MHDV manufacturers reduces effective tariff exposure.
Increased compliance obligations and scrutiny of production structures.
Continued policy evolution monitoring, particularly regarding the definition of “limited production operations” for other vehicle classes.

BLG’s International Trade and Investment group continues to monitor the situation closely. If you have any questions about the tariff developments impacting your organization, please reach out to one of our lawyers below. Our multidisciplinary team can help you navigate the new regulatory landscape, maximize opportunities, and ensure compliance across all major industries.

Plead carefully: SCC clarifies cause of action estoppel and limits on relitigation

Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

In Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. v. 11368 NL Inc., 2026 SCC 15, the Supreme Court of Canada held that cause of action estoppel barred the appellant from advancing a new theory in a second proceeding to support its entitlement to mortgage proceeds. The Court’s decision is an important reminder that litigants must bring forward all reasonably available arguments in the first proceeding, and subsequent attempts to relitigate the same underlying cause of action will likely be barred. Respondents must raise res judicata at first instance to rely on its protections, including by properly pleading the underlying material facts.

Background

The dispute arose from a commercial property owned by 11368 NL Inc. and encumbered by multiple mortgages. Patrick Street Holdings Ltd. was one of the secured creditors.

Following a default, Patrick Street exercised its power of sale and prepared an accounting of the sale proceeds. The accounting included a $4 million collateral mortgage in Patrick Street’s favour. In earlier proceedings in 2016, competing encumbrancers challenged the accounting. The court ultimately excluded Patrick Street’s $4 million mortgage from the distribution of the proceeds, which was upheld on appeal.

In 2019, 11368 NL Inc. brought a separate application seeking payment of the remaining proceeds. In response, Patrick Street asserted new arguments supporting its entitlement to the excluded $4 million mortgage. Both the application judge and the Court of Appeal rejected Patrick Street’s position on the basis that the issue had already been determined. The Court of Appeal further found that Patrick Street’s claim was barred by the cause of action estoppel.

The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision

The test for cause of action estoppel

The Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed the long-standing test for cause of action estoppel, which has four parts:

there must be a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction;
the parties must be the same or in privity;
the cause of action must not be separate and distinct; and
the arguments advanced in the later proceeding were, or could reasonably have been, advanced earlier through reasonable diligence.

The Court provided new direction on the third and fourth stage of the test, emphasizing that (i) the analysis turns on substance rather than the manner in which claims are framed, and that (ii) courts must focus on the underlying set of material facts giving rise to the claim and assess whether additional legal theories could have been pursued earlier with reasonable diligence.

Applying this framework, the Court held that the 2016 and 2019 proceedings involved the same cause of action and barred Patrick Street from re-litigating its entitlement to the mortgage proceeds, as each proceeding required a determination of the validity, value and priority of encumbrances arising from the sale proceeds. Patrick Street’s attempt in the later proceeding to rely on new contractual interpretations and evidentiary arguments was simply a new legal theory grounded in the same material facts.

Limited residual discretion

The Court acknowledged that courts retain a narrow residual discretion to decline to apply cause of action estoppel where doing so would result in an injustice. That discretion is exceptional and typically arises only in cases of procedural unfairness.

No such circumstances were present. The earlier proceeding had fully and fairly adjudicated the accounting, and finality weighed decisively in favour of estoppel.

A functional approach to pleading res judicata

The Court confirmed that parties seeking to rely on res judicata as a defence must plead or raise it at the earliest opportunity, emphasizing a functional approach to pleading. In particular, the Supreme Court held that:

the obligation to plead res judicata is satisfied where a party pleads the material facts giving rise to the estoppel;
it is not necessary to expressly use the term “res judicata”; and
the central inquiry is whether the opposing party had fair notice of the case it was required to meet.

On the record before it, the Supreme Court concluded that the respondent had adequately raised the doctrine of res judicata through its pleadings and submissions.

Dissenting opinions

Three justices dissented in two separate sets of reasons, each raising distinct concerns about the application of cause of action estoppel in the circumstances.

Justice Côté would have declined to use res judicata to bar Patrick Street’s claim and would have allowed the appeal. She found that res judicata must be raised in the first instance—in this case, before the application judge—and that 11368 NL Inc. had failed to do so. Further, she took a narrower view of the doctrine itself, finding that the later claim was not sufficiently identical in substance to justify foreclosing it through estoppel, as the 2016 proceeding pertained only to the determination of encumbrances of other creditors.

Justice Martin, joined by Justice Karakatsanis, similarly would have found that 11368 NL Inc. failed to raise res judicata at first instance, but did not agree that a party should be barred from raising it for the first time on appeal. In their view, the earlier accounting decision did not finally determine Patrick Street’s contractual entitlement under the $4 million collateral mortgage and they would have exercised the Court’s residual discretion to permit the claim to proceed on its merits.

Key takeaways

The decision underscores the need for parties to carefully assess, plead, and advance all reasonably available arguments at the earliest opportunity in proceedings involving overlapping factual foundations. In particular, parties should be mindful of the following considerations when structuring and litigating claims arising from the same factual matrix:

Cause of action estoppel requires parties to advance all reasonably available legal theories arising from the same material facts in the initial proceeding.
Reframing a claim or advancing a new legal argument based on the same factual foundation will not avoid estoppel.
The residual discretion to decline estoppel is narrow and exceptional and will not be exercised absent genuine procedural unfairness.
The decision reinforces finality as a central organizing principle of civil procedure – litigants are generally entitled to one opportunity to advance their case.
Pleading res judicata is assessed functionally: material facts must be pleaded to provide fair notice, but formal terminology is not required.

Loose lips sink ships: SCC upholds restrictions on Parliamentarians’ right to disclose national security information

Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

In Alford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2026 SCC 14, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutional validity of the limit on parliamentary privilege imposed by s. 12 of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, S.C. 2017, c. 15 (the NSICOP Act). Section 12 prohibits members of Parliament and the Senate who sit on the committee established by the NSICOP Act from claiming immunity based on parliamentary privilege in any proceeding against them arising from their public disclosure, in parliamentary proceedings or otherwise, of national security information that they obtained or had access to as a consequence of their committee membership.

The SCC’s decision affirms Parliament’s powers to define its own privilege and marks the end of an 8-year constitutional challenge against s. 12 of the NSICOP Act by Professor Ryan Alford of the Bora Laskin Faculty of Law, who challenged the provision due to concerns that its limit on parliamentary privilege would prevent parliamentarians from disclosing government abuses.

Background

The NSICOP Act, enacted in 2017, establishes a committee of parliamentarians, appointed by the Governor-in-Council, who are given the authority to access classified information pertaining to matters of national security and intelligence (the Committee). The Committee’s mandate is to oversee Canada’s national security and intelligence apparatus and prepare reports for the Prime Minister on the matters into which it inquires. Membership on the Committee is voluntary.

Section 11 of the NSICOP Act prohibits Committee members from disclosing information if the information meets the following two criteria: (1) it was obtained or they had access to it through participation on the Committee; and (2) if a government department is taking measures to protect the information. Ordinarily, parliamentary privilege would immunize members of the House and Senate against having statements made in Parliament used against them in court. However, s. 12 of the NSICOP Act prohibits any member or former member of the Committee from claiming immunity based on parliamentary privilege in any proceeding related to a violation of s. 11.

After initially having his application dismissed for lack of standing, in 2019 Professor Alford was granted public interest standing by the Court of Appeal for Ontario to seek a declaration that s. 12 of the NSICOP Act was ultra vires Parliament because it impermissibly infringed on parliamentarians’ freedom of speech in the course of parliamentary proceedings. At the application hearing, the application judge granted the relief sought by Professor Alford, finding that parliamentary privilege is an essential part of Canada’s constitutional democracy and that Parliament lacked the constitutional competence to restrict parliamentary privilege in the manner of s. 12 of the NSICOP Act, absent a constitutional amendment.

In 2024, a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the Attorney General of Canada’s appeal and overturned the application judge’s decision, finding that Parliament had the legislative authority to limit parliamentary privilege pursuant to s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court’s decision

The Supreme Court dismissed Professor Alford’s appeal. Writing for an 8-judge majority, Justice Rowe began by defining parliamentary privilege as “the sum of the privileges, immunities, and powers enjoyed by the Senate, the House of Commons, and provincial legislative assemblies, and by each member individually, without which they could not discharge their functions”. Justice Rowe emphasized that the purpose of parliamentary privilege is to ensure the autonomy of the legislature from undue interference from the executive branch or the judiciary. In practice, parliamentary privilege is the legislative bodies’ exclusive authority to set and enforce their own rules and conduct their proceedings without interference of the courts. In so doing, Parliament distinguishes areas of legislative body jurisdiction from judicial jurisdiction. Parliament’s authority is set out in s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which assigns Parliament the power to “define” its “privileges, immunities, and powers” by passing legislation “from time to time”. Citing Canada (Board of Internal Economy) v. Boulerice, Justice Rowe noted that Parliament’s ongoing power to define legislated parliamentary privileges is subject to the express limit that these privileges do not exceed those of the British House of Commons held at the time of passing of the Canadian legislation.¹

Justice Rowe undertook a two-step analysis to determine the constitutionality of s. 12 of the NSICOP Act. He first considered the text, context, and purpose of s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to determine the scope of the provision. Justice Rowe found that the provision grants Parliament the legislative authority to both supplement and to limit its privileges as it deems appropriate to fulfill its constitutional role. Justice Rowe went on to find that Parliament’s powers under s. 18 are broad and subject to only three constraints. First, Parliament must not grant itself privileges, immunities, or powers that exceed those of the British House of Commons at the time the legislation is passed, as stated expressly by the provision. Second, s. 18 cannot be used in a manner that would fundamentally undermine Parliament’s function as a legislature in Canada’s Westminster-styled parliamentary democracy, such as abolishing parliamentary privileges as a whole. Third, s. 18 must be used consistently with other provisions of the Constitution that expressly relate to the functioning of Parliament, such as the constitutional right to speak English or French in debates.

Justice Rowe then evaluated whether s. 12 of the NSICOP Act falls within the scope of the legislative authority conferred by s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867. He concluded that Parliament had the legislative authority to enact s. 12 and limit the privilege of freedom of speech in favour of parliamentary oversight of national security matters. By imposing this narrow limit on its own privileges, Parliament chose to enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts by permitting them to adjudicate criminal proceedings arising from disclosure of sensitive matters of national security. Justice Rowe also observed that the limit in s. 12 is narrow because it restricts the immunity only of those parliamentarians who have chosen to join the Committee and only applies to national security information meeting the two criteria under s. 11, namely that the information was obtained through membership on the Committee and that a government department is taking measures to protect the information.

In her dissenting opinion, Justice Côté agreed with the majority’s interpretive framework for s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867 but disagreed with its application to s. 12 of the NSICOP Act, holding that the provision is an unprecedented restriction on parliamentary free speech and that it is ultra vires Parliament’s authority under s. 18. Justice Côté found that the combined effects of s. 11 and s. 12 of the NSICOP Act invite the executive branch of government to define the boundaries of lawful parliamentary speech, and the courts to sanction parliamentarians for crossing those boundaries, without parliamentary oversight or involvement. Justice Côté additionally found that the limit on parliamentary free speech was broad and indeterminate, and that it lacked material safeguards, such as statutory requirements that the information protected from disclosure be of a particular kind or relate to a particular subject.

Key takeaways

The Constitution of Canada recognizes the need for parliamentary privilege in a Westminster-styled parliamentary democracy. However, it is Parliament’s role to define its own parliamentary privileges. Parliament has broad, legislative authority to do so under s. 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Courts should be cautious when reviewing exercises of legislative authority under s. 18 so as to avoid interfering with Parliament’s authority to define what it needs to carry out its own constitutional role. On review, a court’s role is limited to ensuring that the authority is exercised within the limits of the Constitution, including the constitutional function of Parliament and Canada’s constitutional architecture.
As a result of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision, Canada now differs from other Westminster-style parliamentary democracies such as the United Kingdom, which grant absolute parliamentary freedom of speech, even in relation to highly sensitive contexts such as national security.

La Cour suprême du Canada reconnaît le délit de violence entre partenaires intimes : Ahluwalia c. Ahluwalia

Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

Dans l’arrêt Ahluwalia c. Ahluwalia, 2026 CSC 16, la Cour suprême du Canada a reconnu un nouveau délit de violence entre partenaires intimes axé sur la conduite coercitive et contrôlante au sein des relations intimes.

L’affaire concerne une relation conjugale de longue date marquée par une conduite récurrente s’étendant au-delà des actes isolés de maltraitance physique. La demanderesse souhaitait obtenir des dommages-intérêts non seulement pour des incidents précis d’agression, mais pour une conduite globale soutenue de coercition, de contrôle et d’atteinte psychologique.

La juge de première instance a reconnu un nouveau délit de « violence familiale » et octroyé des dommages-intérêts en plus des réparations en droit de la famille. La Cour d’appel de l’Ontario a confirmé la responsabilité au titre des délits existants, mais rejeté la reconnaissance d’un nouveau délit. La question centrale que la Cour suprême devait trancher était celle de la nécessité du nouveau délit.

Décision de la majorité : reconnaissance d’un nouveau délit de violence entre partenaires intimes

Le juge Kasirer, s’exprimant au nom de la majorité, a accueilli le pourvoi et reconnu un nouveau délit. La portée de ce dernier est toutefois plus restreinte par rapport à celui reconnu en première instance.

La majorité est partie du principe selon lequel le droit de la responsabilité délictuelle doit s’adapter à la réalité des préjudices qu’il vise à réparer. Selon elle, le régime de la responsabilité fondée sur les incidents ne convenait pas à la violence entre partenaires intimes.

La majorité a conclu que le préjudice se distinguait par sa nature récurrente et cumulative (une conduite marquée par la coercition, le contrôle et l’érosion de l’autonomie au fil du temps). À son avis, le fait de forcer une partie demanderesse à décomposer cette réalité en délits distincts ne reflète pas la nature des torts et peut mener à une réparation inadéquate.

Pour la majorité, cette inadéquation révèle une lacune dans le droit. Elle a conclu que les délits existants peuvent toujours servir à traiter des incidents précis, mais ne conviennent pas à la dynamique relationnelle et systémique qui caractérise la violence entre partenaires intimes. Cette évolution graduelle de la common law était donc justifiée.

Les juges majoritaires ont reconnu un délit de violence entre partenaires intimes, mais ont rejeté le délit de « violence familiale » reconnu en première instance, qui était selon eux trop large et imprécis. Cette expression englobe un vaste éventail de relations familiales, sans égard aux particularités des différentes dynamiques. Or, tout développement théorique doit se rattacher au contexte relationnel en cause.

En l’espèce, les torts provenaient d’un partenariat intime, qui implique des formes particulières de vulnérabilité, de dépendance et de déséquilibre de pouvoir. Le délit de violence entre partenaires intimes est ancré dans cette dynamique unique et vise à la fois la violence physique et non physique. Il vise la coercition, le contrôle psychologique, le contrôle financier, l’isolement et l’intimidation, lorsqu’ils font partie d’une conduite récurrente prolongée. Le contrôle coercitif porte gravement atteinte aux intérêts intangibles de la victime au respect de la dignité, de l’autonomie et de l’égalité.

Démonstration du délit : les trois éléments de la violence entre partenaires intimes

La majorité a pris soin de mentionner que le nouveau délit n’écarte pas les causes d’action existantes. Pour faire la démonstration du délit, la partie demanderesse doit établir que :

la conduite de maltraitance s’est produite dans le contexte d’un partenariat intime ou à la suite de celui-ci;
le défendeur a intentionnellement adopté cette conduite;
la conduite, d’un point de vue objectif, constitue du contrôle coercitif.

La majorité a souligné que le préjudice associé à la coercition découle de la preuve de la conduite transgressive. Ainsi, la partie demanderesse n’a pas à prouver séparément une quelconque conséquence préjudiciable. Une fois que les trois éléments du délit sont établis, le préjudice est nécessairement présent et la responsabilité s’ensuit. La majorité a précisé que le quantum des dommages-intérêts doit répondre réellement à la gravité de l’atteinte.

La majorité a conclu que Mme Ahluwalia avait établi ces trois éléments, et que la conduite M. Ahluwalia constituait du contrôle et minait sa dignité, son autonomie et l’égalité dans la relation. Le préjudice subi correspondait donc au nouveau délit de violence entre partenaires intimes.

Opinions concordante et dissidente : là où les juges ne s’entendent pas

La juge Karakatsanis, dans des motifs concordants, estime quant à elle que le délit de violence entre partenaires intimes ne doit pas être limité aux cas où le « contrôle coercitif » est établi.

Dans leur dissidence, les juges Jamal, Côté et Rowe écrivent qu’ils auraient rejeté le pourvoi. Ils estiment que la création d’un nouveau délit est injustifiée, car la demanderesse peut obtenir pleine réparation au titre des délits existants. Selon eux, les délits existants offrent des recours adéquats à la fois pour les gestes isolés et pour la violence récurrente. Ils craignent que le nouveau délit crée de l’incertitude et complique l’accès à la justice.

The “deal”: U.S. “Reciprocal Trade Agreements” in Southeast Asia

Thu, 14 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

In Episode Four of the “Tariff Home Companion” – BLG’s trade and tariff podcast – we heard about business concerns over the continued lack of certainty in Canada-U.S. trade relations. These concerns are real.

As we have chronicled over the past fifteen months, that lack of certainty arose, in the first place, when the United States announced the imposition of punishing tariffs on Canadian exports, ostensibly because of lack of action on “fentanyl” and “illegal migrants”. The justification shifted considerably over the months, taking in supply management and banking, and defence spending, in due course.

So did the measures.

The “fentanyl” tariffs were moderated to exclude “CUSMA-compliant” Canadian exports, thus removing about 85 per cent of exports from tariff coverage. At the same time, the United States proceeded to impose additional measures on Canadian exports, under its “national security” framework, on imports of copper, steel, aluminum, autos and auto parts, and furniture, among others.

Along the way, the United States also imposed significant tariffs on all its global trading partners, inviting them to enter into “deals” to either reduce tariffs or prevent additional tariffs. These measures were introduced under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA).

On Feb.20, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (Learning Resources) that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. As BLG has discussed in “U.S. Supreme Court Decision on Emergency Tariffs: Legal and Commercial Implications ” and “U.S. trade developments: IEEPA tariffs end, but will new Section 301 tariffs follow? ”, the decision invalidated the IEEPA-based reciprocal tariff regime that supplied much of the leverage behind the “Agreements on Reciprocal Trade” (ARTs). The Trump Administration has since turned to the Trade Act 1974, imposing a temporary global surcharge under Section 122 and launching Section 301 investigations as a potential longer-term tariff vehicle. Meanwhile other authorities, such as Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, remain available.

This brief history – chronicled and documented meticulously by law firms, industry associations, and think tanks, not to mention in the Supreme Court decision itself – is necessary as context in any discussion of “what is to be done”, for at least three reasons:

The United States repeatedly asserts the right to impose tariffs, often in direct conflict with its obligations under multiple existing trade agreements, to address both perceived imbalance in its trade relations and unrelated policy objectives.
The “deals” offered by the United States often require pre-concessions as well as counterparty involvement in directing private sector investment and procurement decisions.¹
Even with a “deal” in place, the United States considers itself the sole arbiter of compliance, varying the deal arrived at in order to redress perceived compliance.

This does not mean that affected governments should not pursue a “deal”, or that a “deal” of some sort is not preferable to the present state of uncertainty. Rather, that any “deal” should be assessed on at least two axes:

the terms already negotiated and agreed; and
the overall uncertainty of continued unilateral action.

1. The negotiated terms: the South-East Asia template

In the span of four months, the United States signed final “reciprocal” trade agreements with Cambodia, Malaysia and Indonesia, and reached framework agreements with Vietnam and Thailand.² These instruments are the first detailed templates for the ARTs.

They are not conventional free trade agreements.

They are short, asymmetric instruments that use tariff access, and the threat of renewed tariff pressure, to secure commitments on customs enforcement, technical standards, digital trade, critical minerals, export controls, sanctions cooperation, forced labour, state-owned enterprises and “third country” trade practices.

Their legal and political significance has become more complicated since they were signed.

Learning Resources continues to cause uncertainty despite the pivot from the Trump Administration. Malaysia may, or may not, now view its ART as invalid, while Indonesia’s implementation path remains dependent on ratification amid strong domestic backlash.³

This article examines the ARTs and frameworks, both in light of recent uncertainty and as revealing precedent for the Trump Administration’s model agreement: tariff relief in exchange for one-way commitments on regulatory treatment, supply-chain policing, free digital trade, forced labour prevention, access to critical minerals and economic-security alignment with China rarely named, but plainly in view.

For Canada, the significance is direct. The Southeast Asian template previews the kinds of demands Washington may seek to normalize in other relationships, including the 2026 CUSMA review. In brief:

The ARTs are a different breed of trade instrument. The ARTs are not reciprocal liberalization agreements but short, asymmetric, U.S.-centred instruments aimed at buttressing U.S. influence in the region.
The longevity of the deals is uncertain. Learning Resources invalidated the IEEPA tariff leverage behind the ARTs, but the instruments procured through this leverage remain, albeit with some uncertainty. Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s ARTs have faced domestic challenges and the U.S. is pivoting to Section 122 and Section 301 to maintain pressure.
Kinks in the supply-chain. The key provisions are not the headline tariff rates, but the tightening of U.S. control over supply chains in the region, with imposed trading partner obligations on transshipment, forced labour, export controls, sanctions, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), critical minerals and “third country” trade practices.
China is the unnamed target. The texts rarely say so expressly, but the architecture is aimed at China-linked routing, inputs, investment, technology transfer and supply-chain dependence.
Enforcement is unilateral. The ARTs lack meaningful dispute settlement. Compliance turns on consultations “when practicable” and action under domestic law, especially U.S. tariff law.
Canada should read this as a preview. The Southeast Asian template points to the demands Washington may bring to the 2026 CUSMA review: transshipment controls, forced-labour enforcement, critical-minerals alignment, China-facing supply-chain rules, U.S. regulatory recognition, digital-trade constraints and broader economic-security coordination.

2. An ARTful structure

The ARTs are short.

And they are asymmetric.

They leave nearly all of the consequential machinery such as rules of origin, dispute settlement, regulatory cooperation, either to be filled in later or not at all.

The five agreements/frameworks share a recognizable architecture, though the legal form varies. Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia have signed full Agreements on Reciprocal Trade with operative articles, schedules, and annexes. Thailand and Vietnam have signed “Joint Statements” on “frameworks” pointing toward final agreements still under negotiation. The substance is broadly similar across all five.

a. Economic and national security alignment — the “third country” provisions

The most distinctive feature of the new instruments is their use of trade and economic-security alignment disciplines. In the Cambodia, Malaysia and Indonesia ARTs, the partner countries undertake to coordinate with the United States on measures directed at third-country goods, services or firms, including anti-circumvention measures, export-control cooperation, sanctions-list cooperation, investment-security cooperation, and disciplines on SOEs or third-country-controlled companies.⁴

Thailand and Vietnam’s frameworks point in the same direction through commitments to strengthen supply-chain resilience, address duty evasion, and cooperate on export controls and investment security.⁵

The texts do not name China, but the structure is plainly relevant to China-linked transshipment, SOEs, export controls and critical-minerals supply chains.

Cambodia and Malaysia contain the clearest tariff-alignment language. Cambodia must regulate imports through similar measures when notified of U.S. restrictions on third-country goods or services,⁶ while Malaysia must adopt measures with equivalent restrictive effect or agree to an implementation timeline.⁷ Both agreements also include export-control, sanctions, anti-duty-evasion and SOE-related commitments.

In July 2025, President Trump announced that Vietnamese goods would face a 20 per cent tariff and that goods treated as “transshipping” through Vietnam would face a 40 per cent tariff — a measure widely understood as targeting China-linked rerouting through Vietnam.⁸ But the October 2025 public framework does not set out that 40 per cent levy, define “transshipping,” or establish a Chinese-content threshold. Instead, it deals with the same policy concern only indirectly, through high-level commitments to strengthen supply-chain resilience, address duty evasion, cooperate on export controls, and engage on customs, trade facilitation and distortionary conduct by state-owned enterprises.

b. Tariff architecture and market access

The U.S. concessions to the trading partners are limited.

As drafted or announced, in conjunction with relevant executive orders domestically in the U.S., the ARTs and frameworks generally preserve or reset the applicable country-specific U.S. reciprocal tariff rates (19 per cent for Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia; 20 per cent for Vietnam). The baseline reciprocal tariff rate is subject to specified zero-rate product carve-outs for items that “cannot be grown, mined, or naturally produced” in the U.S. in sufficient quantities, such as certain agricultural products, aircraft and parts, and non-patented pharmaceutical inputs.⁹

The partners’ concessions are far more sweeping.

According to USTR “Fact Sheets” describing the deals, Cambodia eliminated tariffs on 100 per cent of U.S. goods,¹⁰ Indonesia eliminated tariffs on more than 99 per cent of U.S. exports across all sectors,¹¹ Thailand committed to eliminate tariffs on 99 per cent of U.S. goods,¹² and Malaysia and Vietnam committed to “preferential market access” with elimination on a wide range of priority sectors.¹³

The asymmetry is evident on the face of the agreements.

For instance, in the Indonesia ART, the phrase “Indonesia shall” appears more than 200 times across 45 pages while “United States shall” appears only nine times — a 22-to-1 ratio embedded into the binding text.¹⁴

c. Enforcement architecture — or lack of it

As with Sherlock’s dog that did not bark, the most striking common feature is what these instruments do not contain.

Unlike CUSMA, they do not create a binding dispute-settlement architecture comparable to Chapter 31 state-to-state panels, Chapter 10 binational trade-remedies review, the rapid response labour mechanism, or the now-narrowed Chapter 14 investor-state regime.

Malaysia Article 7.4(2) provides only that, where a party considers that the other has not complied with the agreement, it may review the terms of the agreement and take action under applicable domestic law. That is, unilateral recourse to tariff measures.

The new ART model is less the establishment of a rules-based trading system between partners than a one-way framework enforced through action under U.S. domestic law and the constant threat of additional tariffs.

d. Regulatory alignment

The ARTs are instruments of regulatory alignment with the United States.

The relevant provisions create one-way regulatory concessions by the partner countries. In priority sectors, the partner countries are required to treat U.S. regulatory systems as presumptively good enough for market access.

Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia undertake not to use import licensing, technical regulations, standards or conformity-assessment procedures in ways that restrict U.S. goods or make them less competitive.¹⁵ Where U.S. goods already comply with applicable U.S. or international standards, technical regulations or conformity-assessment procedures, the agreements push against trading partners imposing their own local approval requirements. The U.S. does not make an equivalent commitment to treat Cambodian, Malaysian or Indonesian regulatory approvals as sufficient for access to the U.S. market.

Public statements by the U.S. Government make the practical target of these provisions clear: vehicle standards, medical-device and pharmaceutical approvals, remanufactured goods, steel and steel-containing products, and customs procedures.¹⁶

Thailand and Vietnam are still at the framework stage, but their instruments point in the same direction of fewer local licensing hurdles, less duplicate testing, and more reliance on U.S. regulatory approvals for U.S. exports.

e. Digital trade

The digital-trade provisions follow the same one-way regulatory pattern.

In the final ARTs with Cambodia, Malaysia and Indonesia, the partner country undertakes not to impose discriminatory digital services taxes, to facilitate cross-border data transfers, to avoid customs duties on electronic transmissions, and to support a permanent WTO moratorium on such duties.¹⁷ The Cambodia, Malaysia, and Indonesia texts also limit market-entry conditions requiring U.S. persons to transfer technology, source code or other proprietary knowledge.¹⁸

Thailand’s framework points in the same direction: no discriminatory digital services taxes, free cross-border data transfers, support for the WTO moratorium, and removal of in-country processing requirements for domestic retail electronic payment transactions for debit cards issued in Thailand.¹⁹ Vietnam’s framework is more general, but identifies digital trade as an area to be finalized and the USTR fact sheet claims Vietnam has committed to refraining from imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions and requiring licences for cross-border data transfers out of Vietnam.²⁰

The overall effect is to move these trading partners toward a U.S.-style digital trade template:

limits on digital services taxes;
freer data flows, no customs duties on electronic transmissions; and,
fewer local regulatory conditions attached to digital market entry.

The digital architecture underlines concerns raised in the past by Canadian experts.

f. Critical minerals

At least two of the Southeast Asian trade agreements, Malaysia and Thailand, paired the trade text or framework with a separate memorandum of understanding on critical minerals supply chains²¹ designed to lock in U.S.-aligned investment in extractive sectors and constrain Chinese participation.

Indonesia’s commitments go further.

The Indonesia ART requires Indonesia to allow and facilitate U.S. investment in critical minerals, energy resources, power generation, telecommunications, transportation and infrastructure services on terms no less favourable than those accorded to Indonesian investors in like circumstances, and to regulate those investments consistently with minimum standards of international law. Indonesia also undertakes to facilitate job-creating greenfield investment in the United States and, in Article 6.2 of Annex III to the ART, endeavours to facilitate the realization of outbound direct investment to the U.S. with a minimum indicative value of US$10 billion.²²

g. Purchase commitments

The agreements are not limited to tariff concessions or conventional market-opening commitments, they also require counterparties to deliver or facilitate investment conditions, procurement outcomes and private-sector opportunities in ways that are favourable to U.S. firms.²³

Article 6.1 of the Malaysia ART requires Malaysia to “facilitate and promote” U.S. investment in sectors including critical minerals, energy resources, power generation, telecommunications, transportation and infrastructure services. The same article requires Malaysia to facilitate, “to the extent practicable,” approximately US$70 billion in job-creating investment, including greenfield investment, in the United States over the next 10 years. Article 6.3 then provides that Malaysia “intends to purchase, or to facilitate the purchase by Malaysian companies,” of U.S.-origin goods set out in Annex IV. Malaysia’s shopping list in Annex IV includes:

30 Boeing aircraft;
US$67 million of security equipment;
US$2.04 in U.S. liquified natural gas;
US$150 billion in semiconductors, aerospace components and equipment, and data centre equipment;
US$42.55 million in coal from a U.S. supplier; and
US$119 million in telecommunication products and services.

The Indonesia deal follows the same pattern.²⁴ Article 6.4 of the Indonesia ART requires Indonesia to facilitate the purchase, by Indonesian companies, certain good set out in Annex IV. In Annex IV, Indonesia commits to support and facilitate US$33 billion in commercial deals involving investment in agriculture, aerospace and energy in the United States, including US$15 billion in purchases of U.S. energy commodities, US$13.5 billion in procurement of commercial aircraft and aviation-related goods and services, and more than US$4.5 billion in purchases of U.S. agricultural products.

Cambodia’s commitment is narrower but more direct. The Cambodian ART provides that Cambodia shall purchase 10 Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft, with purchase rights for an additional 10 aircraft, no later than October 31, 2025.²⁵

h. Outlier provisions

A few outlier provisions also deserve special attention.

Malaysia’s unusual nuclear-procurement restriction. Article 5.3(4) provides that Malaysia shall not purchase nuclear reactors, fuel rods or enriched uranium from “certain countries,” except where there are no alternative suppliers on comparable terms and conditions. Oddly, the provision does not identify those “certain countries”.
“Poison Pill” clauses. The Malaysia, Indonesia and Cambodia ARTs each give the United States leverage if the partner later enters a bilateral free trade agreement or preferential economic agreement that Washington views as undermining the ART or threatening U.S. economic or national-security interests.²⁶
One-way MFN Service Commitments. Malaysia Article 2.7 incorporates, mutatis mutandis, any services commitment Malaysia has made or later makes in a trade agreement with any third country, jurisdiction or economy, subject to an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) carve-out. The Cambodian ART’s Article 2.6 is similar but narrower: Cambodia must refrain from imposing new barriers that provide less favourable treatment to U.S. services suppliers than domestic or third-country services suppliers.

Conclusion

The post-Learning Resources landscape has already complicated the legal and political status of the Southeast Asian ARTs.

The ARTs have not collapsed, but the post-Learning Resources environment is already producing divergent partner-country responses, and the legal stability of these instruments now depends on more than the text of the agreements themselves.

Malaysia is the clearest example. In March 2026, Malaysia’s Investment, Trade and Industry Minister reportedly stated that the Malaysia-U.S. ART was “not on hold” but “null and void” following the Supreme Court’s IEEPA decision.²⁷ Subsequent reporting, however, described uncertainty over whether that statement reflected settled Malaysian Government policy, including reports that the ministry had characterized the statement as a misstatement, while other reporting suggested the minister’s position “remains.”²⁸

Indonesia’s implementation path also appears less settled. The Indonesia ART still requires ratification, but reporting after Learning Resources described both implementation uncertainty and domestic pressure against ratification.²⁰

The Trump Administration has moved quickly to rebuild tariff leverage through more conventional statutory tools. On March 11, 2026, USTR launched Section 301 investigations into structural excess capacity and production in manufacturing sectors in 16 economies, including Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.³⁰ On March 12, 2026, USTR launched a second set of Section 301 investigations into alleged failures by 60 economies to impose and effectively enforce prohibitions on imports made with forced labour.³¹ Public comments for the forced-labour investigation were due April 15, 2026, with hearings beginning April 28, 2026. Hearings on the excess-capacity investigation are scheduled to begin in early May.

Section 301 offers a more familiar and potentially longer-lived enforcement pathway if USTR determines that foreign acts, policies or practices are unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce.³² The Section 301 investigations may restore the leverage the U.S. requires to enforce or renegotiate those agreements after Learning Resources.

It also means that for now, any “deal” will remain contingent on unilateral decision-making in the United States.

For ongoing coverage of the ever-changing landscape of global trade, BLG’s Tariffs and Trade Resource Centre maintains a running chronology, and the Tariff Home Companion podcast traces the policy and the personalities driving these shifts.

U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs update: Relief, more of the same or more extreme industrial policy?

Wed, 13 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

The world of tariffs used to be sedate and boring. There were times in the Times Before when glaciers appeared more agile than trade policy. Those days, of course, are gone. We can hope not for ever; we can look into the horizon and pine for a Return to the Mundane. For now, change is the order of the day. Rapid, dizzying, change – it’s difficult to keep up; even more so to inform.

And so here we are, with some delay, yet again talking steel and aluminum, yet again talking section 232; yet again talking changes in the US tariff structure.

April 23, 2026.

On that day, the United States Department of Commerce (the DOC) issued a notice setting out procedures under which certain Canadian and Mexican producers of steel and aluminum may seek partial reductions of Section 232 tariffs.

Relief from what?

From changes introduced earlier in April resulting in an expansion of the Section 232 regime earlier in the month.

The new procedures do not restore country‑wide exemptions or roll back the April 2 tariff increases. Instead, they introduce a targeted, discretionary process that links tariff relief to commitments to expand or establish production capacity in the United States. There is that.

Reminder: What was the regime after the Times Before but before the recent changes?

In the Times Before there were no “national security” tariffs on steel and aluminum. There was a global trading order with “bound tariffs”, negotiated and agreed under the umbrella of the World Trade Organization and subject to dispute settlement and multilateral monitoring. In North America, we had the North American Free Trade Agreement that actually prohibited increasing ordinary tariffs.

In 2018, the United States impose wide-ranging tariffs on steel and aluminum under the guise of “national security” interests. And then Canada, the United States, and Mexico negotiated a new free trade agreement imaginatively called the “Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement”, or “CUSMA” for short, which generally prohibited the imposition of new ordinary tariffs. CUSMA entered into force in 2020.

All good thing and all … but we’re going too fast.

When they were first introduced in 2018, the Section 232 tariffs were applied primarily to base metal products, such as steel slabs or aluminum ingots, and a limited set of downstream derivative articles.

In many cases, duties were assessed only on the value of the metal content incorporated into a finished good.

The regime was tightened in 2025. How? Well, through higher tariff rates and the elimination of many exemptions. On top of all of that, a stakeholder‑driven derivative inclusion process allowed interested parties to request that additional downstream products be brought within the scope of the Section 232 tariffs over time.

“Sometimes it snows in April”

The April 2 Proclamation introduced several structural changes.

First, Section 232 tariffs now apply to the full customs value of covered products, regardless of the proportion of steel, aluminum, or copper they contain. This change substantially increases effective tariffs on many finished and semi‑finished goods.

Second, tariff rates were recalibrated. A 50 per cent ad valorem tariff now applies to most steel and aluminum articles and certain copper products, while other specified copper articles and selected derivatives are subject to 25 per cent tariffs. Limited preferential treatment remains for articles made entirely with U.S.‑origin metals and, in narrow circumstances, UK‑origin products.

Third, the derivatives inclusion process was eliminated – but not derivative inclusion as such. Rather, authority to expand coverage is now centralized, with the DOC and the U.S. Trade Representative empowered to add products on a rolling basis without stakeholder petitions. This could well become the subject of public choice dissertations many years hence.

What now?

That brings us to April 23, 2026, and the DOC notice.

Good news! Canadian and Mexican steel and aluminum producers may apply for reductions of applicable Section 232 duties, subject to several important limitations.

Now, relief is not automatic and must be requested through a formal application process.

On the one hand, it is conditional. Applicants must commit to making investments that result in new or expanded steel or aluminum production capacity in the United States.

On the other hand, there's a catch. Even where relief is granted, tariffs may not be reduced below 25 per cent, preserving a substantial residual duty burden.

On the third hand – indulge us – the mechanism is also narrowly targeted. It is principally directed at CUSMA‑qualifying supply chains, with a particular focus on producers supplying U.S. automotive and medium‑ and heavy‑duty vehicle manufacturers (MHDVs). The process does not represent a general reduction in tariffs and is unlikely to be available for many exporters whose products fall outside these supply chains.

What does that mean, specifically?

The following features are required for steel or aluminum producers to be eligible for relief:

operate production facilities in Canada or Mexico;
supply, directly or indirectly, U.S. manufacturers of automobiles, automobile parts, medium‑ and heavy‑duty vehicles (MHDVs), or MHDV parts; and
commit to new U.S. production capacity for primary steel or primary aluminum used in key products (automobiles, automobile parts, MHDVs, and MHDV parts).

In addition, only imports that:

qualify for CUSMA preferential treatment; and
were melted and poured (for steel) or smelted and cast (for aluminum) in Canada or Mexico

are eligible for relief.

The DOC may reduce existing Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs by up to half for qualifying imports tied to new U.S. production commitments. Any adjusted tariff, however, may not fall below 25 percent and is limited to quantities corresponding to the producer’s newly committed U.S. production capacity. The relief is also granted for a fixed period of time as determined by the DOC, with its duration tied to the scope of the project, the applicant’s progress against committed milestones, and the national‑security benefits associated with the investment.

Applications may be submitted project‑by‑project, starting April 23, 2026. The Required documentation (certified by a senior officer) primarily includes:

proof of eligibility and supply relationships;
detailed project description and investment plan;
production details (NAICS, HTSUS, capacity, supported U.S. products);
project costs, suppliers, contractors, and raw materials;
mandatory milestones (land purchase, construction, equipment, first production, etc.);
a project management plan and quarterly reporting commitment; and
designation of a single importer of record.

The DOC reviews each application to make sure it is complete, credible, and consistent with the program requirements. Where an application is approved, the DOC notifies U.S. Customs and Border Protection of the company’s eligibility, the effective start date for the tariff adjustment, the applicable quarterly volume limits, and the authorized importer of record. Eligible imports may then enter the United States at a reduced tariff rate, subject to those quarterly caps.

Once approved, companies are required to submit quarterly reports to the DOC on the shipment information for any imports benefiting from the adjustment, including the required melt‑and‑pour or smelt‑and‑cast certifications.

If a company fails to substantially meet its committed project milestones, The DOC may suspend or terminate the tariff relief. In such cases, previously imported goods may be liquidated or reliquidated at the full Section 232 tariff rates. However, where a company brings its project back into compliance and resumes meeting its commitments, tariff relief may be reinstated.

What next?

For importers and exporters, the introduction of a conditional relief mechanism does little to soften the immediate impact of the revised regime. Products previously (prior to April 2, 2026) exposed to limited tariffs may now face substantial duties assessed on full product value, while relief, where available, comes with investment commitments and a high residual tariff floor.

Downstream and fabricated products, including those outside traditional metals chapters of the tariff schedule, remain at heightened risk. Supply chain strategies based on metal content thresholds are unlikely to mitigate exposure. Additionally, increased emphasis on origin tracing, smelting and casting documentation, and CUSMA qualification is expected as enforcement tightens.

The Section 232 regime remains dynamic. While the April 23 notice introduces a narrow path for tariff reduction in specific circumstances, U.S. authorities retain broad discretion to expand coverage further or recalibrate relief mechanisms. For businesses engaged in cross‑border trade involving steel, aluminum, or copper, whether directly or through finished goods, these developments underscore the importance of proactive compliance, supply chain planning, and strategic assessment of long‑term tariff risk.

BLG is there to help

L’AMF publie ses attentes sur l’utilisation de l’IA

Tue, 12 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

L’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) a récemment publié sa Ligne directrice sur l’utilisation de l’intelligence artificielle dans le secteur financier (la ligne directrice), laquelle entrera en vigueur dans environ un an, soit le 1er mai 2027.

Cette ligne directrice est la première établie par une autorité provinciale de réglementation du secteur financier en matière d’utilisation de l’intelligence artificielle. Elle s’ajoute ainsi au corpus d’attentes d’autres régulateurs du secteur financier, telles que la Ligne directrice E-23 du Bureau du surintendant des institutions financières et l’Avis 11-348 du personnel des Autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières (ACVM).

Cette ligne directrice vise principalement à s’assurer que les institutions financières établissent certains mécanismes de gouvernance et de gestion des risques à l’égard des systèmes d’intelligences artificielles (SIA), et ce, tout au long du cycle de vie des SIA.

Qui est visé par cette ligne directrice?

La ligne directrice vise l’ensemble des institutions financières qui utilisent des SIA et qui sont assujetties à la surveillance et au contrôle de l’AMF. Cela inclut les assureurs autorisés, les coopératives de services financiers, les sociétés de fiducie autorisées et les autres institutions de dépôts autorisées au Québec.

La ligne directrice définit un SIA comme étant un :

système automatisé qui, pour des objectifs explicites ou implicites, déduit, à partir d’entrées reçues, comment générer des résultats en sortie tels que des prévisions, des contenus, des recommandations ou des décisions qui peuvent influer sur des environnements physiques ou virtuels.

La ligne directrice précise que « différents systèmes d’IA présentent des degrés variables d’autonomie et d’adaptabilité après déploiement ».

La définition retenue s’appuie sur les principes internationaux reconnus en matière de gouvernance et de gestion des risques et reprend substantiellement celle développée par l’OCDE, tout comme l’Avis 11‑348 du personnel des ACVM.

Quelles sont les principales attentes de l’AMF?

Gouvernance

La ligne directrice précise que le conseil d’administration a un rôle crucial à jouer dans une saine gouvernance de l’IA. De façon proactive, le conseil doit notamment :

Veiller à ce que la haute direction promeuve une culture d’entreprise axée sur l’usage responsable des SIA.
Demeurer informé, sur une base régulière, des tendances, risques et changements liés aux SIA pouvant modifier le profil de risque de l’institution.
S’assurer que la compétence collective du conseil est suffisante pour comprendre les risques, en particulier lorsque des SIA servent à réaliser des activités critiques.

La haute direction doit, quant à elle, assurer un encadrement adéquat des SIA (gouvernance, gestion et contrôle des risques, connaissance des SIA et validation adaptée aux technologies utilisées).

L’AMF s’attend également à ce qu’un membre de la haute direction se voit attribuer l’imputabilité pour l'ensemble des SIA de l’institution. Elle précise aussi que les SIA doivent être sous la charge des responsables de modèles pour toute la durée de leur cycle de vie. Les responsables de modèles sont les personnes ou équipes chargées de choisir le modèle à utiliser, d’en coordonner l’élaboration, la mise en œuvre et le déploiement.

Gestion des risques

L’AMF s’attend à ce que les institutions financières assurent une gestion rigoureuse des risques importants reliés aux SIA à l’échelle de l’institution, afin d’en avoir une vision complète.

Soulignons que, par ailleurs, vu la Ligne directrice sur la gestion du risque de modèle, l’institution doit mettre en place et tenir à jour un répertoire centralisé des SIA . Les modèles liés aux SIA doivent également être soumis à une évaluation globale des risques, laquelle doit par la suite être communiquée sur une base périodique aux principales parties prenantes, telles que les responsables des modèles, les gestionnaires des équipes qui les utilisent ou en assurent la validation, ainsi que la haute direction.

Les risques à considérer sont variés : il peut notamment s’agir du non-respect des lois sur la protection des renseignements personnels lorsque des renseignements des clients ou d’employés sont utilisés, du risque de biais ou de discrimination dans les décisions automatisées susceptibles d’affecter les droits et les obligations des clients, ou encore du risque de décalage entre les résultats produits par les SIA et les valeurs éthiques de l’institution.

La ligne directrice insiste en outre sur la nécessité de privilégier des SIA adaptés à leurs besoins en sélectionnant les SIA avec un apport significatif aux besoins de l’institution financière et dont les résultants sont fiables et utiles pour l’usage envisagé. Cela s’applique, par exemple, aux données, aux systèmes et aux outils technologiques utilisés par les institutions pour soutenir leurs besoins opérationnels, la prise de décision ou encore l’évaluation des risques.

Évaluation des risques

La gestion des SIA au sein de l’institution financière doit s’appuyer sur une classification basée sur les risques, en attribuant à chaque SIA une cote de risque qui doit être mise à jour sur une base régulière. Le processus d’évaluation des risques décrit dans la ligne directrice s’apparente à l’exercice de matrices de risques de données que plusieurs institutions ont déjà mené ces dernières années.

La ligne directrice propose plusieurs facteurs à prendre en compte dans l’évaluation des risques, notamment l’estimation des répercussions potentielles sur le plan opérationnel, le niveau d’autonomie du SIA ou le risque de non-conformité y étant associé. Également, une évaluation initiale devrait donner lieu à une cote de risque provisoire, qui pourrait être révisée lorsque les informations sont complètes.

Cette approche basée sur les risques doit permettre de moduler, notamment, les activités de validation et de documentation, le niveau d’approbation requis, ainsi que la nature et la fréquence des activités de surveillance et le calendrier de révision de la cote de risque. En cohérence avec l’appétit pour le risque de l’institution, cette cote de risque sert également à ajuster les contraintes imposées aux SIA, le niveau de surveillance, ainsi que les contrôles et mesures d’atténuation visant les risques résiduels.

Il est important de souligner, toutefois, que les institutions disposent d’une discrétion dans la détermination de cette cote de risque, celle-ci étant conçue comme un outil interne de gestion.

Cycle de vie des SIA

Les institutions financières doivent mettre en place des mécanismes et encadrements de gouvernance, tels que des politiques, processus, procédures et contrôles, afin d’encadrer chaque étape du cycle de vie des SIA, de façon proportionnelle à la cote de risque. Elles doivent notamment :

Documenter les besoins organisationnels et la justification du recours à un SIA (y compris lors d’une nouvelle validation).
S’assurer de la qualité des données utilisées, à l’entraînement comme pendant l’utilisation (données primaires/secondaires, privées/publiques, réelles/synthétiques, structurées/non structurées).
Intégrer la cote de risque des SIA et les exigences d’explicabilité (et, au besoin, de cybersécurité) dans les critères de sélection d’une solution. Ces exigences peuvent être modulées en fonction du but recherché, du niveau d’autonomie du SIA, des exigences réglementaires applicables et des impacts potentiels.
Effectuer des évaluations adaptées aux objectifs et au risque (par exemple, explicabilité des extrants, cybersécurité, actualité des méthodes et étude des composantes fournies par des tiers).
Encadrer l’utilisation des SIA à risque élevé (ou à information incomplète) par des contraintes et des mesures d’atténuation cohérentes avec l’appétit pour le risque.
Suivre l’intégration, la performance et l’utilisation, et établir des normes de surveillance selon le niveau de risque.

Enfin, rappelons que lorsqu’un SIA implique le traitement de renseignements personnels, l’institution doit réaliser une évaluation des facteurs relatifs à la vie privée (EFVP), conformément aux exigences de la Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels dans le secteur privé (LPRPSP). Consultez notre publication récente, La LPRPSP : Guide de conformité pour les organisations, pour en savoir plus.

Traitement équitable des clients

La ligne directrice réfère par ailleurs à la ligne directrice de l’AMF relative au traitement équitable des consommateurs et ajoute des attentes supplémentaires adaptées à l’utilisation des SIA.

À cet égard, elle souligne l’importance de détecter et de traiter les risques de discrimination et de biais. L’institution devrait notamment dresser, pour chaque SIA, une liste des facteurs et variables de substitution qui ne peuvent être utilisés parce qu’ils seraient discriminatoires dans le contexte d’usage visé et la communiquer aux parties prenantes en temps utile.

Transparence

En ce qui concerne les communications aux clients, les institutions devraient notamment informer les clients lorsqu’ils communiquent avec un SIA (par écrit, audio, vidéo ou tout autre mode dynamique) et les aviser qu’ils peuvent demander l’intervention d’une personne agissant pour le compte de l’institution. À titre d’exemple, cette exigence pourrait s’appliquer à l’utilisation d’un agent conversationnel vocal dans un centre d’appels, utilisé pour interagir avec les clients, répondre à leurs questions ou traiter leurs demandes.

Tout contenu généré avec la participation d’un SIA doit être accompagné d’une note à cet effet. Enfin, lorsque les clients font l’objet d’une décision prise par un SIA (ou recommandée par un SIA), l’institution doit expliquer cette décision de manière claire et simple.

Quelles sont les premières étapes à suivre pour assurer votre conformité?

Les avocats de BLG ont préparé une liste de contrôle constituée de mesures pratiques pour vous aider à vous conformer aux attentes de l’AMF.

1) Inventaire des SIA

Dresser un inventaire centralisé de tous les SIA (en production, en essai/pilote, en développement) et le tenir à jour.
Identifier les « activités critiques » et les cas d’usage où un SIA peut affecter des décisions, des recommandations ou des contenus ayant un impact significatif.

2) Gouvernance et imputabilité

Désigner un membre de la haute direction responsable de l’ensemble des SIA.
Désigner des responsables de modèles (par SIA) couvrant tout le cycle de vie.
S’assurer que le conseil d’administration reçoit une information périodique sur les tendances, les risques et les changements liés aux SIA pouvant modifier le profil de risque de l’institution.
Identifier les besoins de formation du conseil d’administration et de la haute direction relativement aux SIA utilisés (et à leurs risques), surtout lorsque des SIA soutiennent des activités critiques.

3) Gestion des risques et classification

Identifier, répertorier et maintenir à jour les risques importants liés aux SIA à l’échelle de l’institution.
Établir une méthode uniforme d’attribution d’une cote de risque pour chaque SIA (incluant une cote provisoire lorsque l’information est incomplète).
Prévoir un calendrier de révision périodique de la cote de risque et des mesures d’atténuation.
Communiquer, sur une base périodique, les résultats d’une évaluation globale des risques aux principales parties prenantes (responsables des SIA, gestionnaires, haute direction).

4) Cycle de vie des SIA

Documenter les besoins organisationnels et la justification du recours à un SIA.
Mettre en place des exigences de qualité des données à l’entraînement et en utilisation (exactitude, biais, pertinence, etc.).
Intégrer les exigences d’explicabilité (et, au besoin, de cybersécurité) dans les critères de sélection et d’approvisionnement.
Adapter les évaluations aux objectifs et au niveau de risque de chaque SIA (explicabilité des extrants, cybersécurité, actualité des méthodes, étude des composantes fournies par des tiers).
Encadrer l’utilisation des SIA à risque élevé (ou à information incomplète) par des contraintes et des mesures d’atténuation cohérentes avec l’appétit pour le risque.

5) Renseignements personnels et vie privée

Réaliser une évaluation des facteurs relatifs à la vie privée (EFVP) lorsqu’un SIA implique le traitement de renseignements personnels, conformément aux exigences réglementaires en vigueur.
Encadrer l’accès, la conservation, la traçabilité et la suppression des données utilisées par les SIA.

Quels sont les changements apportés à la version finale de la ligne directrice de l’AMF?

Pour ceux étant familiers avec le projet de ligne directrice, l’équipe de BLG a ciblé les changements les plus importants qui ont été apportés à la version finale et vous les présente sous forme de questions-réponses.

La ligne directrice s’applique-t-elle à toute utilisation de SIA?

Oui. La nouvelle ligne directrice de l’AMF précise de façon explicite qu’elle s’applique désormais à toute utilisation des SIA, y compris les situations qui ne concernent pas le traitement de dossiers de clients.

Quelles sont les attentes qui ont été retirées par rapport au projet antérieur de ligne directrice?

Fonction de gestion des risques : L’AMF précisait souhaiter que la fonction de gestion des risques joue un rôle quant à la validation de SIA, de l’élaboration de la taxonomie des risques et de la gestion des sources des risques. Dans la version finale, l’AMF n’accorde pas de rôle précis à cette fonction.
Audit interne : L’AMF ne réfère plus à l’audit interne dans la version finale de ligne directrice.
Moissonnage du Web : L’ancienne version indiquait que les données secondaires obtenues à l’aide de moissonnage du Web devaient avoir une incidence négative sur la cote de risque d’un SIA. Or, toute référence au moissonnage du Web a été retirée de la ligne directrice.
Supervision en continu : L’AMF a retiré la liste d’éléments précis qui devraient être supervisés en continu quant aux SIA, tout en conservant l’attente générale de supervision en continu.

Quelles sont les attentes qui ont été ajoutées ?

Normes de surveillance : L’AMF précise qu’elle s’attend désormais à ce que des normes de surveillance soient établies pour chaque SIA en fonction de son niveau de risque. Ces normes de surveillance serviront de balises pour la surveillance des SIA qui présentent des défis particuliers, tels que les SIA qui sont dotés d’autonomie ou les modèles faisant l’objet d’un calibrage dynamique.

Quelles sont les attentes qui ont été modifiées ?

Processus de validation : L’AMF suggère de procéder à des évaluations différentes de celles proposées dans le projet pour le processus de validation d’un SIA, soit l’évaluation de l’explicabilité, une analyse de l’actualité des processus liés au SIA et une étude faite par un tiers des composantes du SIA. Les évaluations de l’analyse et de la correction du biais effectuées, ainsi que de l’analyse de la discrimination, ont été retirées.

Les auteurs tiennent à remercier Marianne Bellavance, étudiante en droit, pour sa contribution à cet article.

Agence contre les crimes financiers : nouvelle ère dans la lutte contre la criminalité financière au Canada

Tue, 12 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

Le 27 avril 2026, le gouvernement fédéral a déposé le projet de loi C-29, Loi constituant l’Agence contre les crimes financiers et apportant des modifications corrélatives à certaines lois et à certains règlements. S’il est adopté, il mènera à la création d’une nouvelle agence fédérale autonome chargée d’enquêter sur les crimes financiers complexes, de contribuer au recouvrement des produits de la criminalité et de participer aux efforts déployés à l’échelle internationale pour lutter contre les crimes de nature financière.

La proposition témoigne des inquiétudes grandissantes quant à l’incapacité actuelle de réagir aux inconduites financières de plus en plus sophistiquées, transnationales et portées par la technologie.

Aperçu

Le projet de loi, qui s’attaque explicitement aux « crimes financiers graves et complexes », s’inscrit parmi d’autres initiatives du gouvernement fédéral visant à démanteler les réseaux de blanchiment d’argent, à combattre le crime organisé et la fraude en ligne et à faciliter le recouvrement d’actifs illicites.

Champ d’application : Le projet de loi donne une définition large au terme « crime financier », qui englobe toute infraction relative aux actifs financiers, y compris les actifs numériques, ou aux services ou marchés financiers. Sont notamment visés le blanchiment d’argent, la fraude grave, l’inconduite sur les marchés financiers, les infractions liées à des sanctions et les infractions impliquant des produits de la criminalité, de même que toute conduite qui nuit ou qui peut nuire à la sécurité ou à l’intégrité de l’économie ou du système financier du Canada ou de tout marché financier au Canada.

Structure : L’Agence contre les crimes financiers (ACF) serait placée sous la responsabilité du ministère des Finances et dirigée par un commissaire ayant qualité d’agent de la paix dans tout le Canada. Les employés de l’ACF pourraient être désignés comme des agents d’enquête ou des policiers, selon leur rôle.

Pouvoirs d’enquête : L’ACF aurait le pouvoir d’ouvrir des enquêtes de son propre chef ou à la demande d’un organisme chargé du contrôle d’application de la loi ou de tout organisme public au Canada ou à l’étranger. Le procureur général du Canada conserverait le pouvoir d’intenter des poursuites découlant des enquêtes de l’ACF. Ainsi, on préserve la séparation des fonctions d’enquête et de poursuite qui existe traditionnellement dans le système de justice canadien.

Le projet de loi prévoit aussi que, dans certaines circonstances, particulièrement lorsque la conduite visée est de portée nationale ou transnationale, le procureur général fédéral pourra établir sa compétence au détriment de celle d’un procureur général provincial.

Collaboration : Le projet de loi C-29 propose de donner à l’ACF le pouvoir de conclure des ententes visant à faciliter l’échange de renseignements ou la coopération dans les enquêtes sur les crimes financiers. Il propose aussi de modifier plusieurs lois de façon à faciliter la transmission de renseignements à l’ACF en soutien à sa mission d’enquête et d’application de la loi.

L’ACF proposée présente des similitudes avec le Programme des enquêtes criminelles (PEC) de l’Agence du revenu du Canada, une fonction d’application de la loi spécialisée dans les enquêtes sur des cas graves d’évasion ou de fraude fiscale. Comme le PEC, l’ACF se concentrerait sur des affaires d’importance systémique et à grande valeur dissuasive, plutôt que sur les cas routiniers de non-conformité.

Incidences concrètes

Même s’il est encore au tout début du processus législatif, le projet de loi C 29 témoigne d’une volonté de passer à un régime canadien de lutte contre la criminalité financière plus centralisé, mieux équipé et plus ferme. Le paysage des enquêtes et des sanctions pour crimes financiers au Canada en sera transformé. Voici quelques-uns des effets auxquels on peut s’attendre :

multiplication des enquêtes pour fraude, blanchiment d’argent, conformité aux sanctions, corruption et inconduite sur les marchés financiers;
passage plus rapide au statut d’enquête criminelle, notamment pour des affaires qui avant auraient été traitées au moyen d’une procédure réglementaire, administrative ou civile;
meilleure coordination entre les organismes d’application de la loi et de réglementation, dont CANAFE, les autorités en valeurs mobilières, la GRC et les partenaires à l’international.

La multiplication des outils d’enquête et le renforcement de la collaboration interagences mèneront à un risque accru sur le plan de l’application de la loi pour les organisations œuvrant dans les secteurs réglementés des marchés et services financiers, de l’immobilier, de la technologie, du jeu, de la cryptomonnaie et des activités transfrontalières. De plus, comme on l’a vu avec les enquêtes criminelles de l’ARC et dans d’autres contextes, ce risque se cristallise souvent bien avant que le dépôt d’accusations soit envisagé. Les premiers contacts avec les enquêteurs, les réponses données aux demandes de renseignements et les communications internes peuvent avoir des conséquences juridiques et stratégiques à long terme.

Les organisations ont donc avantage à revoir leurs contrôles internes et mécanismes de signalement et à s’assurer que leur haute direction et leur personnel savent comment il faut réagir aux enquêtes et aux demandes de production de documents.

Can provincial courts decide tax matters? Alberta clarifies Income Tax Act jurisdiction

Mon, 11 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

The recent decision of the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta in 2585929 Alberta Ltd (Re), 2026 ABKB 75 discusses when the jurisdiction of provincial courts can extend to matters relating to the Income Tax Act.

Key takeaways

The Tax Court of Canada has the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine references and appeals to the Court on matters arising under the Income Tax Act.
Provincial courts can interpret provisions of the Income Tax Act if it is necessary to decide an issue properly before the Court but cannot directly decide tax matters.

Case overview and background facts

A group of related companies (AMI) experiencing financial difficulties filed a notice of intention to make a proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to restructure their liabilities.

The Court issued a reverse vesting order, which allows a distressed company to transfer unwanted assets and liabilities to a new corporation (ResidualCo). This allows the distressed company to be acquired and continue its business, while ResidualCo is then usually wound down or makes an assignment into bankruptcy.

AMI transferred assets and liabilities to ResidualCo in exchange for promissory notes owing from AMI to ResidualCo. Subsequently, all the shareholders of AMI exchanged their shares for shares of ResidualCo. The result is that the creditors and shareholders of AMI become the creditors and shareholders of ResidualCo.

The shares of AMI owned by ResidualCo were then cancelled in contemplation of AMI being purchased by a third party. The reverse vesting order states that these shares were cancelled for no consideration to ResidualCo.

AMI was then acquired for almost $22 million, received by ResidualCo (the distributable proceeds) and distributed to the former creditors and shareholders of AMI (now the creditors and shareholders of ResidualCo).

Issues

The fundamental issue underlying this case is that ResidualCo wanted clarification as to the tax consequences of the reverse vesting order. Specifically, ResidualCo sought a declaration for an interpretation of the reverse vesting order under which the distributable proceeds were received by ResidualCo not directly as taxable income, but rather, as proceeds of disposition of the AMI shares that were cancelled.

Such an interpretation of the reverse vesting order would create favourable tax outcomes for ResidualCo but would appear to be in conflict with the plain reading of the reverse vesting order that the shares of AMI owned by ResidualCo were cancelled for no consideration.

ResidualCo also sought declarations related to their tax analysis. Specifically, ResidualCo sought advice and direction on how to determine the appropriate holdback amounts when distributing funds to equity claimants under the bankruptcy proceeding.

The Court was concerned with the threshold question of whether the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta had the jurisdiction to decide such matters.

Decision summary

In relation to the declaratory relief sought by ResidualCo, Justice Barbara Johnston ultimately concluded that the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta:

had the jurisdiction to grant such relief regarding the interpretation of the reverse vesting order, but ultimately declined to grant it; and
did not have the jurisdiction to grant such relief regarding the direct tax questions posed by ResidualCo.

The Tax Court Act gives the Tax Court of Canada the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine references and appeals on matters arising under the Income Tax Act. However, Justice Johnston noted that there was “no extant reference or appeal” in this case. No notice of assessment had been issued, and no return had been filed for ResidualCo. On this basis, the Court distinguishes several cases in which provincial courts declined jurisdiction and refused to provide declaratory relief where tax matters were at issue.

The Court fundamentally characterized ResidualCo’s application as applying to the Court for an interpretation of the reverse vesting order, rather than for a direct determination of tax issues. On this basis, the Court found that the Tax Court did not have exclusive jurisdiction and that the Court did have the jurisdiction to grant the declaration.

However, the Court declined to grant the declaration for the following three reasons:

Evidence: There was a lack of evidence that the parties intended for the reverse vesting order to be interpreted in the manner now put forth by ResidualCo.
Public interest: The Court raised concerns that declaring an interpretation correct in advance of filing tax returns may not be in the public interest (e.g. because it may result in provincial courts doing the specialized work of the CRA and Tax Court in an unsystematic manner and lead to taxpayer confusion).
Timing: The Court raised concerns about the timing of the application. Professional advisers were engaged in the reverse vesting order structure, but this application now comes almost two years after the reverse vesting order was issued, with the applicant now seeking this declaration which essentially reads in language that was not argued when the reverse vesting order was initially granted.

The Court declined to grant the declaration related to ResidualCo’s tax analysis on the basis that it did not have the jurisdiction to do so. ResidualCo wanted the Court to confirm issues such as whether certain shares are taxable Canadian property, and what the paid-up capital of those shares would be for income tax purposes. Ultimately, these determinations are not within the jurisdiction of the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta. The Court stated that to make such determinations would be, in effect, an advance tax determination.

Provincial courts can interpret provisions of the Income Tax Act if it is necessary to decide an issue properly before the Court, but in seeking these specific declarations, ResidualCo was instead squarely asking the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta to decide a tax issue.

Implications

This decision leaves open the possibility that a taxpayer could successfully obtain declaratory relief from a provincial court regarding the tax consequences of an order issued by a Court where the facts are suitably on the taxpayer’s side (e.g. better evidence, timing, and public interest considerations). This may lead to litigants attempting to seek tax advice from provincial judges by seeking such declaratory relief and framing such attempts as a necessary corollary of an issue “properly” before the Court.

If such relief were granted in this case, it would have directly determined the figures used on ResidualCo’s tax returns. Justice Johnston agreed that ResidualCo in effect sought to “have the court declare their interpretation of the [reverse vesting order] correct in order to assert a resulting tax consequence”. In such cases, it would create jurisprudential clarity if provincial courts would simply decline jurisdiction. However, it would also restrict the flexibility for provincial court judges to deal with complex fact patterns, especially in areas which commonly interface with tax issues (such as bankruptcy proceedings).

Given the existing jurisdictional muddiness between the Tax Court and the Federal Court, a clearer and more principled doctrine may be required to avoid further confusion for both taxpayers and civil litigants in provincial court.

Pas de parrain? Pas de problème! La TSXV abolit l’obligation de parrainage pour l’inscription à la cote

Thu, 07 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

La Bourse de croissance TSX (TSXV) a supprimé, à compter du 31 mars 2026, l’obligation qui pesait depuis longtemps sur les émetteurs de faire appel à un parrain pour s’inscrire à la cote. Cette modification concerne notamment les prises de contrôle inversées, les opérations admissibles et les inscriptions directes. Auparavant, les membres offrant leur parrainage devaient effectuer un contrôle diligent et remettre un rapport dans le cadre du processus d’examen de la TSXV.

Ce que vous devez savoir

Depuis le 31 mars 2026, la TSXV n’oblige plus les émetteurs qui souhaitent s’inscrire à faire appel à un parrain.
La politique 2.2, les formulaires de parrainage et les directives connexes ont été retirés du Guide du financement des sociétés de la Bourse de croissance TSX.
Les émetteurs ne sont plus tenus de préparer ou de déposer un rapport de parrainage dans le cadre du processus d’examen de la TSXV.
Ce changement devrait permettre de réduire les coûts de transaction et de simplifier le traitement de certains types d’opérations.
La TSXV continuera d’examiner les opérations et l’information reçue, et pourra exiger des renseignements supplémentaires ou des pièces justificatives.

Contexte

Le cadre antérieur de la TSXV exigeait l’intervention d’un parrain (généralement un courtier en valeurs mobilières) pour de nombreuses demandes d’inscription à la cote, entre autres pour les prises de contrôle inversées, les opérations admissibles et les changements dans les activités. Concrètement, cette personne agissait en tant que contrôleur indépendant pour la TSXV. Elle devait notamment réaliser :

un contrôle diligent et exhaustif de l’émetteur et de ses activités, y compris une évaluation de son plan d’affaires, de son aptitude générale à l’inscription et de son respect des exigences de la TSXV;
un examen des administrateurs et des dirigeants de l’émetteur, ainsi qu’une évaluation de leur conformité aux exigences boursières et aux obligations d’information continue prévues par la législation applicable en matière de valeurs mobilières;
une analyse de l’opération envisagée, de la contrepartie proposée (paiement et/ou émission de titres) ainsi que du caractère raisonnable de ladite contrepartie et de l’organisation du capital social;
une évaluation du fonds de roulement de l’émetteur et de la capacité de celui-ci à disposer de ressources suffisantes pour financer ses activités.

Le parrain devait rédiger et déposer un rapport résumant les vérifications effectuées, identifiant les lacunes ou les préoccupations relevées et comprenant une recommandation à l’intention de la TSXV. Le processus se déroulait par étapes et donnait souvent lieu à plusieurs cycles d’échanges et de suivis entre la TSXV, l’émetteur et ses conseillers. En conséquence, le parrainage pourrait faire gonfler les coûts, allonger les délais et compliquer la coordination d’une transaction.

Bien que cette exigence soit restée en vigueur jusqu’au 31 mars 2026, la TSXV avait laissé entendre depuis un certain temps qu’elle avait l’intention de l’abolir. Dans un avis adressé aux émetteurs en 2016, la TSXV a communiqué son intention de supprimer l’obligation de parrainage et se montrait déjà disposée à examiner certaines demandes de dispense.

Comparaison avec d’autres bourses

En levant l’obligation de parrainage, la TSXV s’aligne sur la Bourse des valeurs canadiennes et sur Cboe Canada, qui disposent plutôt d’un modèle d’examen basé sur la divulgation d’information. En revanche, la Bourse de Toronto continue d’imposer le parrainage dans certaines circonstances. Le cas échéant, le parrain doit assumer des responsabilités de diligence et de déclaration semblables à celles précédemment dictées par la TSXV.

Considérations pratiques pour les émetteurs

En plus de réduire les coûts, la suppression de l’obligation de parrainage devrait permettre de simplifier la réalisation d’opérations qui y étaient auparavant assujetties. Les émetteurs n’auront plus à préparer de documentation de parrainage, ce qui devrait raccourcir les délais de transaction et réduire la coordination avec des tiers. Ils ne doivent toutefois pas s’attendre à un allègement des contrôles. La TSXV conserve un large pouvoir discrétionnaire dans son processus d’examen et peut, s’il y a lieu, demander des renseignements complémentaires ou des pièces justificatives. En l’absence d’un parrain officiel, les émetteurs et leurs conseillers juridiques peuvent également s’attendre à ce que la tâche de répondre aux commentaires de la TSXV leur incombe directement.

Regard vers l’avenir

Les participants au marché suivront de près la manière dont la TSXV mettra dorénavant en œuvre son processus d’examen pour voir, entre autres, si l’approche diffère de celle déjà adoptée dans le cadre d’opérations ayant fait l’objet d’une dispense. Cette modification s’inscrit dans les efforts généraux déployés par la TSXV pour rationaliser ses processus et moderniser son cadre réglementaire.

Overhauling EU customs system

Thu, 07 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

The European Union (EU) has agreed on the largest overhaul of its customs system since 1968 (see our Insight in July). While the reforms will be rolled out over time, the direction of travel is already clear: responsibility for customs compliance is increasingly shifting toward e-commerce platforms.

This reform will reshape how goods enter the EU market, with notable implications for international exporters – particularly Canadian businesses.

A fundamental re-think of who bears responsibility

Under the new framework, e-commerce platforms are no longer treated as neutral intermediaries sitting between sellers and consumers. Instead, they will increasingly be treated as “importers for distance sales”, with direct responsibility for customs compliance.

Platforms will be required to report sales to EU consumers through a new, centralised EU Customs Data Hub – often as soon as the transaction takes place. That real-time reporting allows customs authorities to assess risk and intervene before goods even reach the EU border.

This marks a sharp departure from the current model, where responsibility for customs duties and compliance has largely been pushed down the supply chain – to individual consumers.

That model, in the EU’s view, no longer reflects commercial reality.

Centralisation, at last

At the heart of the reform is centralisation.

The EU will establish a new EU Customs Authority (EUCA), based in Lille, France. While national customs authorities will continue to operate and conduct their own national risk analysis, the EUCA introduces EU-level coordination and oversight.

The EUCA will:

Oversee the EU Customs Data Hub;
Conduct EU-wide risk analysis; and
Promote consistent application of customs rules across Member States

In practice, this is expected to mean fewer national divergences, more coordinated enforcement, and increased scrutiny of platforms that show repeated or systematic non-compliance.

One data hub to replace many systems

The EU Customs Data Hub is the operational centrepiece of the reform.

Today’s customs processes rely on fragmented, transaction-based reporting to multiple systems at different stages of importation. That fragmentation has limited authorities’ ability to conduct meaningful, system-wide risk analysis.

The Data Hub is designed to change that. It will provide a single-entry point for customs data, regardless of where goods enter the EU.

The rollout will be phased:

2028: Data Hub operational for e-commerce imports
2031: Extended to other businesses
2034: Becomes the mandatory customs entry point across the EU

As part of a legislative proposal (which has not yet been formally adopted), Member States would also be able to develop their own digital applications to access and use Data Hub information for national customs purposes. To speed up rollout, Member States may choose to entrust the EU Customs Authority with both the finances and the mandate to build these applications. Where that occurs, the EU Customs Authority would develop shared applications for use across all Member States, including through the development of open-source code applications under the EU’s Share and Reuse Framework.

The end of de minimis

If the Data Hub changes how information is collected, the removal of the de minimis threshold changes who pays.

The long-standing exemption from customs duties for parcels valued under €150 will be eliminated. Low-value goods will no longer move through the EU customs system duty-free by default.

To bridge the gap before the Data Hub is fully operational, interim measures will apply:

From July 1, 2026: a €3 customs duty on goods under €150
By Nov. 1, 2026: an additional €2 handling fee per parcel

The intent is clear – address volume and scale, particularly in the e-commerce sector, and level the playing field between online platforms and traditional retailers.

Enforcement has teeth

The reform is not just about new obligations – it is about enforcement.

Member States will be able to impose financial penalties based on the value of goods imported in the preceding year:

1 per cent – 4 per cent for initial infringements
3 per cent – 6 per cent for repeated non-compliance

Authorities may also designate platforms as high-risk operators, withdraw access to simplified customs procedures, or – in cases of systematic non-compliance – temporarily restrict access to the EU market altogether.

Repeated issues across a platform’s seller base are likely to attract particular attention.

What this means for e-commerce operators

While full implementation will stretch well into the next decade, the direction is unmistakable. E-commerce operators importing goods into the EU will be expected to:

Pay or guarantee applicable customs duties at the point of sale;
Ensure the accuracy and completeness of customs data provided by sellers;
Maintain an EU customs presence, either by being established in the EU or by acting through an EU-based representative holding recognised customs status (such as AEO or trust-and-check trader status); and
Ensure compliance with EU product and safety legislation across their platforms

As part of the reform, e-commerce operators will increasingly be required to rely on EU-based representatives holding recognised customs status. Two such designations are central to the new framework: Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) status and trust-and-check trader status.

AEO status is an EU designation for trusted traders that signal a high level of compliance and reliability across the supply chain. Under the Union Customs Code, applications are open to economic operators established within the EU customs territory that can meet the standards set out in Article 39. In practical terms, AEO status is reserved for operators that are able to demonstrate to customs authorities that their customs-related activities are supported by robust processes and controls. Once granted by one Member State, AEO status is recognised by customs authorities across all EU countries.

The reform also introduces a new category of trust-and-check traders, reserved for the most transparent and compliant operators. Businesses in this category are expected to provide, amongst other things, comprehensive information on the movement and compliance of goods. In return, qualifying operators may benefit from simplified customs procedures, particularly in relation to temporary storage and transit.

What is next?

Early-stage obligations, including interim charges, begin in 2026. Implementation will proceed on a phased basis, with major milestones extending through 2034. The legislative text still awaits final legal review and publication, but the policy decisions have been made.

BLG’s International Trade and Investment group continues to monitor these developments closely and is available to assist clients in assessing compliance risks, navigating platform-level obligations, and preparing for the phased implementation of the EU Customs Data Hub.

For more information, please reach out to the key contacts below.

Mise à jour économique du printemps de 2026 en contexte : réinvestir dans le système sportif canadien

Fri, 01 May 2026 00:00:00 Z

Le 28 avril 2026, François-Philippe Champagne a présenté la Mise à jour économique du printemps de 2026 du Canada (la « Mise à jour économique »). Elle comprend des investissements « de portée historique » dans le sport, soit 755 M$ sur 5 ans et 118 M$ de financement récurrent.

Cette nouvelle fait suite aux déclarations de Mark Carney en mars 2026 assurant que le gouvernement fédéral allait examiner et réformer le financement des athlètes canadiens dans l’optique d’offrir un soutien accru au sport, du niveau novice jusqu’à la haute performance.

La Mise à jour économique prévoit de nouveaux investissements dans les associations sportives nationales, l’appui aux athlètes et la promotion de l’organisation d’événements sportifs.

Investir dans le sport, des terrains de jeux au podium

Annonce notable : le renouvellement du financement fédéral accordé aux associations sportives nationales, lequel n’a presque pas changé depuis 2005. Celles-ci bénéficieront d’une enveloppe de 660 M$ sur 5 ans, et de 110 M$ par année par la suite. La Mise à jour économique établit un lien entre cette augmentation des fonds et la participation croissante des enfants et des jeunes à l’échelle nationale.

De plus, 45 M$ sur 5 ans et 8 M$ par année par la suite seront alloués au soutien des athlètes dans leur entraînement et leur participation à des compétitions de haut niveau. Le financement portera notamment sur des services qui favorisent la santé mentale, et il sera lié à « des mesures et des cadres robustes de sécurité dans le sport ».

Le gouvernement fédéral a par ailleurs annoncé l’injection de 50 M$ sur 5 ans pour soutenir l’organisation d’événements sportifs au pays qui auront des retombées durables, entre autres des projets pour les générations futures dont profiteront les collectivités et le sport communautaire.

Ces investissements ont été applaudis dans l’ensemble du secteur du sport, qui les attendait depuis longtemps. On les considère comme un signe que les préoccupations de longue date des athlètes concernant l’abordabilité et le manque de ressources sont enfin entendues et prises en compte.

Le Comité olympique canadien (le « COC ») et le Comité paralympique canadien (le « CPC ») ont salué publiquement l’initiative du gouvernement, la qualifiant d’« investissement marquant dans le sport » et de « tournant important » ayant le potentiel de renforcer le système sportif canadien et d’offrir un meilleur encadrement aux novices tout comme aux athlètes.

Dans un communiqué publié conjointement, l’association des athlètes des équipes nationales canadiennes AthlètesCAN, la Commission des athlètes du COC et le Conseil des athlètes du CPC ont aussi célébré cet investissement, qu’ils considèrent comme une occasion de moderniser le système sportif et de l’adapter afin de mieux servir les Canadiens et Canadiennes.

Dans la foulée du rapport de la Commission sur l’avenir du sport au Canada

Ces annonces de financement arrivent un peu plus d’un mois après la publication du rapport final de la Commission sur l’avenir du sport au Canada en mars 2026.

La Commission a formulé 98 appels à l’action visant à améliorer la sécurité dans le sport et le système sportif au Canada, entre autres par l’augmentation urgente du financement des associations sportives nationales (appel à l’action n° 81) et par le renfort du soutien aux athlètes (appel à l’action n° 88), et à poursuivre les investissements destinés à promouvoir la pratique du sport et de l’activité physique (appel à l’action n° 84).

Bien que l’investissement du gouvernement soit considérable, certains éléments essentiels restent en suspens. On ne sait pas encore quelles modalités seront associées au financement supplémentaire accordé aux associations sportives nationales ni si le gouvernement fédéral donnera suite à la recommandation de la Commission d’imposer l’adoption et le respect du Code de gouvernance du sport canadien dont elle est l’auteure, entre autres obligations en matière de sécurité dans le sport et le système sportif.

Comme indiqué dans la Mise à jour économique, ces nouveaux investissements répondent à certaines des conclusions de la Commission, mais le gouvernement a fait savoir que des travaux étaient en cours pour examiner l’ensemble des appels à l’action.

Ce que signifie la Mise à jour économique pour le secteur sportif

Au-delà de l’aide immédiate apportée aux associations sportives nationales et aux athlètes, la Mise à jour économique met l’accent sur le renforcement du sport de haut niveau et de la participation au sport en général.

Il est par exemple attendu des associations sportives nationales qu’elles apportent des modifications à leurs programmes pour investir dans le sport à tous les niveaux, et qu’elles collaborent avec des partenaires du secteur privé pour augmenter la participation au sport. Cela pourrait améliorer l’accès au sport pour un grand nombre de Canadiens et Canadiennes.

La Mise à jour économique fait également état d’attentes accrues relativement au secteur sportif. Le financement est explicitement subordonné à la mise en place d’un « système sportif robuste et sécuritaire », ce qui renforce le message de la Commission selon lequel la sécurité et la gouvernance ne sont pas facultatives.

Regard vers l’avenir

La Mise à jour économique répond à certains des appels à l’action les plus urgents de la Commission : augmenter le financement des associations sportives nationales et améliorer le soutien direct aux athlètes. Cependant, de nombreux autres entourant la sécurité dans le sport, la réforme de la gouvernance et la transformation plus large du système restent sans suite.

Reste à savoir si les futurs budgets et décisions politiques s’appuieront ou non sur cette première réponse; ce point sera déterminant pour la transformation en profondeur du système sportif canadien envisagée par la Commission.

After Sunrise: Federal approval and CER conditions on the Westcoast Energy expansion

Thu, 30 Apr 2026 00:00:00 Z

Background

Last week, the Canadian federal government approved the Sunrise expansion project, a roughly $4 billion expansion of the Westcoast Energy natural gas pipeline system in British Columbia (Project). The Project consists primarily of new pipeline loops, compressor station upgrades, and associated electrical facilities. The aim was to increase transportation capacity on the existing system and address anticipated capacity shortfalls in southern BC and the U.S. Pacific Northwest. Sunrise, among other things, was planned to respond to liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports from the West Coast.

The Project was subject to a lengthy public hearing before the Commission of the Canada Energy Regulator (CER), which included extensive participation by Indigenous nations, landowners, governments, non-governmental organizations and industry stakeholders.

The CER decision

In January 2026, the CER issued a Commission Report recommending that a certificate be issued authorizing construction and operation of the Project under the Canadian Energy Regulator Act (CER Act). The Commission concluded that the Project is required by present and future public convenience, as well as necessity. However, approval is subject to compliance with 47 binding conditions.

Several aspects of the decision are particularly notable

The Commission found that the Crown’s duty under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 was met through the CER hearing process, supplemental Crown consultation and the conditions. The decision expressly considered the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act and recent Federal Court jurisprudence. This reflects the evolving legal framework for Indigenous consultation. Many of the conditions imposed by the Commission required Indigenous participation in construction and post-construction monitoring, as well as ongoing reporting. These conditions reinforce the CER’s role as a lifecycle regulator for projects.

While the Commission granted several exemptions sought by the proponent, it denied a requested exemption from the detailed route process for one power line component citing concerns raised by Indigenous intervenors. This demonstrated that exemptions under section 214 of the CER Act are not automatic and turn on context-specific public interest considerations.

The Commission further found there was a demonstrated need for additional natural gas transportation capacity in northeast British Columbia. This was on the basis of a forecasted supply shortfall on the existing West Coast system beginning later this decade, particularly as LNG export facilities and upstream production expand. Without the Project, the Commission concluded that the system would be unable to reliably meet expected demand. This could result in constrained production and compromised reliability of the energy system.

The Commission emphasized the Project’s substantial economic benefits, including employment and GDP contribution over both the construction and operation phases. The Project is expected to create more than 18,000 jobs, generate approximately $1.7 billion in labour income and contribute over $3.3 billion to GDP nationally. These benefits were considered significant and durable, particularly in northern British Columbia and Indigenous communities.

While acknowledging that the Project would result in adverse environmental effects, the Commission determined that these effects would not be significant after mitigation and the imposition of conditions. The decision relied on a mitigation hierarchy requiring avoidance, minimization, restoration, and offsets (where necessary). Detailed conditions addressed sensitive features such as wetlands, old-growth forests, species at risk and greenhouse gas emissions.

Balancing all factors, the Commission concluded that the Sunrise expansion project was in the Canadian public interest, subject to certain conditions. These conditions were central to the recommendation and reflected the Commission’s view that approval was only justified if accompanied by strong, ongoing oversight.

The Federal Government’s approval of the project

Following receipt of the CER’s report, the Federal Government approved the Sunrise expansion project and directed the issuance of a certificate. In doing so, the government was required to consider the CER’s recommendation, the proposed conditions, and the broader public interest.

The federal approval explicitly relied on the Commission’s conclusion that the Project satisfied the statutory public-interest test under the CER Act. The government accepted the finding that the Project addressed a real and time-sensitive capacity constraint in Canada’s natural gas transportation system. It additionally recognized that the Project would support both domestic supply reliability and access to export markets.

The government also considered the Project’s role in supporting Canada’s broader energy and economic objectives, including enabling upstream production tied to LNG exports. While recognizing that natural gas is a fossil fuel, the approval reflected the Government’s position that natural gas will continue to play a transitional role in Canada’s energy mix, including displacing higher-emission fuels. The Project was therefore seen as compatible with national economic interests.

In granting approval, the government acknowledged the Project’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions. However, the government also accepted the Commission’s finding that emissions were quantified, manageable and subject to mitigation and monitoring. The Project was approved on the basis that it did not undermine Canada’s climate objectives when assessed alongside federal emissions-reduction policies and the imposed conditions.

Rather than reopening the consultation process, the federal approval relied on the Commission’s conclusion that the duty to consult had been met. Outstanding concerns could be addressed through ongoing accommodation mechanisms that were embedded in the conditions. The government placed particular weight on requirements for Indigenous monitoring, capacity funding, socio-economic participation, and adaptive management. These features were viewed as essential to creating project oversight that is aligned with reconciliation.

Ultimately, the federal government concluded that the benefits of the Project outweighed its burdens and that any concerns were appropriately managed through conditions and ongoing regulatory supervision.

Considerations for future projects

The Sunrise CER report offers important guidance for proponents, Indigenous communities, and intervenors involved in future energy projects regulated at the federal level:

Early and sustained engagement with Indigenous nations and other stakeholders can meaningfully influence project design and regulatory outcomes.
Future projects will need to establish system-wide need using credible demand forecasts and evidence of capacity constraints. Applications are stronger where proponents can explain why existing infrastructure cannot meet anticipated demand.
Decision-makers continue to give weight to employment, GDP contribution, and regional economic impacts. This is especially true where benefits are quantifiable, realistic in scope and supported by enforceable commitments.
Adverse environmental effects, including greenhouse gas emissions and cumulative impacts, do not preclude approval. However, environmental effects must be transparently quantified, mitigated and managed through monitoring over the lifecycle of the project.
Enforceable conditions are increasingly the primary mechanism through which impacts are justified and managed. Proponents should expect detailed conditions governing environmental protection, Indigenous participation and socio-economic outcomes.

BLG lawyers Alan Ross, KC and Logan Hale were counsel for an intervening party on the CER proceeding. If you have any questions about this Insight or would like to discuss any other regulatory concerns, please do not hesitate to reach out to the key contacts below.